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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the articulation of the incentives to perform Research and 
Development of profit seeking firms. Throughout the thesis, the dynamic evolu- 
tion of the distribution of these incentives across firms is the engine of industry 
transformation and growth. Thus, in order to assess the impact of different in- 
dustry characteristics on the market structure, we need a faithful picture of the 
context where firms make their R&D choices. 
Chapter one exposes more in detail the motivation to pursue the analysis 
developed in each chapter independently, and how they combine to build up the 
search for the understanding of the interactions between R&D, appropriability 
and market structure. 
Chapter two presents a dynamic model of the firm size distribution. Empir- 
ical studies of the firm size distribution often compaxe its moments to those of 
a log-normal distribution, as implied by Gibrat's Law, and note important de- 
viations. Thus, the first and basic questions addressed in the first chapter are 
how well does the dynamic industry model reproduce Gibrat's Law and how well 
does it match the deviations uncovered in the literature. We show that the model 
reproduces these results when testing the simulated output using the techniques 
of the empirical literature. We then use the model to study how structural paxa, 
meters affect the firm size distribution. We find that, among other things, fixed 
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and sunk costs increase both the mean and variance of the firm size distribution 
while generally decreasing the skewness and kurtosis. The rate of growth in an 
industry also raises the mean and variance, but has non-monotonic effects on the 
higher moments. 
In the third chapter we explore the implications of different degrees of R&D 
appropriability on market structure and welfaxe. We propose a framework to 
pursue this analysis by extending the Markov-Perfect dynamic industry model 
proposed by Ericson and Pakes (E-P, henceforth) (1995) through the introduc- 
tion of a non-proprietaxy productivity component to R&D as part of a dynamic, 
stochastic process. We first assume that spillovers are costlessly absorbed and 
exploited by firms in the industry, and find that, in this case, a free rider problem 
arises, thereby decreasing the incentives for investment. This leads to a lower 
amount of innovations being developed in the industry, which in turn, implies 
lower consumer welfaxe while leaving the degree of concentration in the industry 
fairly unchanged. We then model a settmg where it is assumed that in order to 
build its absorptive capacity the firm has to engage in some R&D of its own. 
In this case, we find that an increase in spillovers will enhance both consumer 
and producer welfaxe substantially, and increases the likelihood of neck-and-neck 
competition, therefore reducing the level of concentration in the industry. These 
results arise from the fact that having absorptive capacity being built as a by- 
product of R&D enhances the productivity of R&D investment, compensating for 
the free rider effect associated with the lar-k of appropriability. 
The frameworks used in the two first chapters suffer from the "curse of di- 
mensionality", such that the industries under analysis axe limited in terms of the 
number of agents simultaneously active. In order to overcome this problem, in 
chapter four we move away from oligopolistic market structures and propose a 
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model of monopolistic competition, where firms are sufficiently large to generate 
a firm size distribution with a certain degree of asymmetry, although each firm 
is too small to affect the industry's outcome. Furthermore, we account for in- 
dustry growth by having the industry's output increasing over time as a result 
of knowledge externalities. The rich micro set-up of this model is analogous to 
that of FP (1995), as it is composed by heterogeneous firms making their in- 
vestment decisions in a world of uncertainty, but we abstract from entry and exit 
and instead of an oligopolistic market structure we model a monopolistic com- 
petition environment with many, heterogeneous firms. In this setting, firms are 
asymmetric in terms of the technology they use to produce a given commodity, 
and they axe able to increase the likelihood of decreasing their maxginal costs of 
production by investing in Cost Reducing R&D. In order to evaluate their future 
stream of profits and make their investment decisions firms only caxe about the 
evolution of their efficiency and the long-run efficiency index in the industry. Cut- 
ting down the oligopolistic interactions present in the E-P framework, and having 
firms looking at the long-run average industry state, allows us to overcome the 
curse of dimensionality usually associated with dynamic models with agent het- 
erogeneity. Therefore, we are able to simulate the model with a large number 
of firms competing in the industry and we show that, contrary to most existing 
endogenous growth models, this model is able to deliver a firm size distribution 
with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. 
Chapter 6 presents the final remaxks to the investigation carried out in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"In the years after the Second World Wax the economist's attitude gradually 
changed. The vast expenditures on Research and Development made it increa&- 
ingly obvious that inventive activity was - or could be made to be - responsive to 
economic needs (or even to non-economic needs if such needs received sufficient 
financial support). Clearly much of the search activity of R and D was highly 
purposive: business firms were looking for new techniques in specific categories 
of products, they spent much money upon this search, and they were sometimes 
highly successfal. " 
Nathan Rosenberg, 1974 
This thesis explores the dynamics of organic growth through technological 
process as an output of R&D effort at the corporate level and the role of the 
expansion of scientific knowledge in the dynamics of market structure. Tech- 
nological change has assumed a primordial role in the search for the engines of 
growth and development, and throughout the past decades Reseaxch and Devel- 
opment has predominantly become the province of firm; rather than the outcome 
of government efforts or stand alone inventors. Thus, the inventive activity and 
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the growth of scientific knowledge should be accounted for in the context of firms' 
investment choices, which arise as a response to the economic environment deter- 
mining the inc6ntives to perform R&D. 
We aspire at providing some insights on the nature of R&D competition, and 
on how it shapes the maxket structure of an industry. We believe that the market 
environment, captured by the demand and cost conditions, the maxket structure, 
the productivity of innovations in enhancing the attractiveness of a firm's product 
or in improving the efficiency in which it combines inputs to produce its output, 
and the extent to which a firm is able to appropriate the outcome of its own 
investment govern the allocation of the innovative effort in the industry, and thus 
the pace of technological growth. 
In our attempt at modelling firms' innovative activity, we allow for uncertainty 
in the outcome of R&D effort. By increasing the amount of resources allocated 
to the R&D activity, a firm enhances its likelihood of developing an innovation 
but it also faces the possibility of failure. The importance of accounting for 
uncertainty when modelling R&D competition was highlighted by Kamien and 
Schwartz (1971) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). In their approach to R&D 
competition, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) also highlight the other dimension 
determining the pace of R&D: the maxket structure. Given the conditions for the 
productivity and appropriability of R&D in the industry, the relative position of 
the players in the market is what determines the magnitude and distribution of 
research effort across firms. Following this path of research implies moving away 
from the traditional approach (Schumpeter, (1942)) of modelling the connection 
between the degree of concentration and R&D unilaterally, addressing not only 
the role of market structure in affecting the incentives to invest, but also the 
endogenous determination of the maxket structure itself with respect to the R&D 
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program. 
In the approach presented here, product maxket competition generates incen- 
tives for profit maximising firms to engage in R&D competition, with the aim 
of potentially reducing the unit costs of production by improving its production 
process (process innovations). The uncertain outcome of the innovative R&D ac- 
tivity will, in turn, determine the innovation path of the firm and its profitability 
in the spot maxket. The returns to R&D depend not only on the firm's success 
in innovating, but also on the outcome of the rivals' R&D effort. A firm's com- 
petitiveness at a given moment in time depends on the path of both its own and 
its rivals' past successes in the R&D activity. 
In the first chapter, we investigate the economic forces shaping the market 
structure in the industry. Given the dynamic character of R&D competition 
and the relevance of accounting for heterogeneity at the firm level and turbulence 
when modelling an industry environment, we depart from the E-P (1995) dynamic 
industry framework, which is able to replicate the variability of similar firms 
fates empirically observed. This framework also accounts for the endogeneity of 
market structure with respect to R&D competition, which is essential to the task 
of exploiting how industry conditions and R&D rivalry affect the distribution of 
the incentives to engage in R&D when its outcome is uncertain. 
The distribution of market shares across the set of firms operating in an in- 
dustry and the asymmetry in firm size have long been an issue of interest in eco- 
non-dc theory. The first approach to this issue was conducted in 1931 by a French 
economist, Robert Gibrat, who proposes a simple model to explain the statis- 
tical properties of the distributions of a number of realities such as 111'inýgalites 
des Hchesses, la concentration des entmprises, la population des tfilles", among 
others. Gibrat presents intuitively the importance of his results: "Wouldn't it 
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be astonishing the existence of a general tendency of an increase to 11 workers 
in firms with ten, and an increase to 1.100 in those with 1.000 workers? " . This 
intuitive approach was formalised as Gibrat's law of proportionate effect, accord- 
ing to which the relative effect of industrial fluctuations in the number of workers 
of a firm (Gibrat takes the number of worker as a proxy for firm size), or their 
absolute effect on the log of the size of the firm does not depend on the number 
of workers of the firm, such that the distribution of firm sizes can be well approx- 
imated by a lognormal distribution. This subject has attracted much attention 
since the late 50's, and has motivated many empiricists in testing the validity of 
Gibrat's statements. 
The first chapter of this thesis, however, is not related with the testing of 
Gibrat's law, but rather with the search of the economic forces that shape the 
distribution of firm sizes and make the law of the proportionate effect a reasonable, 
yet imperfect approximation for the firm size distribution. What axe the economic 
forces influencing the higher moments of firm size distribution? How do industry 
characteristics affect them? These research questions gain further interest given 
the results of empirical studies uncovering cross-industry variation in the higher 
moments of the firm size distribution such as Machado and Mata (2000), Lotti 
and Santerelli (2004) and Audretsch et al. (2004). 
We tadde these research questions through the attempt of unraveling how 
industry characteristics, captured by a set of parameters in our &P based model, 
affect the expected returns to R&D investment at the level of product maxket 
competition and R&D rivalry. In a first stage, we demonstrate that the model 
is able to generate a set of simulated data for firm sizes with similar statistical 
properties to those of the real data. We then vary the values of the paxameters 
capturing the industry characteristics whose impact on the distribution of firm 
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sizes we want to analyse. We find that the firm size distribution in industries 
with higher fixed or sunk costs are flatter and have larger mean size of firms. 
Fixed costs make it more difficult for firms to survive in the industry and act as 
a requirement of a minimum scale of operations to produce non-negative profits 
and survive, implying that the less efficient firms will be better off by exiting the 
industry and receiving the scrap value, while sunk costs act as entry barriers and 
discouraging potential players to enter the industry. As one would expect, both 
a higher technological progress and a higher productivity of R&D in the industry 
will lead to higher mean size and variance, but we found the impact of these 
industry characteristics on the higher moments of the firm size distribution to be 
non monotonic. Finally, we should expect that the higher the appropriability of 
R&D in the industry, the higher the mean and variance in the size of firms, but 
the effects on skewness and kurtosis are highly non-monotonic. These theory- 
driven results are in line with many of the findings of the empirical literature on 
cross industry variation in the firm size distribution, and yield a series of testable 
hypothesis on the nature and direction of the effects of key industry characteristics 
on the properties of the distribution of firm sizes. 
In the third chapter of this thesis, we address the impact of cost-reducing 
R&D spillovers on the evolution of the ergodic distribution of market structures. 
Our aim is to unravel the dynamic forces driving the market structure changes 
brought about by the presence of externalities, and understand the relationship 
between the market structure and the trade off between the damage to the incen- 
tives for R&D effort and the reduction in wasteful duplication. The contribution 
of this piece of research lies on the analysis of the impact of externalities on 
market structure and welfare in a dynamic, -stochastic context, given that the 
investigations carried out in the literature rest on static, symmetric models, or 
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models that fall to account for the uncertainty in firms' R&D decisions. 
In the existing literature concerning the effects of R&D externalities, it is 
usually assumed that the external effect of each firm's R&D is to lower the rival 
firms' unit cost of production (when modelling process innovations) or increase 
the quality of the competitors' product ( product innovations). In chapter three, 
we propose a specification which incorporates uncertainty in the outcome of R&D 
such that the external effect of a firm's R&D is to enhance the likelihood of a rival 
firm experiencing a reduction in its maxginal cost of production. Therefore, we 
eliminate the determinism in the relationship between R&D effort and maxginal 
costs. 11igher R&D does not ensure successful innovation, it rather delivers a 
more favourable innovation path over time. 
We first introduce the conventional form of spillovers modelled in the literature- 
Costless R&D Spillovers. Under this setting, there are benefits of the R&D un- 
dertaken to firms other than the one who has bore its cost. A portion of the R&D 
effort by each firm flows to the public pool of knowledge, becoming readily avail- 
able to the other firms. The proportion of the R&D effort leaking to the public 
pool of R&D is determined by the appropriability conditions in the industry such 
as patent policies, secrecy (particulaxly relevant for process innovations), lead- 
time, the extent of knowledge embodied in the output of the innovation process, 
the ease of imitation, worker mobility, etc. Under this scenario, firms substitute 
costly R&D effort by a free external source of R&D and cost optimization allows 
them to achieve higher values. However, the classical effect of R&D externali- 
ties of potentially improving the rival's state decreases the incentives to invest 
in R&D. Fewer innovations axe developed in the industry and consumers will 
experience a welfare loss from reduced appropriability. 
These implications of spillovers, however, axe sensible to the assumption of 
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R&D spillovers being a pure public good. If one assumes, such as in Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989), that the absorption and exploitation of rivals' R&D spillovers is 
not a costless, process, but that it rather depends on a crucial element, this being 
the firms' absorption capacity, built as a by product of R&D, the implications 
of R&D spillovers for market structure and welfare change dramatically. In this 
scenario, the productivity of R&D increases with an offsetting effect on the re- 
duction of the incentives to perform R&D that arise from the free rider problem. 
Even with a reduction in the R&D investment undertaken in the industry, spe- 
cially in the case of the leader firm (the firm with an advantage in the efficiency 
level), the presence of externalities improves the total amount of R&D devoted 
to the innovative process, delivering a more favourable innovation path which 
implies lower marginal costs in the industry. Consequently, consumer welfare will 
increase, but at the producer level, only the follower firm win experience a welfaxe 
gain. The improvement in the follower position relative to the leader reduces the 
asymmetry in the market structure. 
Thus, we show that spillovers do not necessarily have a detrimental effect 
on R&D investment incentives and that the Schumpeterian results axe weakened 
when imposing the need of an absorption capacity, built as a by product of R&D 
investment, in order for firms to absorb and exploit the spillovers. In fact, the 
literature on this subject has recurrently treated external information as costlessly 
absorbed, and with no other countervaling effects, the free riding problem dooms 
the lack of appropriability to be welfare reducing. 
Dynamic industry models with agent heterogeneity can be very enlightening 
for the understanding of a number of important dh-nensions related to firm be- 
haviour and market evolution, such as the ones addressed in chapters two'and 
three. However, their usage is limited by the computational burden involved in 
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I computing rational expectations concerning the expected future states of the set 
of players in the industry. This "curse of dimensionality" associated with the 
dynamic framework used throughout the thesis prevents its use to study indus- 
tries with more than a handful of firms. The dimensions of agent heterogeneity 
axe also restricted by the computational burden. 
There have been a series of attempts do overcome this limitation of the mod- 
elling of dynamic strategic interaction, namely a version of the Palxs and McGuire 
(2001) algorithm that computes expectations over the states of the ergodic set 
and ignoring the rest of all possible states and improves the computational effi- 
ciency. Dorazelski and Judd (2005) also propose a continuous time alternative 
which reduces to zero the probability that the state of two firms change simulta, 
neously, improving the computational speed. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, 
we propose an alternative dynamic industry model where each firm is assumed 
too small to affect the industry outcome, but large enough so that its size is sig- 
nificant. As a result, each firm, individually, is too small to have a strategic effect 
on its rivals' decisions, and only the average industry state affects firms' decision. 
Dirthermore, we simplify firms' decision process by having them treating the long 
run average of the industry as constant. Thus, in computing their perceptions of 
the evolution of the future payoffs, firms only care about the expected long-run 
average state of the industry and the dynamics of their own state, whose motion 
is given by the firm's own transition function. 
Cutting down the oligopolistic interactions present in the original FP (1995) 
framework allows to model industries with many heterogeneous agents. Firms 
will invest in R&D in order to improve their efficiency, and their decisions axe a 
function of the long run average industry state and the probability dynamics of 
their own state. We propose an algorithm and the corresponding code to find the 
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optimal R&D investment decisions. For doing this we have the* firms forecasting 
the long run average industry state, which ultimately affects its profits. Given 
that expectation, we find the optimal R&D decision for each of the possible 
states each firm can find itself in and, using those, we simulate the industry 
maxket structure to obtain actual series of states for the firms in the industry. 
We perform this process until th6 expected long run industry average that firms 
assume as given for their optimization process is the actual long run average 
industry state that arises when simulating the industry's market structure using 
the optimal policy functions. We show that the equilibrium long run distribution 
of firm sizes entails a substantial degree of heterogeneity. 
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Chapter 2 
Understanding Gibrat's Law with 
a Markov-Perfect Dynamic 
Industry Model 
2.1 Introduction 
Studies on the firm size distribution and Gibrat's Law to date have been the 
province of empiricists. We can, write down various reduced form models, as in 
McCloughan (1995), to reproduce many of the statistical facts surrounding the 
firm size distribution and Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, which states that 
the growth rate of a firm is independent of its size, and the well know deviations 
from this law found in the empirical literature. However, little of the empirical 
work has been guided by a formal structural model. In Caves' (1998) survey on 
the recent empirical findings in industrial organization, he states, "Although the 
importance of these facts for economic behaviour and performance is manifest, 
their development has not been theory-driven. " This paper seeks to take a step 
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towaxds filling this gap. 
We employ an extension of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model of a dynamic 
industry that allows for firm growth developed by LaIncz (2004a). By varying 
key priors, the simulations demonstrate potential sources for the vaxious, and 
sometimes conflicting, results on Gibrat's Law uncovered in the empirical liter- 
ature. We demonstrate that the model matches empirical findings on Gibrat's 
Law. 
A more recent literature uncovers significant cross-industry variation in the 
higher moments of the firm size distribution. Machado and Mata (2000) find that 
industry chaxacteristics such as technological orientation and capital-intensity are 
significantly related to the skewness. Lotti and Santerelli (2004) show how the 
distribution of a new cohorts differs across different industries and over time. Au- 
dretsch et al. (2004) present evidence suggesting that the firm size distribution 
of the service industry differs from manufacturing. We use the model to develop 
theoretical reasoning for many of these findings, however, our analysis also em- 
phasizes that some vaxiables have strong non-monotonic effects on the moments 
of the firm size distribution suggesting caution in generalizing empirical results 
based on hneax specifications. 
After briefly reviewing the lengthy empirical literature on Gibrat's Law and its 
relationship to the firm size distribution in the next section, section 2.3 presents 
the basic model. In section 2.4 we compare the results of a baseline simulation to 
the empirical literature on the firm size distribution and Gibrat's Law. Section 
2.5 then documents how varying key structural parameters alters the firm size 
distribution. Section 2.6 summarizes the results. 
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2.2 Gibrat's Law and Empirical Findings 
Following the seminal works of Hart and Prais (1956) and Ijiri and Simon (1964), 
the industrial organization literature devoted much energy into exploring the sta, 
tistical regulaxity known as Gibrat's Law as it applies to the firm size distribution. 
Figure 2.1 shows the size distribution of enterprises for the U. S. in 2001. Notably, 
the distribution is significantly skewed to the right with the laxge peak for the 
smallest size class with non-zero employment. The following simple statistical 
process generates almost the same distribution. Let xi be the size of firm i, then 
growth from one period to the next is represented as: 
xi (t) = xf (t - 1) exp [ui (t)] ,0>0 
where ui(t) , iid N(p, a2). Defining yi(t) = Inxi(t), then: 
yi(t) = pyi(t - 1) + Ui(t). (2.2) 
When 8=1 we have Gibrat's Law wherein the growth rate of a firm is inde- 
pendent of its size and the process yields a log-normal distribution of firm sizes. 
Empirical work on the firm size distribution finds that this characterization is 
a close, but imperfect proxy for the data. The earliest work on Gibrat's Law 
only had data available for laxge firms. Hart and Prais (1956), for example, 
included only firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1885 and 1950. 
They found that Gibrat's Law provided a good statistical approximation for the 
distribution. Simon and Bonini (1958) found similax results for laxge US firms. 
More recently, Hart and Oulton (1996) compare the implications'of (2.1) to 
a large sample of firms measured by employees, net sales, and net assets. They 
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find that the distribution has a long right tail, with skewness coefficient estimates 
ranging from 0.19 to 0.75, and leptokurtic with values from 4.58 to 6.20. However, 
they argue the deviations should not be compaxed with the extreme of matching 
the log-normal distribution exactly and that the close approximation justifies the 
use of Gibrat's Law in empirical work. 
Our task is rather different. We axe specifically interested in the deviations 
themselves. We want to construct a sensible model of optimizing firm behaviour 
that can both approximate the distribution and provide us with a tool to under- 
stand the deviations and, moreover, cross-industry differences. Before turning 
to the model, we look at the literature that explicitly rejects the strong form of 
Gibrat's Law where 8 is exactly one. 
Mansfield (1962) was perhaps the first to explicitly deal with the problems 
that entry and exit present for the interpretation of Gibrat's Law. Specifically, 
since eadting firms effectively have a growth rate of -100%, does Gibrat's Law 
hold for all firms, only the survivors, or for firms exceeding a size threshold such 
as minimum efficient scale? Of the three, he found that the latter interpretation 
fit his data the best using a ; ý' test on the lognormality of the distributions for 
ea, ch of his industries in each time period. In growth size regressions, Mansfield 
found that in the entire sample of survivors, firms grow less than proportionally, 
i. e. < 1. However, analyzing large firms only, he found that the mean growth 
rate is independent of size, i. e. 0=1. He still concluded that Gibrat's law does 
not hold for any of the versions considered due to the fact that, even for the case 
of larger firms only, the vaxiance of growth rates decreases with size. 
Subsequent empirical analysis largely confirmed Mansfield's initial foray into 
the subject. Using more advanced econometric techniques to deal with het- 
eroscedasticity and sample selection bias, Hall (1987) and Evans (1987) found 
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that Gibrat's Law generally holds for large firms, but not for the entire popula, 
tion. They uncover a negative relationship between size and growth. Dunne and 
Hughes (1994) also find that while size evolves proportionally for medium and 
large firms, small firms' growth rates have higher vaxiance and tend to decrease 
with size. 
Another set of growth regression studies focused on the persistence of devia, 
tions of firm size from the mean, which would imply biased estimates for, 6. Singh 
and Whittington (1975) and Kumar (1985) found evidence for serial correlation 
in the growth rates of firms supporting the variant of Gibrat's Law proposed in 
Iiiri and Simon (1964). Kumar (1985) confirms the previous findings rejecting 
the strong form of Gibrat's Law, by showing that the earlier conclusions were 
robust to correcting for autocorrelation in the growth rates. 
One of the problems that has plagued this literature, particularly the early 
work by Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini (1958), has been data 
without a balanced representation of small firms. Dunne and Hughes (1994) 
and Hart and Oulton's (1996) work tries to address the problem by using a 
database with broad representation of small firms. They use this database to 
test for differences in growth rates among firms of different size classes and find 
the differences to be significant in contrast to Gibrat's Law. In the analysis of 
our model, we find the same differences and we also note that how small firms 
are counted matters when analyzing the firm size distribution itself. 
A newer literature focuses on cross-industry variation. Santarelli and Lotti 
(2004) look at the evolution of the size distribution of new firms in four indus- 
tries. Over a period of five yeaxs most of the distributions approach the log 
normal distribution, however, they find that the more technologically oriented 
industries achieved the lognormal faster. Audretsch et al. (2004) find evidence 
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that services may exhibit different distributional properties than manufacturing, 
the main focus of the empirical literature to date. Looking at the Dutch hospi- 
tality sector they find that growth is independent of size, whereas the majority of 
studies focusing on manufacturing find the negative growth-size relation discussed 
above. Machado and Mata (2000) use quantile regressions to examine the effect 
of industry chaxacteristics on different portions of the distribution for Portuguese 
data. While their results axe mixed for some characteristics and distribution 
measures, they find that the impact of industry characteristics on skewness is the 
most stable over time. Both technology measures and the rate of growth in an 
industry reduce the skewness of the distribution, while turbulence increases it. . 
However, all of the results of the previous paragraph lack a solid theoretical 
base for their findings. It is this gap in the literature we seek to fill by propos- 
ing a fully dynamic model of optimizing firms that generates the distributional 
chaxacteristics found in the empirical literature. 
2.3 The Model 
To capture the forces that affect firm size distribution in a structural model, 
we apply a variant of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model described in Laincz 
(2004a). The modification allows for continually falling maxginal costs through 
process R&D such that we can discuss both firm and industry growth rates. That 
enables us to perform analogous growth-size tests on the resulting simulated data. 
We specify an industry with a finite set of imperfect substitutes such that 
one of the common drawbacks of the Ericson-Pakes framework does not apply. 
Because the state space for a single industry can be very large, it limits the total 
number of firms that the computational algorithm can handle, often to no more 
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than about 10 firms. In order to generate a cross-sectional distribution with a 
reasonable number of observations, our industry is characterized by a finite set 
of imperfect substitutes, but each good is produced by a Cournot oligopoly. We 
solve for the dynamics associated with each substitute separately treating them 
as highly disaggregated. goods and then aggregate across the varieties. We think 
of each good as being defined at a 7-digit level in the SIC or NAIC codes, for 
example, and the aggregation taking place at a less detailed industry level such 
as 4 or 5 digits. ' 
The older literature presumed that a market contained a series of isolated op- 
portunities and assigned exogenous probabilities that these opportunities would 
be undertaken by either incumbents or new entrants. By specifying independent 
products within the same broader maxket, we follow Sutton (1998) in bridging 
the literature between the earlier stochastic models and the more recent literature 
devoted to strategic interaction, by using a distinction between the market as a 
whole, and a number of more or less independent submarkets within it. As Sutton 
(1997) states, the assumption is "crude, " however, ". .. most conventionally de- 
fined industries exhibit both some strategic interdependence within submaxkets, 
and some degree of independence across submaxkets. "2. Our characterization al- 
lows for strategic interdependence within each product maxket, but independence 
across products within the industry. 
'The approach is similar to Sutton (1998), pgs. 19-20. However, our use of the term 
"submarketsr differs from his and accords more with his notion of "subindustry" (see pages 
297-298). 
2Sutton (1997), p. 49. 
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2.3.1 The Industry 
We characterize the industry as producing intermediate goods sold into a perfectly 
competitive final goods sector. Firms producing the intermediate goods choose 
quantity produced, investment in R&D, and whether to exit or not, if they axe 
currently active in the product market, or enter if they axe not currently active. 
The dynamic equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium which imposes 
that decisions axe functions only of the current state which is the current market 
structure. The basic timing of the model begins with incumbent firms first 
choosing whether to exit or not. The remaining incumbent firms then compete 
in a Cournot fashion in the product market and determine their optimal levels 
of investment in R&D to lower future costs which follow a stochastic ýrocess. 
Potential entrants then compare their opportunity cost of remaining outside the 
industry to the expected value of entering in the next period. These potential 
entrants draw on a public stock of knowledge which increases overtime through 
spillovers according to another stochastic process. At the end of the period, R&D 
outcomes and the public stock of knowledge for the next period are determined 
by the results of the stochastic processes. 
The Product Markets 
Demand for intermediate goods comes from a perfectly competitive final goods 
sector with a CRS production fanction. 3 Output in period t, Yt, of the final 
goods sector is given by the production ftmction: 
m 
Yt = ko' -k 
02 
... kom where E 0,, n =1 (2.3) It 2t Mt I 
M=l 
3We could analagously think of (2-3) as the utility function for a consumer and apply the 
framework to imperfectly competitive final g(mds producers. 
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Each k,,, t is the input from subsector m, where m denotes the products within 
the industry. Within each subsector, multiple firms engage in Cournot competi- 
tion providing a homogenous good to gain market shaxe. The demand for each 
intermediate good k,,, t is given by: 
k,,, t = 
O. Pvyt 
P. t 
(2.4) 
Firms producing intermediate goods at any given time have a technology for 
production of intermediate goods where the maxginal costs axe constant although 
they vaxy across firms. All firms are assumed to face constant fixed costs which 
do not vaxy either with time or across firms. Each intermediate goods firm, 
nE [1, Nn], in industry m faces the following optimization problem for choosing 
quantity: 
N. ý 
MaX7rj. =P. OmPyyiEqnm qj7n - 
MCjnqj7n -f (2.5) 
qjm 
n=l 
where maxket size, 0,,, Y, and total quantity, EN- q,,,,,, determine the price of the n=1 
intermediate good, P,,,. qj,,, is the quantity output of firm j producing product 
m, MCj,,, axe the marginal costs for firm j, and f is fixed costs. The implicit 
production function is lineax in the input good with a coefficient equal to the 
inverse of the marginal cost. 
We focus on one submarket to illustrate the model in the discussion that 
foHows. Let N, *,, be the number of firms producing q,,,,, > 0. The Cournot-Nash 
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y 
equilibrium outcomes yield the profits for firm j as 
max 
O. Pyl 
MC,,,,, -(N; ý-1)MCj. 
) 2-f (2.6) 
(EN; % MC 
n=l M 
Firms choose to produce if- 
Ný* 
(2.7) 
Equation (2.7) simply states that a firm will choose not to produce if its marginal 
costs are too high relative to its competitors. 
The Cobb-Douglas specification generates a Cournot solution for the interme- 
diate goods firms in which profits axe homogenous of degree zero in the vector 
of marginal costs across firms once we normalize expenditures on the final good, 
PyY, to unity. Thus, a proportional change in the vector of marginal costs leaves 
profits the same despite falling marginal costs through process innovation (de- 
scribed below). Moreover, it allows for continuowly declining marginal costs as 
opposed to the Ericson-Pakes framework where marginal costs are restricted to 
take on values in a finite set. The reason is that for any given vector of marginal 
costs, once the policy functions specifying R&D expenditures, entry, and exit are 
determined, these decisions will not vary provided the vector of marginal costs 
changes proportionally. Hence, policy functions for a finite subset of possible 
vectors of marginal costs axe sufficient to characterize the long-run equilibrium 
as marginal costs continuously decline with process innovation. 
However, the fimctional form of the demand system does create a problem in 
the case of an intermediate goods industry containing a monopolist. Because 
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the price elasticity of maxket demand is unity, the monopolist's solution is not 
well defined. We assume that there is a minimum scale level of operations for 
a monopoly. ' Let q be the minimum amount that a monopoly must produce 
in order to engage in the maxket. The assumption has two effects. First, it 
immediately defines a solution for the monopoly problem with a positive level 
of output while still. providing the monopoly with incentives to invest in order 
to lower its costs. Furthermore, provided q is sufficiently small, there re i 
strong incentives for firms to strive to become monopolists. The minimum scale 
chosen for the simulations of the next section, while small enough to generate 
laxge monopoly profits, is such that in equilibrium firms always have sufficiently 
strong incentives to remain in the maxket or enter the market when the number 
of firms is small. Those incentives are discussed in the next subsection. Given 
that true monopolies without regulatory protection are exceedingly rare, the focus 
on maxkets where the probability of a monopoly emerging is quite small seems 
realistic and appropriate for the questions at hand regarding the distribution of 
firms. 
2.3.2 Evolution of Market Structure 
The number of firms operating in each product market and their relative levels of 
marginal cost determine the market structure at any point in time. The market 
structure evolves through process R&D which lowers a firm's maxginal cost when 
4 There axe other assumptions that could be made here instead, but do not significantly affect 
the results. For example, it would be more natural to think of the minimum scale assumption 
applying to all firms whether or not there is a monopoly. This assumption, while more plausible, 
only complicates the Cournot-Nash solution by changing the corner solution for output from 0 
to q for affected firms. Moreover, Dixit-Stiglitz technology is a viable alternative that yields 
the same homogeneity of degree zero property, but it does not create a poorly defined monopoly 
problem as in Laincz (2004b). That extension introduces a more complicated problem to solve 
without adding much in the way of additional insights for the present inquiry. 
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R&D is successful. We track the level of marginal costs by accounting for the 
number of innovations that each firm j in market m has available at time t and 
denote it as ij .. t. The mapping from innovations to marginal costs is: 
1 
mcj", t = -ýý exp(-qij,, t). (2.8) 
Marginal costs fall at the rate 77 with each additional innovation. Z is a scale 
parameter on costs which we use below to calibrate the model to match the mean 
employment level of firms observed in the data. Z captures the unit labour costs 
of firms relative to the price of the final output good. Firms with a greater 
number of innovations enjoy a cost advantage over rivals. The cost advantage 
generates higher profits and the motive for engaging in process R&D. 
The total number of innovations accessible by firm j is the sum of publicly 
available innovations for product m, labelled I,, t, and each firm's private innova, 
tions, ipjt, 
ijmt It + ipjmt. (2.9) 
Private innovations of incumbents diffuse to the public stock at a constant rate, 
S. Thus, I,,, t increments by one with probability S in every period. We interpret 
J as the strength of lead-time, secrecy, and patent protection within the industry. 
However, for incumbent firms an increment in the stock of public innovations also 
means a reduction in the stock of private innovations. Thus, in the absence of 
successful R&D in any period (discussed below), diffusion of an innovation to the 
public stock leaves the total stock of innovations for an incumbent unchanged. 
Consider an industry with, e. g., three firms simultaneously active. If, at a given 
moment in time, there is a diffusion process, although all firms loose a private 
innovation, the public stock of innovations available increases by one such that 
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the incumbents' total innovation stock is unaltered. However, contraxy to the 
private stock of innovations, the public stock is not private information and it is 
also available to the entrants, such that with the diffusion process the gap between 
the total innovation stock of the incumbents and the entrants is reduced. Thus, 
the effort that potential entrants need to pursue in order to catch up with the 
incumbents is lower than before the diffusion process. In section 2.5, we explore 
how the diffusion rate, J, alters the observed firm size distribution. 
The constantly growing public stock of innovations allows potential entrants 
5 to remain viable. Completely new firms in a particulax market do not have 
to invest to leaxn all of the innovations that have taken place in an industry 
since the beginning of th-ne. Rather, we assume that most innovations are in the 
form of readily available public knowledge, while more recent innovations axe held 
privately by incumbent firms. Existing firms have access to all of the publicly 
available technological innovations and have discovered some new ones through 
process R&D which is temporaxily private information. It is through this process 
of knowledge diffusion that industries are prevented from becoming permanently 
monopolized. ' 
We assume that new firms generally enter at relatively lower efficiency levels 
than incumbents to capture the fact that hazard rates of exit decline with the 
age of the firm (See Diinne, Robertson, and Samuelson, 1988). Specifically, new 
5 If all information was permanently private, a leading firm could innovate a sufficient number 
of times such that the cost to a new firm of acquiring enough innovations to generate positive 
profits would make entry costs prohibitively high. 
"In the specification presented here, there are no spillovers between active firms which con- 
trasts with the empirical evidence (e. g. Griliches, 1992). The spillover from private to the 
public stock of knowledge is necessary for continual growth because it enables new firms to 
enter at levels competitive with incumbents. The model can be adjusted to account for diffu- 
sion between incumbent firms. Doing so would enable analysis of the role of secrecy and lead 
time and how they interact with market structure. Overall, we do not believe it would change 
the main results presented in the next section, but we do believe it is worthy of exploration in 
future work. 
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firms wiH enter, on average, with fewer private innovations than incumbents: 
M N,,, 1 
0< ip" < ip- =I 
(E 1: W; ýip., nt dt, (2.10) 
m=l n=l 
where ipE' represents the number of private innovations of a new entrant. If new 
firms entered at higher levels than incumbents, then incumbents would be more 
likely to die than entrants producing the counterfactual result that incumbents 
have a higher hazard rate of e3dt than new firms. The left side of the inequality 
implies that new firms axe bringing some new ideas while the right-side, ip, is 
the equilibrium average (over the long-run) number of private innovations held 
by incumbent firms. This assumption then creates the possibility that new firms 
can immediately establish themselves as the new leader if incumbents repeatedly 
7 fail to innovate. 
The stock of private innovations held by incumbent firm j increases through 
successful R&D. The role of R&D is given by: 
ipjm, t+i ipj. "t + vj. t 
where: 
axj, t 
Pr(vj,,, t) - 
I+axj ..;, 
for vj,,, t 1 (2.12) 
1 
1+ 
1 
int 
for vj,,, t 
01 
xj,,, t is the level of R&D undertaken by a firm at time t. Note that the fLmction 
does not vary with firm size, i. e. large firms do not possess an inherent advantage 
in successftffly conducting R&D. We do not. need to assume advantages owing 
to size to generate R&D spending distributions that match the highly skewed 
'This outcome occurs only rarely. Most of the time new firms will enter with a small market 
share relative to axisting incumbents. 
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distributions in the data (see Laincz 2004a). This assumption is consistent with 
the arguments of Cohen and Klepper (1992) among others that there are no 
differences in the productivity of research investment owing to firm size. 
The parameter a governs the productivity of R&D and is interpreted as mea, 
suring the technological opportunity and basic state of science. We assume this 
to be constant across firms and product maxkets. Cleaxly, the level of R&D 
productivity will be an important paxameter for vaxiation in the firm size distrib- 
ution. Ifigher levels of a generate greater potential for any one firm to extend its 
technological advantage and generate greater vaxiance in firm sizes. We explore 
the relationship between technological opportunity and the firm size distribution 
in section 5. 
The combination of the two stochastic vaxiables, R&D and diffusion, in con- 
junction with the solution to the dynamic equilibrium results in an upper bound 
on how much of a lead firm will actually gain over potentially new fimis in equi- 
librium. Because returns to investment are decreasing when marginal costs axe 
relatively low, firms will enter a "coasting" state and choose not to invest because 
the gains eventually become outweighed by the costs. 8 
This specification for the evolution of marginal costs and innovation has sev- 
eral notable features. First, it is the relative maxginal costs that matter to firms' 
profits as shown in (2.6); the absolute level of the maxginal costs (or total stock 
of inno-ýations) is irrelevant to the decisions of a firm. 'Second, in contrast to 
Ericson-Pakes, the spillover process does not change the marginal costs of active 
firms, but it does lower the costs of potential entrants because the stock of pub- 
licly available innovations continually grows. This feature allows for potential 
entrants to remain within striking distance of the incumbents. Hence, the con- 
8See Ericson and Pakes (1995) for a discussion of the coasting states. 
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tribution. of private innovations to the public stock is an externality that benefits 
the pool of potential entrants. 
2.3.3 Dynamic Equilibrium 
Let s,,,, be the number of firms with ip private innovations producing product m 
and define the vector s,,, = [Snm] which describes the maxket structure at any point 
in time. There are two types of firms facing different problems: incumbents and 
potential entrants. Incumbents axe either producing for the maxket or choosing to 
exit. Their problem is characterized by compaxing the expected net present value 
of investment in R&D against a positive liquidation value given by 0. Potential 
entrants compare an outside alternative, V), against the net present expected value 
of entering minus sunk costs of establishing production facilities denoted by X. 
Both 0 and X are assumed constant across time and equal across firms. 
An incumbent's intertemporal decision can be described by the following Bell- 
man equation where time subscripts axe replaced with a prime indicating a future 
value and all others axe current: 
max SMjiPjM? SM)] VjIm (Pj mIS M) 09 1r(ijM1 SM) - CXjM + 1+r 
)E [V1 (ipjm 
Im 
(2.13) 
where the I superscript refers to the value of an incumbent. If the firm chooses to 
exit it receives the liquidation value ý, otherwise the firm receives current period 
profits minus its investment level in R&D, xj,,, at a cost of c per unit plus the 
discounted expected value conditional on future market structure. The future 
maxket structure depends on the firm's current number of private innovations and 
the current market structure. 1/ (1 + r) is the common discount factor facing all 
firms. The expectation sign reflects the fact that the firm is assigning probability 
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weights via the transition matrix of the market structure moving from its current 
state to all possible states. These include the probability of a spillover, the 
probability the firm itself will be successful in R&D, the probabilities of other 
firms being successful, and the probabilities of entry and e3dt. 
A potential entrepreneur may enter a submaxket, incur sunk entry costs, and 
establish production and R&D facilities. Production and sales do not begin until 
the following period. The Bellman equation resembles that for incumbents with 
few changes: 
vrýN(iPEN'. 511 
') 
EVI(ipj'mjs I JiPEN"Sm) n) max V), -x- C-xj. +M 
(1+r I 
(2.14) 
where the EN superscript refers to entrants and the future value corresponds 
to that of being an incumbent in the next period. ?P measures the opportunity 
cost of entering and X represents the sunk entry costs. By endogenizing entry 
and e3dt, we can observe how turnover rates respond to changes in structural 
parameters as we observe changes in the firm size distribution in the analytical 
section of the paper. 
The Bellman equation can be written as foRows: 
VjI. (ipjm I sm) = max 
0,7r(ijm, SM) - CxjM+ 
CI (iPým +11 St )+ C2 (iPjm, S M 1+axj,, M 
(2.15) 
The investment strategy of firms derives from the first order conditions on the 
above. Let C, (ipj,,, + 1, Q denote the expected value of the firm conditional on 
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successful innovation and C2(ipj,.,,,, sý) the expected value if it fails to innovate9. 
Rom this, the first-order condition yields the following policy fimction: 
+ 
VjWC2 
r)c 
xjm(ipjml sm) = max 
10aI- 
(2.16) 
The firm chooses the value ma-Aimizing level of R&D investment subject to a 
non-negativity constraint on R&D expenditure. Investment in R&D rises with 
the expected marginal gain in value, C, - C2, and falls with the discount rate, 
r, and the cost of investment, c. The productivity of R&D, captured by a, has 
offsetting effects. As a rises it increases the probability of successful R&D and an 
incentive to increase investment. However, the higher the level of a the lower the 
marginal product for any given level of investment which lowers R&D investment. 
Overall, the industry exhibits growth in total output and thus, Y in equation 
(2.3), grows over time while the innovations constantly reduce the cost of inputs. 
This continually growing industry can exhibit a great deal of change over time 
in terms of the identities of firms, their relative sizes, and the degree of entry 
and exit. The model provides us with the ability to generate a long-run firm 
size distribution based on the ergodic distribution of the model and the ability to 
examine the growth-size relationship at the individual firm level. The numerical 
algorithm uses value function iteration to solve for the space of values given by 
all possible combinations of firms and private innovations. We use a code for 
finding the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game which is the original C 
programniing language version of the code by Palms, Gowrisankaran and McGuire 
gThis notation follows the convention used in Pakes, Gowrisankaran and McGuire (1993) 
"Implementing the Pakes-McGuire Algorithm for Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria in 
Gauss", pag. 17, available at the authors webpage. Details on this notation can be found 
in the appendix to this chapter, which presents an explanation for the algorithm and code used 
to find the equilibrium of the game presented. 
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for implementing the Pakes and McGuire algorithm. A Gauss and Matlab versions 
of this code axe made available at the authors' webpage for this code is written 
in '0. We extract the policy functions including RSZD expenditure as well as 
the entry and e-Nit decisions. Rom the solutions, we can simulate our product 
markets and industry for compaxison with the results found in the empirical 
literature. We now turn to that analysis. 
2.4 Firm Size Distribution 
2.4.1 Simulation 
Table 2.1 presents the baseline parameterization of the model. We set the dis- 
count rate to 1/1.08 as an appro)dmation of the average cost of capital for firms 
following Ericson and Pakes (1995). The rate of technological spillovers, 6, is set 
to 0.7 such that knowledge enters the public pool roughly one-and-ahalf years 
after discovery. This fits with the empirical estimates of Mansfield (1981) on im- 
itation time. Cost of a unit of R&D spending is set to one unit of the final good. 
The liquidation value and outside opportunity cost are chosen to be small to pre- 
vent them from dominating the incentives firms face. The liquidation value is 
about 7.5% of the average firm value, while the opportunity cost is roughly 15% 
of average firm value. We set both fixed and sunk costs equal to the outside 
opportunity cost. 
The parameters a and 17 interact to determine the incentives for investment in 
R&D and ultimately the growth rate of the industry as measured by the rate of 
cost reduction. These parameters are set to 3 and 10% respectively. The latter 
"Details on the algorithm and code used to find the Markov Perfect Nash solutions to the 
entry/exit and R&D investment problem stated here can be found in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
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imDlies that successful R&D will reduce marginal costs by 10%, but the former 
governs the incentives to engage in R&D such that we find at the mean level of 
R&D investment, the expected rate of cost reduction is just over 2%, which is 
approximately the industry growth rate. Both of these two paxameters, plus the 
rate of knowledge diffusion, fixed and sunk costs will be allowed to vary in the 
following section to analyze their relationship to the moments of the firm size 
distribution. 
The state space constraints we use have a maximum of six firms per submarket 
and each firm can hold up to 30 private innovations. To ensure that the state 
space boundaries do not drive the results we choose our demand parameters such 
that when six symmetric firms axe in a submarket they axe making negative 
profits. For the maximum number of private innovations, we checked in the 
simulations whether any firm attempted to obtain more private innovations than 
e--dst in the state space and made adjustments accordingly which led to our choice 
of 30. 
Because we had no priors on how to vary the submarket sizesil, we choose to 
use a simple, transparent linear function as follows: 
0,. = 01 + (m - 1) b (2.17) 
where 01 is the market share of the smallest submarket and each submaxket 
increments by b". Upon simulating the model, we use the state space constraints 
"An example on empirical work along these lines is the article by Buzzacchi and Valletti 
(1999), where they develop a test to the independent submarkets model proposed in Sutton 
(1998) for the Italian motor insurance industry. The independence between opportunities in the 
sector, both due to spacial and administrative reasons, provides an ideal setting to test Sutton's 
independent submarkets model. The authors have found that the size of the submarkets affects 
the skewness of firm size distribution. Further investigation concerning the impact of the size 
of the submarket on skewness and the other higher moments of the firm size distribution in the 
model presented here would be of interest. 
"We also considered using a random process, or possibly demand shocks, but opted for the 
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to determine 01 and determine m by matching the model to the empirical results 
M 
on the firm size distribution. b then follows from F, 0,,, = 1. 
The choices on the market size parameters, 01 and b, were determined as 
follows. We started with 10 submarkets, m= 10, where the smallest market 
share was determined by the lowest level of the market size that still produced 
positive levels of investment in R&D. At the tenth submarket firms began to 
invest at the upper bound of the state space. Therefore the increments in market 
share per submaxket were determined to be 0.0318. For the analysis below, we 
then choose the number of submarkets, m, to analyze by matching the general 
shape of the log-normal distribution which closely, but not perfectly, resembles 
the empirical firm size distribution across industries. We found that if there 
axe too few markets, the distribution is skewed left instead of right. Thus, 
for very narrowly defined markets with only one or two submarkets, the model 
generates a high frequency of average sized firms and a small number of tiny 
firms. On the other hand, as the number of submaxkets expanded the model 
generated a bimodal distribution, in accord with some of the findings in Bottazi 
et. al. (2003b) for some industries. For the general log-normal distribution, 
we found that specifying five submarkets, m=5, was the closest match to the 
results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996) discussed in the next subsection. As 
a further check on the validity of the results, beyond matching the general pattern 
of the firm size distribution, we then conduct cross-sectional regressions to see if 
the growth-size relations match the empirical literature in section 2.4.3. " 
simple linear. function on account of its transparency. 
"Clearly, it would be more appealing to have the submarket sizes determined endogenously. 
This additional feature could perhaps be accomplished by specibring a Dbdt-Stiglitz demand 
function. However, it would still require additional assumptions on how firms interact across 
sectors in terms of both price-taking (or not) behavior as well as specifying how innovations 
in one sector affect the other. The additional complications introduced would detract from 
the main task of this paper, which is to understand how the overall firm size distribution 
changes with underlying structural parameters. Moreover, because our model captures strategic 
43 
2.4.2 Distribution Results 
In our first comparison of the model with the data, we compute the ergodic 
distribution by simulating the model. "' From the distribution found in the 
simulations, we weight the observed outcomes by their probability of occurrence 
to generate the ergodic distributions for various size measures. 15 
Table 2.2 shows the results of the baseline parameterization compared with 
the statistics found in Hart and Oulton (1996) who use subsets (50 to 80 thou- 
sand companies) of a large UK database that includes very small firm in the 
sample. We calibrate the cost paxameter, Z, to match the mean log size of 
employment reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). Because their data set has a 
good representation of small firms we felt that it was the most appropriate for 
comparison with the model. They find that the distribution of the natural log of 
vaxious; size measures (employment, sales, and net assets) exhibit positive skew- 
ness (long right-tails) and peaked (leptokurtic) distributions relative to the log 
normal distribution. We report analogous measures based on our model. 16 Sales 
are computed by extracting the quantities and prices while we use firm values, 
VI, for net assets. All values below are reported in natural logs. 
interaction within each submarket, it is likely that most forms of strategic interaction across 
submarkets would be of second order importance. Our assumption of no strategic interaction 
across submarkets fits with the arguments of Sutton (1997), mentioned earlier, for blending 
strategic interaction with the independent opportunities assumed in the older literature on 
Gibrat's Law. 
"'The simulation runs the model for one million periods. In order to avoid any bias caused 
by the specification of the initial market structure, we simulate it first for 10,000 periods and 
find the modal market structure. The main simulation then uses the modal market structure 
as its starting point. 
IsIt is important to note that the comparison here with the data is not direct. We take 
advantage of the fact that through simulations we can generate the probability distribution of 
the market structures. Empirical studies use a cross-section of firms at a point in time (we 
turn to this analysis later) while the ergodic distribution shows the probabilities of a market 
structure occurring at a point in time. That is, the ergodic distribution is generated as a time 
series, but it reveals what the expected cross-section would look like. 
16AR employment calculations add one in levels to represent the manager which we view as 
part of fixed costs. 
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Figures 2.2 to 2.7 show the distributions in levels and in logs. The distrib- 
utions in levels, for all the three size proxies considered, exhibit long right tails, 
especially for the net assets distribution. The size range accumulating the higher 
probability mass lies to the left of the mean size in all the distributions. The dis- 
tributions for both the log of sales and log of net assets are roughly bell shaped, 
but exhibit thicker tails and higher peaks than the standard normal. The distri- 
bution of the log of employment exhibits less variance, but shows some skewness 
and leptokurtosis. 
There are two noticeable differences between the model and the data. First, 
the standaxd deviations of the size measures are considerably smaller. This 
discrepancy is not surprising since the model is designed for a particulax industry 
whereas the empirical estimates cover a large range of industries which would 
generate greater size variation. 
Of greater concern is the slight negative skewness in the natural log of em- 
ployment generated by the model versus the positive skewness observed in the 
data. Upon careful examination of the results, it turns out that the negative 
skewness is being driven by a tiny fraction of extremely small firms. These axe 
firms with less than one employee which constitute about 0.1% of all firms and 
only 0.0025% of total employment. Those firms axe to the left of the vertical line 
in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. If we eliminate them from the distribution and recalibrate 
Z, the skewness in employment goes slightly positive and the negative skewness 
in sales is cut in half as shown in Table 2.3. Moreover, the high kurtosis value 
in sales comes down considerably and is much more in line with the data. If we 
drop more small firms, less than 5 employees (0.02% of total employment), the 
skewness for employment rises to approximately 0.41. In fact, we found that we 
can match the Hart and Oulton skewness figure almost exactly if we eliminate all 
45 
firms of less than 10 employees (0.14% of total employment). 
The negative skewness for sales remains even after eliminating the small firms, 
although the skewness value for sales reported by Haxt and Oulton, while positive, 
is the smallest of the three. This result of our model is being driven by the 
strong implications of Courhot oligopoly pricing with homogenous goods in each 
submarket. For example, when multiple firms produce large quantities, and 
hence have substantial employment, the direct competition between them drives 
the price down significantly. What we find is that the model often generates 3 or 
4 firms in a given submarket with marginal costs that are very close. Although 
quantities are reasonably high for these firms, the low level of the price accounts 
for the reduced skewness when comparing employment and sales. 17 Overall, the 
ergodic distribution of the model reasonably matches the observed data in terms 
of deviations from a log-normal distribution 
When we turn. to the growth-size relationship in the next subsection, we ex- 
tract a balanced panel which eliminates exiting firms. These exiting firms in- 
clude these extremely small firms that generate the negative skewness in employ- 
ment. Thus, in our summary statistics on the balanced panel below, the skewness 
measures increase significantly. These results suggest an interesting hypothesis. 
First, although the skewness is generally smaller than that observed in the data, 
it is important to bear in mind that data sets rarely include the full population 
of small firms. Second, the model accounts, in some sense, for part-time workers 
while data typically do not. These differences may be relevant empirically for 
testing distributions against the log-normal distribution. For example, if data 
collected round workers upward it would imply an underweighting of the left-side 
! 'Note that the statistics we report exclude monopolies altogether so as not to be affected by 
the minimum quantity assumption. In the baseline, monopolies account for less than 0.000001% 
of all observations. 
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of the distribution which would bias skewness upwards. 
2.4.3 Cross-Sectional Growth-Size Properties 
We examine the growth-size relationships of the simulated model and compare 
them with the empirical literature on Gibrat's Law. To extract cross-sectional 
data comparable to that used in the empirical literature, we simulate the model 
five times for 5,000 periods each and extract the final periods from each run. 18 
That provides us with simulated panel data to test the growth-size relationship. 
We ran these simulations ten times to check the robustness of these results. 
The average number of total firms observed in each simulation was 138.8 
(range of 132 to 143) with an average of 43.4 new entries over two periods and 
25.9 eidts. " We eliminate all the new entrants, who do not produce in their initial 
period and all firms that e)dt to generate a balanced panel for analysis. Table 
2.4 shows the average distributional characteristics for size measures across these 
simulations of the balanced panel of firms for the initial period. The measures are 
similar to those shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, but note the substantial increases 
in the skewness values when small eidting firms axe eliminated. 'o 
Table 2.5 provides the results of the regressions on each of the ten simulations 
of the following form: 
yt = 'Byt-i + ft 
(2.18) 
where yt is the log of the various size measures. Of interest in terms of Gibrat's 
18To prevent the variance of the size of the firms from being dominated by the overall growth 
process, we shut down the increments to the public stock of knowledge except for the periods 
we extracted for analysis. 
"Note that entries and exits would match almost exactly if we included those firms that 
exited in the previous period. 
20The negative skewness in sales persists, but becomes even smaller in absolute value than 
when we eliminated the smallest firms outright in the preceding subsection. 
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Law is whether the coefficient is significantly different from unity. Hall's (1987) 
estimates for fl as applied to employment across three different samples were 
consistently 0.99 and significantly less than one. Evans (1987) found values 
for 3 that range between 0.93 and 0.97 for employment. The model here also 
generates a coefficient less than one, below Hall's estimates, but in accord with 
those of Evans'. " The last columns report the percentage of times the null 
hypothesis of P=1 was rejected at the 10% level, followed by the percentage of 
times it was rejected at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
We use the median size values to split our sample into large and small firms. 
Empirical evidence suggests that Gibrat's Law works better for the large firms. 
Our results show a similax pattern. The estimated fl's axe consistently closer to 
one for the laxge firm sample for each size measure and in every simulated sample. 
In fact, for the employment size measure we cannot reject 8=1 nine out of ten 
times and then only at the 10% level. 
For the three size measures we also tested for the equality of the coefficients 
between the large and small firm subsets reported in the last rows of Table 2.5. 
For employment we reject equality in all cases at the 5% level or better and 80% of 
the time at the 1% level. For sales, the differences weaken somewhat and we reject 
equality 60% of the time all of those t-statistics at the 5% level or better. Equality 
of values is rejected in nearly all of the subsamples. It is worth emphasizing, 
however, that in all subsamples, the estimated beta for large firms was greater 
than that of small firms for all three size measures. Given the small sample 
size we draw, the large number of significant rejections Of '8LARGE "': '8SMALL1 
21 We report the results using robust standard errors, but even without using them the results 
are hardly changed. The R-squared's are exceedingly high typically between 0.95 and 0.99. 
However, since there are only two simple stochastic processes in the model and nothing akin to 
demand shocks, it is not surprising in the least that past size is a good predictor of size in the 
short-run. 
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indicates the model matches the empirical findings. 
In order to test for serial correlation we reduce our sample to those firms 
surviving in three consecutive periods for a balanced panel. The previous tests 
only had 69 .5 observations on average and after one more period of eliminating 
edting firms to retain a balanced panel, we were left on average with 46.9 firms. 
The test specification is similar to Kumax (1985) where growth is the dependent 
variable (instead of the log of size): 
( Yt ) (1 + ß) +Y 
(Et---' )+ 
Yt-i Yt-2 
Persistence in growth will show up as a positive value for y. We find that the 
coefficients for, 8 and -y are significant at the 5% level for the majority of the ten 
samples. Their average estimated values are 0.9817 and 0.577 respectively. y is 
positive and significant in all but one of the samples at the 1% level. 
The positive and significant value of y indicates serial correlation which comes 
as no surprise given the design of the model. There axe several contributing 
factors to serial correlation in our model. First, successful firms seek to build 
on and protect any technological advantage and thus invest more heavily than 
small firms. In addition, a growing firm pushes rival firms closer to the exit 
threshold. Thus, the growing firm will get a subsequent additional increase in 
market share with the increase in the likelihood of rivals' exit. These processes 
of firm dynamics effectively embed serial correlation in error terms that do not 
control for innovative behaviour and expected future changes in market share 
conditional on them. The results suggest that serial correlation should weaken 
dn empirical studies if appropriate controls for own and rival R&D expenditure 
and innovations axe included. We leave this hypothesis for future empirical 
49 
work. 
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Finally, we look at the variance in growth rates across firm sizes. A number 
of studies find that the variance of the growth rate is larger for small firms (e. g. 
Dunne and Hughes (1994)). The work by H. Starfley and his co-authorSý3 has 
also found, for a dataset comprising information concernmg all publicly traded 
U. S. companies between 1974 and 1993, that the fluctuations in the growth rates 
, as measured by the width of the 
distribution, decrease with company size and 
increase with time. They find a scaling relationship between the variance of 
growth rates and company size which is the same for all size measures they have 
considered. In fact, they find that the spread in the distribution of rates decreases 
with increasing sales as a power law over seven orders of magnitude. 
Again, we separate our simulated samples by the median size. Table 2.6 
shows the average standard deviations in growth rates across the ten samples 
and for large and small firms according to the three size measures. By all three 
measures the variance in the growth rate of the small firms is larger than that 
of the large firms and across all ten samples. The final columns report the 
percentage of rejections based on the F-statistic for the variance ratio test for 
equality of the standard deviations. We reject equality at the 1% level based on 
the employment and sales measures in seven out of ten samples, but in only half 
22 One note on the magnitude of serial correlation is required here. Ourestimateofý islarger ly 
than that found in either Singh and Wlýittington (1975) or Kumar (1985) who find values of 
approximately 0.3 and 0.12 respectively. The distinguishing feature is in the difference in time 
periods. Those authors use a much longer time frame, 10 to 12 years, compared with our 
simulated data which corresponds to roughly three years based on the user cost of capital we 
specify. Because we know that the model will predict serial correlation that declines over time 
due to the Markov perfect nature of the equilibrium, we do not pursue that issue any further 
here. Suffice it to say, that the model does generate serial correlation in the errors when using 
the basic regression model found in the growth-size regressions related to Gibrat's Law. See 
Pakes and Ericson (1998) for the empirical implications of the Markov Perfect feature embedded 
in the model. 
23 "Scaling Behaviour in Economics: The Problem of Quantifying Company Growth", Physica 
A (1997), and "Scaling Behaviour in the Growth of Companies", Nature (1996), among other 
articles. 
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the samples for net assets. The latter also has the highest level of the standard 
deviation. Overall, the results are encouraging in the sense that, again the model 
replicates empirical findings. 
To summarize the section, we find that the model is able to replicate em- 
pirical studies of Gibrat's Law in two ways. First, it can generate a firm size 
distribution with the higher moments deviating from the log-normal distribution 
in the same direction as actual distributions. Secondly, in the cross-section the 
model generates a negative firm size-growth relationship, decreasing vaxiance in 
the growth rate with firm size, and serial correlation, all found in the data. Based 
on the above we feel reasonably confident in using the model to understand how 
underlying structural paxameters affect the overall firm size distribution. 
2.5 Variation in the Firm Size Distribution 
The previous section established that the model reasonably matches the data in 
terms of the firm size distribution and in its cross-sectional empirics. Now we 
ask how the moments of the firm size distribution change with underlying struc- 
tural parameters suggested in the literature. Specifically we vaxy the following 
parameters: sunk costs, fixed costs, productivity of R. &D, rate of spillovers, and 
the rate of decline in maxginal CoStS. 2' The goal of this section is to generate a 
set of hypotheses that can be examined empirically. We do not caxry out that 
examination in this paper, but view the contribution of this analysis as setting an 
24We do not vary the outside alternative paxameter, 0, because it enters in much the same 
way as sunk costs, and we do not vary the liquidation value because the parameter must be 
constrained to be less than X. 1(1 + r) such that firms cannot enter, produce nothing, and exit 
with a net gain. We also do not vary the discount rate because even if the discount factor 
varied uniformly across firms, such variations basically mean interest rate variations and those 
variations are typically short-run fluctuations rather than long-run characteristics inherent to 
an industry that shape the firm size distribution. 
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empirical research agenda on the firm size distribution guided by theory. How 
the model faxes when taken to the data should provide insights for improvement 
in the model itself and a deeper understanding of the empirical work. All of the 
analysis below shows the distribution including all levels of employment, i. e. all 
firms are included no matter how small. 2526 
2.5.1 Fixed Costs 
We start with fixed and sunk costs. In the baseline fixed costs were set to 0.2 and 
we allow that to vary from 0 to 0.25, when translated via the unit cost of labor, 
the range of the fixed costs then go from about 12% (for the smallest non-zero 
value, 0.025) to just over 50% of total costs of production excluding R&D costs 
for the mean sized firm in the sample. 
We find that increases in the level of fixed costs lead to a larger mean size 
of firrns, but lower variance, skewness and kurtosis of the firrn size distribution. 
Figure 2.8 shows how the first four moments of the firm size distribution change 
relative to the baseline while Figure 2.9 shows the same measures when we look 
at the firm size distribution in natural logs. The x-axis shows the level of fixed 
costs and the y-a)ds shows the percentage change from the baseline. Figure 2.10 
shows the baseline distribution in levels against the low and high value of fixed 
costs. 27 In the latter, Figure 2.10, low levels of fixed costs axe associated with 
25We also examined the behavior of the first four moments when eliminating small firms as 
in the previous section, but found no qualitative differences. The only notable difference was 
that as we eliminated small firms from those of less than I employee, to less than 5, to less than 
10, the effects became even more pronounced. By that we mean that the percentage changes 
in any moment of the firm size distribution were larger when eliminating small firms, but the 
direction of the effects was stable. 
26We also analyzed the changes in the distributions of both sales and net assets, but we do 
not report those results here. Qualitatively they are very similar to the effects on the size 
distributions by employment. 
27 In Figures 9 through 12 for the graphs showing the shape of the firm size distribution, 
we standardize the x-axis to maximums of 160 and 6, in levels and logs. However, in many 
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a greater mass of the distribution at lower levels of employment, but also with 
a longer right-tall and, hence, a higher skewness. The high levels of the fixed 
cost exhibit greater mass further to the right and there is a small, but noticeable, 
second mode emerging to the right of the peak. 
Figure 2.11 shows the same distribution but in natural logs and we see similar 
changes. The mean size rises as the mass of small firms shrinks while the mass 
of larger firms grows. The variance falls as the distribution becomes more lep- 
tokurtic (in logs) as firms become more concentrated around the mean size. The 
skewness increases relative to the baseline at lower levels of the fixed costs, but 
then declines at the higher levels. The initial increase stems from an increase in 
the frequency of firms above the mean size creating more mass on the right-side 
of the distribution. The decrease follows from the flattening of the left-side of the 
distribution as smaller firms become more dispersed in their scale of operations. 
When we set fixed costs to zero, the mean firm size is more than 11% below the 
mean size of firms in our baseline. As fixed costs rise the mean size of firms also 
rises with a more rapid increase at higher levels. Although the pattern exhibits 
some non-monotonicity, the variance generally falls with increases in fixed costs, 
while both skewness and kurtosis decline. 
Intuitively, in the model higher fixed costs make it more likely that small firms 
will choose not to produce as in equation (2.7) and increase the likelihood of eyit 
because future profit values axe smaller for the same level of output. Thus, 
by reducing the fraction of small firms in the sample the mean size increases. 
Moreover, with small firms more likely to exit, higher fixed costs create greater 
incentives to innovate for incumbent firms to distance themselves from the e. )dt 
cases the maximum sized firm exceeds those values. We choose to standardize the x-axis to 
facilitate comparison in the regions showing the bulk of the mass and how the parameters alter 
the distribution. 
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threshold which further increases the mean. The variance, however, declines and 
is related to the decrease in kurtosis. With a reduced fraction of small firms, the 
frequency of firms near the mean size increases, but there is also an increase in the 
mass of firms to the right of the peak reflecting higher R&D investment among 
incumbents which decreases the kurtosis. In natural logs we see more or less the 
same pattern, however, the higher moments behave differently. Skewness displays 
an inverted-U shaped pattern, while the kurtosis displays a generally increasing 
pattern. The reason is that the fattening of the tails in levels is primarily just to 
the right of the primary mode such that in logs the effect blends with the original 
mode and the tails remain relatively flat. 
Skewness, in levels, falls because the region of small firms becomes smaller 
while the frequency of mid-sized firms increases. This effect flattens and length- 
ens the tail on the left-side which reduces the skewness. Thus, fixed costs act 
in a way that is fairly straightforward by making it more diflicult for very small 
firms to survive, essentially requiring a minimum scale of operations to produce 
non-negative profits and survive. These results axe consistent with the findings 
of Machado and Mata (2000) who use a Box-Cox quantile regression model to 
chaxacterize the effect of covaxiates on the firm size distribution of Portuguese 
firms. They find that minimum efficient scale had a consistently positive impact 
on the size of firms, a negative effect on the skewness, and an ambiguous effect 
on kurtoSiS. 28 
2.5.2 Sunk Costs 
Figures 2.12 to 2.15 show the results from varying the sunk costs of entry. The 
range here starts from 0.1 such that (--L-) X, >0 continues to hold. The upper 1+r 
"Machado and Mata (2000) do not report measures of variance. 
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bound here is much higher than for fixed costs to capture industries for which sunk 
entry costs will take, in expectation, significant time to recover. These values 
can be understood as a ratio to the value of the mean sized incumbent firm. The 
range is from 10% to 35% and equals approximately 21% at the baseline. The 
vast majority of firms that enter the market do not recover their full sunk costs. 
However, those that survive and grow ultimately reap substantial rewaxds. At 
low levels of sunk costs, a firm does not need to survive for a long period of time 
before making entry optimal. However, at high levels of the sunk costs, firms 
require a substantial likelihood of sustained success to induce entry. 
At low levels of the sunk costs we see little change in the mean size of firms, 
but a negative effect on all the higher moments. In fact, we find that industries 
charucterized by lower levels of sunk and/or fixed costs will more nearly match 
the log-nomml distribution and the strong form of Gibrat's Law. In Figure 2.14 
its clear that these changes axe fairly small when comparing the shape of the 
baseline distribution to the low end for sunk costs. However, once sunk costs 
reach 0.25 (or approximately 26% of the value of the mean sized firm), the mean 
size of firms rises rapidly, while the variance increases though somewhat non- 
monotonically. The entry barrier discourages new firnis reducing the mass of 
small firms. Markets become more concentrated with fewer firms, but of greater 
average size. Thus, industries with high levels of sunk entry costs will exhibit 
greater average size of firms, higher variance in the size, but a flatter distribution 
potentially with multiple modes. 
Higher sunk costs have offsetting effects for incumbents which increases the 
variance but continues to reduce skewness and kurtosis. With smaller firms 
less likely to enter and pose a threat to incumbents, firms have less competition 
reducing the benefits of engaging in R&D which flattens the far end of the right- 
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tail. However, at the same time, among incumbents, because the sunk costs 
help extend the'expected lifetime of any one firm, competition in terms of R&D 
intensifies. Thus, once a firm does enter it has strong incentives to try to develop 
a technological lead over its rivals. This incentive leads to an increase in the 
mass of firms in the mid-sized range. Once a sufficient cost advantage has 
been established the first effect comes to dominate and discourages firms, from 
establishing an even laxger technological lead because the threat of entry has been 
reduced. 
The model thus suggests that industries with large sunk costs should have a 
laxger mean size, greater variance and a flatter distribution overall. The flatter 
distribution and Figures 2.14 and 2.15 suggest that bi- or multi-model distribu- 
tions are quite likely for industries characterized by high sunk entry costs. The 
sunk entry costs protect incumbents such that once a firm reaches a sufficiently 
large size, it seeks to maintain that size by investing in R&D to maintain its 
advantage but with less incentive to increase that advantage. 
Audretsch et. al. (2004) argue on the basis of some studies on particulax 
industries that the service sector approximates better the strong form of Gibrat's 
Law and therefore the lognormal distribution because the link between firm size 
and survival rates is weaker in industries with lower sunk costs and where capital 
intensity and scale economies play less of a role". VvUle evidence on this point 
is limited, the Audretsch claim is consistent with the production of the present 
model reported above (page 54, italicised). In our analysis, we find that to be 
true particulaxly for the fixed costs which imply a higher requirement for scale in 
order for net profits to be non-negative. We also find that the distribution more 
closely approximates the log-normal distribution at the low end of the sunk costs. 
29Audretsch et al (2004) study the Dutch hospitality sector. 
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2.5.3 Rate of Cost Reduction 
The rate of cost reduction is captured by the parameter q. More specifically, 77, 
which first appears in (2.8), is the percentage decline in marginal costs of pro- 
duction conditional on a successful inilovation. Thus increases in 77 will translate 
into a faster industry growth rate for the same level of investment as measured 
by output of the final good. We think of il as a key parameter in governing the 
rate of technological progress which in the context of the model is the rate at 
which costs fall. 
The parameter ranges from 0.07 to 0.20 with our baseline value set to 0.1 
(10%), but to make better sense out of this specification, we convert it to the 
expected cost reduction at the mean level of investment. At the low end, few 
firms are actually engaged in R&D and thus the mean expected rate of cost 
reduction is only 0.32%, an anemically growing industry with little innovation. 
However, at the upper bound, there is a fair amount of R&D and the mean rate 
rises to 12.13%. 30 
Looking at Figures 2.16 to 2.19, we see that increases in the rate of techno- 
logical progress lead to an increase in both the mean and variance of the firm size 
distribution. The higher levels of cost reduction lead to greater incentives to 
engage in R&D and capture market share from rivals which leads to increases in 
both of the first two moments. At the same time, variation in the rate of techno- 
logical progress has non-monotonic effects on both the skewness and the kurtosis. 
Both exhibit conve., dty asq rises. Skewness falls initially because at low levels of 
"Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) report industry growth rates for highly aggregated industries 
with the fastest growing industry, electronic and electric equipment, growing at an annual rate 
of 5.457% from 1958 to 1996. That would suggest an upper bound for -q of approximately 0.14 
or 0.15. However, since that growth rate is for an industry at roughly the 2-digit SIC level, it 
therefore averages across more detailed sectors. Thus, we examine the effects for even faster 
rates of growth. 
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cost reduction, there is a very small percentage of extremely laxge firms. These 
are firms that established a technological advantage and raced ahead to cement 
their leading position. With increases in the rate of cost reduction and, there- 
fore, greater incentives for small and medium sized firms to use R&D, the scope 
for business stealing rises. As a result the industry becomes more competitive 
leading to more firms and more competition with fewer truly giant firms which 
reduces the overall skewness. 
As the rate of cost reduction increases, around 0.15 or a mean expected 
cost reduction of 7.1%, the skewness begins to increase as a larger mass of firms 
emerges in the mid-sized range as can been seen in Figures 2.18 and 2.19. Kurtosis 
undergoes a similar change. In fact, the whole distribution almost completely 
flattens out at our extremely high range. This effect occurs because the range 
of relative marginal costs throughout the incumbent firms increases along with 
the strong incentives to engage in R&D to defend existing market share as well 
as capture market share from rivals. Thus, rapid growth should lead to a high 
variance and a flatter distribution. This leads to the hypothesis that industries 
with high rates of technological progress are more likely than those with low rates 
to'exhibit multi-modal distributions. 
Machado and Mata (2000) also measure empirically the marginal effects of 
industry growth rates on the firm size distribution in their paper. They find that 
firms in faster growing industries have a higher mean, but more rapid growth 
reduces the skewness. For kurtosis they also find a negative effect, but it is not 
statistically significant. 
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2.5.4 Technological Opportunity 
The productivity of R&D which we think of as the technological opportunity 
facing an industry is captured by a in equation (2.12). It is related to the rate 
of cost reduction, q, in the sense that those two paxameters jointly affect the 
equilibrium rate of cost reduction. a governs the incentives to engage in R&D 
and 77 defines the gains of success in terms of cost reduction. Higher levels of 
a imply a higher probability of success for any given level of R&D expenditure. 
However, the m ginal impact of an increase in R&D expenditure falls with higher 
levels of a. Moreover, the solution for the optimal level of investment based on 
the first-order condition of the value function shown in (2.16) implies that changes 
in a will have countervailing effects. Thus, as a prior, we expect to find non- 
monotonic behaviour as a varies. 
The range of a that we used went from 2 to 4, centred around the baseline 
value of 3. At both the lower and upper limits the computational algorithm 
began to generate extreme results. At the lower level, we found that virtually 
no firms were investing in R&D while at the upper bound firms began to exceed 
the limitations of the state space. To provide some economic interpretation of 
these values, a firm investing at the average level from the baseline, would expect 
success in R&D with a probability of 20.7% and thus an expected cost reduction 
by the following period of 2.07%. At the lower bound of a, 2, those values fall 
to less than 10% and under 1% while at the upper bound they are slightly less 
than double the baseline. 
Figures 2.20 through 2.23 show the effect of varying a. Both the mean and 
va7iance of fimn sizes rise ufith productivity of R&D. In natural logs the pattern 
is similar, but there is some concavity at the higher levels of a with respect to 
the vaxiance. Increases in the productivity of R&D have non-monotonic effects 
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on both the skeurness and the ku7tosis. Skewness and kurtosis both exhibit 
concavity, which contrasts with the results for the rate of cost reduction. The 
difference between these two parameters appears to come from the left-side of 
the distribution and their effects on smaller firms. Changes in the productivity 
parameter affect the right-tail of the distribution in much the same way as an 
increase in the rate of cost reduction. In both we observe a steady increase in 
the mass of firms to the right of the peak while the peak itself shrinks which 
eventually lowers the skewness and the kurtosis. In natural logs the pattern is 
similar with, again, another mode emerging on the right. 
At very low levels for a, we found that the right-tail was much shorter and 
thinner than for the higher values. This follows from the much lower productivity 
in R&D which stunts the incentive to engage in R&D and the mean size of firms 
is considerably smaller as a result. Thus, at the lowest levels of a, as R&D 
expenditures yield greater returns with the higher marginal product, larger firms 
emerge and stretch the right-tall initially leading to increases in skewness and 
the kurtosis. As a rises beyond 2.5, more firms engage in R&D leading to the 
increase in the variance and hence a flatter distribution overall with less skewness. 
Of the structural parameters we investigate, this parameter is almost certainly 
the most difficult to capture empirically. However, we do wish to emphasize the 
strong non-monotonicity in this variable and in the rate of cost reduction. The 
am conclusion we draw here is that empirically we should not expect proxies 
for either a or q to have clear monotonic effects on the higher moments of the dis- 
tribution and caution should be exercised in generalizing results found in studies 
of the firm size distribution for a selected group of industries. 
0 
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2.5.5 Rate of Spillovers 
In the model, the parameter 8 governs the rate at which the public stock of 
knowledge grows. The faster it grows the easier it is for entrepreneurs drawing 
on the public stock to enter the industry and challenge incumbents for market 
share. If 5=0, it would imply that no knowledge enters the public stock and 
over time no entrant would be able to challenge eidsting incumbents. At the 
other extreme, if J=1 then all new innovations enter the public stock in the 
following period which would be similar to Klepper (2002) where all R&D is 
costlessly imitated. 31 
Mansfield (1981) reports imitation times that range from about 6 months to 
nearly three years. Thus, we allow 8 to vary from 0.3 to 0.9 which generates 
an expected lifetime for a single innovation to remain private from just over one 
year to more than three years. Low values of 3 can be interpreted as pertaining 
to an industry where incumbent firms possess strong advantages through secrecy, 
patent protection, and/or lead time to implement their innovations. 
Figures 2.24 through 2.27 show the results which are quite striking. Changes 
in the rate of spillovers generate an enormous impact on both the mean and 
variance. Industries ttith stronger patent protection (secrecy, or lead time) uill 
have a higher mean and variance in the size of firm. For example, at the 
low end of J=0.3 the mean firm size is nearly six times that of the baseline! 
Intuitively the stronger the protection for private innovations, the greater their 
value to any one firm. Therefore firms will accumulate a great number of private 
innovations and establish a large presence in the maxket making it difficult for 
"In Klepper (2002), he assumes randomly assigned R&D productivities which allows for 
survival of the more productive firms while generating high rates of exit during the product life 
cycle. Here we do not allow R&D productivity to vary by firm but allow the innovations to 
diffuse slowly which generates the advantage of size because large firms will hold more private 
innovations that smaller firms. 
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any new entrant to mount a successful challenge. However e3dsting incumbents 
will compete fiercely in the R&D arena which contributes to both the high mean 
and the large variance. 
Looking at Figures 2.26 and 2.27, we show the distributions when we move 
away from the baseline of 5=0.7 by ±0.2. The changes, particularly as 5 
falls, axe more substantial here than for other parameters examined. When 5 
is increased the peak mode becomes more pronounced with less vaxiance in firm 
sizes. Because private knowledge passes quickly from any firm to the public stock, 
there is less ability and incentive for firms to engage heavily in R&D to separate 
themselves from rivals. Firms in an industry with a high rate of spillovers are 
facing an uphill battle on a slope that is nearly vertical. 
At the low level of 8, the distribution has no obvious peak and shows great 
variation over the mid-sized range. For the same distribution, a small, but 
noticeable mode emerges to the fax right (around 250 in levels and 5.6 in natural 
logs) which we do not see in other distributions. In fact the distribution generated 
by the model fails to resemble the empirical distributions. MU-ning to the higher 
moments there does not appear to be any straightforward effect and no discernible 
pattern. We draw no conclusions regarding the effects on skewness and kurtosis 
here other than to say týey appear to be highly non-monotonic. 
BAsed on the analysis here clearly the diffusion rate plays a critical role in 
shaping the firm size distribution. While 8 represents the rate at which knowledge 
becomes available to new firms, it does not capture spillovers between incumbents. 
The extreme changes in the shape of the firm size distribution that follow from 
modi4ing 8 at levels that are empirically plausible, suggest that our measure is 
simply too crude to capture all that secrecy and lead time entail. Extending 
the framework to account for spillovers, imitation costs, and absorptive capacity 
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between active firms seems a highly fruitful avenue for further work. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Understanding the forces that generate differences in the firm size distribution 
enables us to identify the forces that generate more or less concentration across 
industries. This study provides a model for undertaking this task. We show that 
the model replicates the chaxacteristics of the firm size distributions reported in 
the literature and reproduces the empirical growth-size relationships. The model 
generates a substantial list of empirical hypotheses for testing the effect of vaxious 
structural parameters on the first four moments of firm size distributions. In 
addition the model suggests that serial correlation in firm growth should weaken 
in empirical studies if appropriate controls for R&D expenditure and innovations 
of existing and rival firms are included. 
It is worth emphasizing that the model is quite flexible and can be adapted to 
serve as a baseline for analyzing particular industries by matching the parameters 
and the moments of an observed industry level firm size distribution. With that 
baseline, counterfactual experiments can be conducted and the effects of policies 
on the firm size distribution can be analyzed, such as subsidization of R&D or 
regulations that affect barriers to entry. 
We note some missing elements in our framework that could be incorporated 
in future work. First, merger activity is one of the major concerns in the empirical 
literature (for example see Kumar, 1985, and Dunne and Hughes, 1994). Our 
model can incorporate mergers by combining it with Gowrisankaran's (1999) ex- 
tension to mergers of the Ericson-Pakes framework. Second, the model here relies 
on stochastic R&D success and diffusion of knowledge to generate entry, growth, 
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survival, and exit. More could be done to capture other risks that entrepreneurs 
face such as uncertainty of true costs as in Jovanovic (1982). That would enable 
an exploration of how the rise of venture capital and lowering of entry barriers, 
other than the sunk costs discussed here, affect the firm size distribution. 
We view the work presented here as a step forwaxd in the interplay between 
the theory and empirics of the firm size distribution. VvUle the motivation for the 
theory comes from a host of empirical observations, the theory provides us with a 
list of hypotheses that can be examined empirically across industries. We would 
be surprised to find that all of the hypotheses generated apply to all industries 
and it is highly likely that the model may serve well for some industries but not 
for others. That probable outcome would lead to both further refinements of the 
model and, we hope, a better understanding of the forces* that shape the firm size 
distribution across industries and their consequences. 
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Table 2.1: Parameter values 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Discount Rate facing firms 1/(1 + r) 1/1.08 
Rate of Technological Spillover j 0.7 
Productivity of R&D investment a 3 
Sunk Entry Costs X. 0.2 
Unit cost of R&D Spending C 1 
Fixed Costs f 0.2 
Liquidation Value V 0.1 
Rate of Decrease in Marginal Costs 77 0.1 
Liquidation Value 0.1 
Outside Alternative Value 0.2 
Smallest Submarket Market Share 0 10.136 
Increments in Submarket Size b 0.031 
Unit Cost of Labour Z 131.12 
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Table 2.2: Distribution Statistics for Baseline (Natural Logs) 
Normal H&O Model H&O Model H&O ' Model 
Measure Distribution Emp Emp Sales Sales Net Assets Net Assets 
Mean 3.1582 3.1582 7.2015 5.1321 5.5539 4.9010 
Std. Dev. 1.5197 0.2803 1.6628 0.3697 1.9635 2.1468 
Skewness 0 0.7487 -0.1 . 1932 -1.0220 0.4366 0.7825 
Kurtosis 1 3 
1 
4.5794 4.7265 6.1876 11.7373 4.835 2.9123 
Note: H&O refers to the results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). 
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Table 2.3: Distribution Statistics for Baseline Excluding Firms with <1 Employee 
(Natural Logs) 
Normal H&O Model H&O Model H&O Model 
Measure Distribution Emp Emp Sales Sales Net Assets Net Assets 
Mean 3.1582 3.1582 5.1825 5.1321 5.5539 4.8469 
Std. Dev. - 1.5197 0.2718 1.6628 0.3516 1.9635 2.1499 
ess 0 0.487 0.077 . 1932 -0.5251 0.4366 0.7777 
11 osis 3 4.5794 3.9254 6.1876 5.6798 4.835 2.9031 
Note: H&O refers to the results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). 
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Table 2.4: Average Summaxy Statistics in Natural Logs 
Size Measures 
1 1 
Employment 
1 1 
Sales 
1 1 
Net Assets 
Observations 69.5 69.5 69.5 
Average 3.521 5.027 5.189 
Std. Dev. 0.521 0.493 1.410 IIU U 
Skewness 0.867 -0.402 
d 
0.717 
Kurtosis 4.183 3.819 2.714 
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Table 2.5: Regression Results 
HO:, 8 =1 
Firms Size Measures Average Coefficient Rejection Rate 
10% 5% 1% 
Employment 0.971 100% 01, 9070 80% 
All Sales 0.966 100% 100% 100% 
Net Assets 0.944 100% 100% 100% 
Employment 0.998 10% 0% 0% 
Laxge Sales 0.979 100% 90% 80% 
Net Assets 0.970 70% 70% 50% 
Employment 0.929 100% 100% 90% 
Small Sales 0.947 100% 100% 90% 
Net Assets 0.883 100% 100% 100% 
HO: PLARGE PSMALL 
Average Difference Rejection Rate 
1 1 10% 5% 1% 
Employment 0.069 100% 100% 80% 
Equality Sales 0.019 60% 60% 20% 
Net Assets 0.061 1190% 90% 70% 
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Table 2-6: Tests of Standaxd Deviation of Growth Rates by Size Class 
HO : Ol ý-- 0'2 
Size Measures Total Laxge Small Rejection Rate 
1 
11 11 1f l 10% 5% 170 
11 
Employment 0.301 0.159 0.361 80% 80% 70%0 0 
Sales 0.321 0.195 0.401 70% 70% 70 %YC 0 
1 
Net Assets 0.542 1 0.438 1 0.584 50% 1 -5500/. 1 1 -A n 70 
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Figure 2.1: US Firm Size Distribution by Employment, 2002 
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Figure 2.2: Employment Distribution 
C. 35 1i 
Fl-rs eft cf Javec re -aye 
e-: --ar cre erD-D,, ee 
C. 3i 
C. 35 
C. 34 
C. 3-- 
c. 1 
4: so- c: 7. ) =C 30 Icc 33 
Emplqyment Lovt44 
72 
Figure 2.3: Log of Employment Distribution 
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Figure 2.5: Log of Values Distribution 
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Figure 2.6: Sales Distribution 
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Figure 2.8: Fixed Costs Effects (Levels) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
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Figure 2.9: Fixed Costs Effects (Logs) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Ln 
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Figure 2.10: Effects of Fixed Costs on Firm Size Distribution (Levels) 
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Figure 2.11: Effects of Fixed Costs on Firm Size Distribution (Logs) 
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Figure 2.12: Sunk Costs Effects (Levels) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
Emplovment 
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Figure 2.13: Sunk Costs Effects (Logs) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
EmploVment 
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Figure 2.14: Effects of Sunk Costs on Firm Size Distribution (Levels) 
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Figure 2.15: Effects of Sunk Costs on Firm Size Distribution (Logs) 
a. 
C 
J 
0 
U. 
Ln Employment 
ý --c 45 - B. 6- 
85 
Figure 2.16: Rate of Cost Reduction Effects (Levels) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
Emplovment 
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Figure 2.17: Rate of Cost Reduction Effects (Logs) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by I 
EmploVment 
1.00 
5200 
1.50 
100 
C0.50 
1000 
r 
1100 0 
1.50 
o so 
02 ý) 60 E 
2 
a 040 
020 
1 000 
"Ü 20 
060 
1040 
1 
In 
E o. 2o 9 
r 
OLO. 20 
1 040 
(A 
. 0.60 
0.1 0 11 0 12 0,13 0 14 0 15 0 16 0 17 0 18 0.19 021 
Rate of Cost Reduction (eta) 
10,07 008 OAW OA 0.11 0.12 0,13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0,17 018 0.19 0.2 1 
Rate of Cost Reduction (eta) 
2VO 
150 
m 
E loo 
oso 
C2 000 
0.050 t 
. 100 
10 07 0.08 0 09 01 'Wl 0 12 0 1' 0 14 0 IV 0,16 0 17 0 18 0 13 C, 21 
Rate of Cost Reduction (eta) 
87 
Rate of Cost Reduction (eta) 
Figure 2.18: Effects of the Rate of Cost Reduction on Firm Size Distribution 
(Levels) 
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Figure 2.20: Technological Opportunity Effects (Levels) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
Emplovment 
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Figure 2.21: Technological Opportunity Effects (Logs) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Ln 
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Figure 2.22: Effects of the Productivity of Investment on Firm Size Distribution 
(Levels) 
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Figure 2.24: The Rate of Technological Spillovers Effects (Levels) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by 
EmploVment 
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Figure 2.25: The Rate of Technological Spillovers Effects (Logs) 
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Ln 
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Figure 2.26: Effects of the Rate of Spillovers on Firm Size Distribution (Levels) 
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Figure 2.27: Effects of the Rate of Spillovers on Firm Size Distribution (Logs) 
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2.7 Appendix 
In finding the Maxkov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game presented in Chap- 
ter 2 we follow the Pakes McGuire algorithm. The code utilized to implement 
the algorithm is aC programming language version of the original Gauss pro- 
gram made available by Ariel Pakes in his website, with a few modifications for 
adjustment to the model presented here. 
Computation of the equilibrium thus follows closely the notes for implemen- 
tation provided in Pakes, Gowrisankaxan and McGuire (1993). In order to better 
expose the computation of the equilibrium we rewrite the Bellman equation for 
incumbents in 2.13 as: 
(i, S) _ CX+ (-. L) pE (Sm) sup I+r . >, O 
Ir 
VlýOvl VNýOsl 
V[i', s' I Pr[vi A] ... Pr[vN 
jxýTl, A] Pr[A] 
s,, ) = max (2.20) 
V[il, S/ + [1 - PE (Sin)] M VI=Oll I'N=O)l 
Pr[vi AI... Pr[VN I xVl, AI Pr[Afl 
where primes stand for next period values, N is the number of firms active 
in the industry, PI(s,,,,, ) stands for the probability of entry conditional on the 
current market structure on submarket m, v is as defined in equation (2.11), i. e., 
captures the outcome of the R&D process, A corresponds to the realizations of 
the dfffusion process which occurs with probability J and j stands for iteration. 
The value of the firm is the maximum between the value associated with 
shut down (e)dt) and the continuation ralue in the industry. The continuation 
value is given by the firm's current profits, minus its investment costs plus the 
discounted expected value next period, considering all possible maxket structures 
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to which the current market structure might evolve, weighted by their probability 
of occurrence. These probabilities are those associated with the outcomes of 
success, for the firm and its rivals, the probability of a spillovers process (diffusion 
of a private innovation) and the probability of entry, given the current market 
structure. If we exclude, from this expression, the probabilities of success for the 
firm making the decision, and define: 
(1) pE (S"n) 1: 
... 
1: V[il 1 -1 1+r 
111ý091 I'NýOsl 
s,,, ]Pr[vi x-'l A] 
--L) 
[1 _ pE(S7n)] 
E 
... E V[il, St (2.21) Pr[vN 
jxWl, A] Pr[Al +( 1+r 
VlýOvl VNýOsl 
.1 
Pr[vi Ix'-', A] ... Pr[VN 
Ix'-', A] Pr[Al 1N 
as the value of the firm given the outcome of its R&D process. This notation 
is similar to that used in the Ericson Pakes literature (e. g. Doraszelski and Pakes 
(2006), page 14). After setting this notation, one can write the Bellman equation 
as: 
0, sup [7r(i, S. ) - c-x+ 
VI (i, s,.,, ) = max X>, O (2.22) 
(--L-) a- C(ipf + 1, Sim) + (-11+-r) 1+lax 
Copt, St., )] I+r 1+ax 
The first order condition with respect to x yields the following solution for 
P, &D investment, i. e., the optimal firm's action: 
+ 
VjýC; 
1ýC2 
J+r)C r)c 
x (ip" S'm) 
a 
(1+r)c (2.23) 
where C, = C(ip' + 1, s' ) denotes the value associated with the successful m 
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innovation outcome (when the firm increases its private innovation stock, ip) 
and C2 = C(ip, s' ) denotes the value of the firm in case it fails to develop a M 
further innovation. The expression derived above is an analytical formula for 
R&D investment given that it remains active and the nonnegative constraint on 
x. The algorithm uses value function iteration for the state space comprising the 
firm's own and rivals' positions. The algorithm starts with an initial guess for 
next period values and all firms' investment levels. The choice of R&D by the 
firm with the highest efficiency level is obtained directly from the optimal level of 
investment above eq. (2.23). This new information is used to calculate the level 
of investment for the firm next in the rank of private innovations, and similarly 
for the next firm and so forth. Each iteration of the algorithm starts with the 
values and investment outputted from the last iteration. Thus, the optimal level 
of investment is obtained directly from the analytical expression for investment, 
by deriving C(ip, s. ) and rival's investment using the last iterations' value and 
investment (except for a firm's own cohorts of higher efficiency). This iterative 
procedure is computed until convergence in values occurs, i. e., when the changes 
in values between iterations is bellow some tolerance level. A last note to say 
that the values and investment are outputted from each iteration in matrix form, 
each row containing the positions of firms in a given market structure, the matrix 
containing all possible market structures. 
Therefore, the algorithm iterates on the values that result from firms' actions 
to find the optimal set of actions for each firm in a given market structure. 
The code used to find the equilibrium policy functions and simulate the model 
to extract the ergodic distribution of market structures in this chapter makes 
modifications to the original Pakes, Gowrisankaxan and McGuire code in order 
to adjust for the functional forms utilised in the model stated. However, the 
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numerical methodology to find equilibrium policy function remains fairly the 
same, and thus, no changes to the core of the Pakes McGuire algorithm axe made, 
and the notes for implementation provided in Pakes, Gowrisankaran and McGuire 
(1993) apply fully to the solution methodology used to find the equilibrium policy 
functions of the model presented here. The most important difference that should 
be highlighted is the fact that the stochastic exogenous process in Ericson-Pakes 
(1995) deteriorates every firm's states upon positive realisations. In the model 
presented here, this stochastic exogenous process is a diffusion process of a private 
innovation to the public innovation stock, therefore decreasing firms' private stock 
of innovation, but leaving the total number of innovations that determine the 
level of innovations unchanged because of the increase in the stock of public 
innovations. The impact of the spillover process, however, is that the gap in 
the innovation stock of incumbents and potential entrants is reduced with the 
diffusion process. This difference is introduced into the code to implement the 
algorithm to find firms' equilibrium policy functions and simulate the. evolution 
of the industry's maxket structure. 
Existency 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) set out a number of conditions for the existence of 
the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of their model, which hold in the model 
presented here. However, contrary to what they claim in the paper, the exis- 
tence of equilibrium in their model of industry dynamics requires admissibility of 
nlixed entry/exit strategies. Computing mixed strategy equilibrium increases the 
computational complexity of the algorithm immensely, and existing algorithms 
cannot cope with that. Doraszelski and Satterthwalte (2007) discuss this prot>- 
lem intensively and propose an incomplete information argument to overcome the 
problem. They propose a model analogous to that of Ericson Pakes (1995), but 
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with a further element of heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately 
known scrap values and setup costs into the model. Although agents are assumed 
to have pure strategies, their rivals perceive them as following mixed strategies 
due to incomplete information. The proof of existence requires a continuous map- 
ping from policies into themselves. So, one of the reasons for adding random scrap 
values/setup costs to the original E-P framework is that they allow to treat the 
continuous exit and entry probabilities as the policies, in contrast to the discrete 
entry and exit decisions we adopted in this chapter, such that there will always be 
an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies. Even if a formal proof for the ex- 
istence of equilibrium cannot be provided in the context of the model presented 
here, the solutions we found axe approximations to equilibriums that do exist, 
and our results hold. However, we can only ensure and prove the existence of this 
equilibrium in our model, namely under other sets of parameters, by making the 
changes proposed by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007). Thus, so as to ensure 
that there exists a computationally tractable Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the 
model presented here in Chapter 2, for whatever paxameterization chosen, similar 
changes should be introduced in the model presented here. The model presented 
in the third chapter, however, is not aflected by these issues as it abstracts from 
entry and exit. 
Multiplicity 
Doralszelski and Satterthwalte (2007) develop a model analogous to that of 
Ericson and Pakes, but where the conditions for the existence of equilibrium are 
met. These conditions, however, axe, as they show, sufficient but not necessary. 
As Pakes and Doraszelski (2006) state, just as the problem of the computational 
burden associated with the model, multiplicity can effectively limit the extent 
to which we can analyse particular applied problems. The extent to which this 
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problem affects an application of the Ericson Pakes framework depends on the 
aim of the analysis. According to Pakes and Doraszelski (2006), "undoubtedly 
the reasonableness of any selection depends on what the subsequent analysis is to 
be used for If we were trying to demonstrate the feasibility of a theoretical 
proposition or the feasibility of a particulax change in outcomes as we vary some 
paxameter, then probably any of the equilibria would be fine", which is the kind 
of analysis developed here. 
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Chapter 3 
The Endogenous Determination 
of Market Structure and R&D 
Spillovers 
3.1 Introduction 
Initially treating technological change as an exogenous process, economic theory 
has moved towaxds a better understanding of the economic forces behind this 
fundamental source of growth. Technological progress is not a random event, but 
rather a product of the incentives for individual firms in developing new products 
and production processes. The negative impact of the lack of appropriability of 
the outcome of the R&D effort in firms' incentives to invest generates the classi- 
cal external economies problem in the innovative activity highlighted by Nelson 
(1959) and Arrow (1962). Even if static efficiency is enhanced when knowledge 
is treated as a common pool (having almost fully appropriable R&D may lead to 
duplication of effort and costs and socially redundant R&D), knowledge exter- 
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nalities axe detrimental to private incentives. We argue here that this does not 
necessarily lead to dynamic inefficiency. 
The initial literature on the problem of free riding investigates the trade-off 
between private incentives to innovate and efficient use of knowledge, and tries to 
determine the net effect for total welfare and firms' performance. Spence (1984) 
develops a deterministic model where symmetric firms invest in cost-reducing 
R&D, and findsý that the absence of appropriability leads unambiguously to sub- 
optimal investment in R&D, but he stresses the fact that appropriability is not 
the solution as market performance will remain inefficient'. He concludes that the 
highest market performance is achieved in an industry with high spillovers and 
subsidies to restore incentives to invest and improve allocative efficiency. In the 
context of a static, deterministic, duopoly model, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) show that, independently of any subsidies policy, cooperative research al- 
lows for the spillovers to be internalised by firms leading to an increase in the 
investment undertaken in the industry. Later work by Henriques (1990), Suzu- 
mura (1992), Simpson and Vonortas (1994) and Ziss (1994) extend the analysis of 
the role of joint research ventures in mitigating the classical externalities problem. 
Levin and Reiss (1988) analyse R&D choices in the context of a static, de- 
terministic model where both cost-reducing and demand creating R&D axe im- 
perfectly appropriable and find that diminished appropriability does not nec- 
essarily lead to a decrease in firms' investment effort. They argue that their 
model, although providing some understanding "about the relationship of R&D 
and maxket structure, it is but a small step towards understanding the more 
complete dynamic process where market structure evolves through time". Co- 
hen and Levinthal (1989) show that treating external knowledge as a pure public 
'The allocative inefficiency arises because the R&D costs required to achieve a given rate of 
industry cost reduction are higher than when there is a public good character to R&D. ' 
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good, acquired at zero cost by all firms in the industry, is in the genesis of the 
results pointing to subinvestment in the presence of R&D spillovers. They claim 
there are substantial costs associated to the learning and absorption of publicly 
accessible industry knowledge. By accounting for the absorptive role of R&D, 
i. e., R&D that enhances the firm's ability to make use of the industry pool of 
knowledge, they show that contrary to the existing literature, externalities might 
increase the amount of R&D investment undertaken in an industry. This is in 
line with Rosenberg (1974) and Nelson (1982) claims that, in order to be able 
to take advantage of externalities, the firm has to undertake some investment of 
its own, i. e., it has to have laboratories with research personnel that will use the 
industry pool of knowledge. 
The literature on the impact of spillovers on R&D choice by firms is extremely 
vast, but it is mainly composed of analyses that rest on static, deterministic mod- 
els, that depart from a given market structure, usually by assuming symmetry, 
and then evaluate the impact of spillovers on R&D incentives. But as argued 
by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), market structure and R&D axe both endoge- 
nous variables, strongly interacting in their determination. We propose a model 
to analyse the implications of imperfect appropriability of R&D on welfare and 
market structure in a dynamic context where market structure and R&D feedback 
on each other. We pursue this analysis by extending the Maxkov-Perfect dynamic 
industry model proposed by Ericson and Palms (1995), through the introduction 
of a non-proprietary productivity component to R&D as part of a dynamic, sto- 
chastic process. The framework presented here captures the dynamic character 
of innovation and market structure. Dirthermore it allows for uncertainty in 
the outcome of the R&D activity and for heterogeneity of firms. Kan-iien and 
Schwartz (1971) and Reignanum. (1983) argue for the relevance of the assump- 
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tion of uncertainty versus determinism when modelling rivalry. Reinganum shows 
that uncertainty is not innocuous for pre-emptive patenting. Here, uncertainty 
will play a role in the escape competition motive, under which firms invest to 
gain a comfortable distance with respect to the followers. The assumption of 
heterogeneity gains one fiirther dimension in this context since a firm's state of 
development, as well as the state of development of its rivals, will affect the ratio 
of own R&D to external R&D. 
We analyse the effects of externalities on the rates of innovation, concentration 
and welfare measures under two distinct scenarios. We first examine the case of 
costless R&D spillovers, where firms can freely assimilate and exploit the external 
pool of knowledge as in Spence (1984). We then compare these results with those 
of the case of absorptive capacity, where it is assumed that a firm can only have the 
ability to identify, assimilate and make usage of the industry's outside knowledge 
if it pursues some positive level of R&D expenditures. Therefore, firms will build 
their absorptive capacity through the R&D they pursue to develop their own 
technology, as in Cohen and Levinthal (1989). 
We find that when firms can freely absorb and exploit external knowledge, 
spillovers have a negative impact on total welfare. There is, in fact, an increase 
in producers' welfaxe, which is fully driven by a decrease in the costs associated 
with the R&D activity. This decTease in costs is a result of the substitution of 
external R&D, which is free, for own R&D, which has -a positive unit cost. How- 
ever, these benefits will not be passed onto the consumers, because the marginal 
costs of production are not affected by the opportunity of cost saving associated 
with the existence of an alternative source of R&D. Furthermore, the lack of ap- 
propriability of R&D leads to a decrease in the amount of R&D undertaken in 
the industry. In the context of reduced appropriablility, the decision of investing 
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in R&D, besides increasing the firm's chances of success, also enhances the R&D 
stock of the rival firm, and consequently, the likelihood that the rival's maxginal 
costs will drop. This implies a loss of profitability for the firm choosing to make 
the costly investment in R&D. As a result of the disincentive to invest in R&D, the 
rate of innovation in the industry decreases. This will translate into an industry 
with less efficient firms and higher maxginal costs than under fall appropriability, 
which in turn implies higher prices and a loss of welfaxe for consumers. 
If 
-we rather assume 
that in order to absorb and exploit external R&D, firms 
have to develop absorptive capacity, which is built as a byý-product of R&D, then 
spillovers increase the productivity of R&D. Furthermore, this increase is higher 
for the follower firm in the industry because the spillover pool available to it is 
higher. Consequently, the gap between the state of the leader and the follower 
firm will decrease as well as the concentration levels as the industry moves from 
less to more competitive market structure. The dynamic incentives lead to a 
higher rate of innovation in the industry, and consequently the marginal costs of 
production in the industry fall and consumer surplus will increase. 
In the remainder of the chapter, we proceed as follows: Section 3.2 presents 
the analytical framework, distinguishing between the two cases considered, cost- 
less R&D spillovers and the absorptiva capacity case. Section 3.3.1 presents the 
methodology used to find the optimal policy surfaces, and section 3.2.3 discusses 
the optimal investment choices and the simulation results for the costless spillovers 
case and, similarly, section 3.3.3 presents and discusses the optimal policy sur- 
faces as well as the simulation results for the absorptive capacity case. Section 
3.4 concludes. 
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3.2 The Model 
We model a duopolistic industry where firms produce homogeneous goods and 
engage in Cournot competition in the spot market. Firms can invest in cost 
reducing R&D in order to increase their likelihood of success in innovation and 
hence, potentially lower their marginal cost of production and increase their mar- 
ket share. Thus, R&D enhances the chances of exploring profitable opportunities 
in the spot market. Therp are externalities to R&D investment because part of 
the R&D undertaken leaks to the industry pool of knowledge. The industry is 
characterised, at time t, by the firms' efficiency levels. These levels capture the 
state of development of a firm, and evolve over time according to the stochastic 
outcome of its innovative activity and to an exogenous stochastic process deter- 
mining the evolution of the factor price index in the industry. In each period, firms 
decide, through intertemporal optimization, how much to spend in R&D. Firms' 
decisions axe based on the information set available to them in each period, and 
on their predictions of others' future states, given that they know the probability 
laws governing the industry motion. The equilibrium is Markov-Perfect in the 
sense of Maskin and Tirole (1988), and it's a rational expectations equilibrium, 
i. e., the equilibrium is reached when the expectations of the firms about future 
states, axe the future states that are actually a consequence of those expectations 
(see E-P, 1995). 
3.2.1 The Spot Market 
The returns to innovation, and thus the incentives to invest in R&D, axe de- 
termined in the spot market. We model an industry is composed of two firms 
producing homogeneous goods. Marginal costs of production axe invaxiant with 
109 
respect to output, but they vary across firms reflecting the differences in their 
stodc of innovations. 
The demand for the industry product is assumed linear and is given by the 
foRowing inverse demand fimction: 
P(Q)=A-B(Q) withA, B>O 
where P(Q) is the price of the good produced, and Q the industry output. 
At the beginning of each period, and in order to decide how much quantity 
to supply to the spot maxket, firms compete in quantities and solve the following 
standard profit maximization problem: 
max 7ri = (P(Q) - mci)qi -f (3.2) 
where qj is the quantity produced by firm i and f is the fixed cost of produc- 
tion. 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium will determine the following optimal quantity 
choices: 
qi* = [A + mcj - 2mci] 13B (3.3) 
which will jointly determine the following equilibrium price: 
(A mcj + mci) /3 (3.4) 
Given equilibrium price and quantities, equilibrium firms' profits axe: 
7ri- = max 
[A + mcj - 2mc, 
12 
f (3.5) s 9B 
I 
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The firm will choose whether to produce or not to do so by comparing its 
marginal costs to the rival's. If a firm succeeds in innovating less often than its 
competitor, such that its marginal costs axe higher than that of its rival, then the 
firm will instead choose not to produce and just pay the amount of fixed costs. 
3.2.2 Dynamic Processes 
The profitability of a firm, at a given moment in time, is determined by its own 
marginal cost relative to its rival's. Marginal costs axe, in turn, fully determined 
by the efficiency level of firms, which capture their accumulated success in inno- 
vation. Therefore, the efficiency levels determine firms' profitability. However, 
its the relative position of the firm that determines its profits, not the absolute 
value of its efficiency level. 
Let wi E Z+ stand for the efficiency level of firm i. The mapping between the 
efficiency level and marginal costs of production of the ith firm at time t is given 
by: 
mcj = mcoe-'7'i (3.6) 
where 17 >0 captures the rate at which maxginal costs decrease with a unit 
increase in the efficiency level. I-Egher efficiency levels deliver lower marginal 
costs of production. 
The market structure of the industry given by the efficiency levels of the firms 
evolves over time as a result of the stochastic outcomes of two processes: 1) 
an exogenous process determining the evolution of the factor price index in the 
industry and 2) the investment process undertaken by firms. Given the efficiency 
level of firm i at time t, the realisations of the two stochastic outcomes will 
determine efficiency levels at time t+1. Letting primes refer to the values of the 
ill 
variables next period 
I Wi = wj+vj for i=1,2. (3.7) 
The outcome of the first of these processes, namely the one determining the 
evolution of the factor price index in the industry, is captured by the random 
variable The realisation of this variable is common to all firms in the industry, 
inducing some degree of correlation in firms' fates, as it changes all firms' costs 
simultaneously. C takes value 1 with probability 8>0, and zero with probability 
1-S. Positive reallsations of C increase marginal costs in the industry by ex- 
actly the same amount of the decrease in marginal costs driven by a successful 
innovation and we interpret them as increases in the factor price index. The sec- 
ond process is the firms' innovative activity, whose outcome is captured by the 
binary random variable vi. Firms invest in R&D in an attempt to enhance the 
likelihood of decreasing their marginal costs of production by means of successful 
innovation. The realisations of this random variable axe firm specific, and axe the 
source of heterogeneity in the industry. Since the realisations of C are industry 
wide, the differences in the efficiency levels (and therefore marginal costs) are due 
to the independent outcomes of firms' innovative activity. The efficiency levels of 
the firms are bounded from above by means of the positive realisations of ý. This 
dynamic process also generates continuous pressure for firms to invest in R&D. 
3.2.3 R, & D and Appropriability 
Let xit be the level of R&D expenditures of firm i at time t. following the specifi- 
cation in Levin and Reiss (1988) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989), we express the 
total amount of innovative R&D that firm i can utilise, to pursue its innovative 
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purposes, mi, as foHows: 
mi = xi +, yi(xi)bX-i (3.8) 
where 0<b<1 is a parameter capturing the extent of the intraindustry 
spillovers, i. e., the fraction of rivals' R&D made available to the firm. X-j = 
Ej: oi xj is the amount of R&D undertaken by all firm i's rivals at a given moment 
in time. In this duopoly set up, X-j will simply be given by the amount of R&D 
pursued by the rival firm, xj. We drop time subscripts for simplicity reasons. 
The extent of spillovers depends on the ease of imitation, patent policies, 
worker mobility, the amount of knowledge embodied in the output of innovation 
process, etc. Larger b implies that a higher proportion of firms' R&D investment 
is spilling into the industry pool of knowledge. If b is set to zero, then R&D is 
perfectly appropriable and we obtain the specification in E-P (1995). If b equals 
unity, then all the R&D in the industry becomes publicly accessible, but not 
necessarily used because how much of it the firm is able to absorb depends on the 
absorptive capacity, which might be costly. When b>0, some R&D is becoming 
public knowledge and bXi will be the portion of others' R&D that the firm will 
potentially use. 
The function yj determines the absorptive capacity of the firm and lies in the 
range 0< -yj < 1. The functional form for the absorptive capacity of firm i is 
given by: 
lyi f (xi) 
*, Yxi 
where 
0=0 Costless SpiHovers Case 
+ Yxi Absorptive Capacity Case. 
(3.9) 
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where the parameter y governs the productivity of the firm's R&D invest- 
ment in improving its ability to assimilate and utilize external R&D. This func- 
tional form accounts for the two cases of limited appropriability. In the Costless 
Spillovers case yj = 1, Vxj and hence external R&D is a pure public good, cost- 
lessly acquired by the firms in the industry. The amount of usable R&D of firm 
i becomes: 
mi = xi + bxj. 
This specification implies that a firm can develop a process innovation, even 
if it does not pursue any R&D of its own. Fligher b implies that the firm can 
rely more on rival's R&D and substitute it for own R&D and it also entails a 
detrimental effect on a firm's incentives to engage in R&D expenditures that 
arises from the possibility that the rival free rides on the firm's own R&D. This 
is the case addressed by the initial literature on the appropriability of R&D such 
as Spence (1984), D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). 
In the absorptive capacity case, Arms require research personnel, laboratories 
or some technological knowledge in order to learn from the external pool of R&D. 
As in Cohen and Levinthal (1989), the fact that the firm engages in R&D for 
innovating has the side effect of enhancing its absorptive capacity. Equation 
(3.9) implies that the absorptive capacity of firm i is a monotonically increasing 
concave function of R&D investment (f. >0 and f.. ý < 0). Furthermore, if the 
firm does not engage in R&D of its own, it will not be able to succeed in innovation 
(y(O) = 0). The parameter -y in the equation above captures the productivity of 
investment in increasing firm i's absorptive capacity and is related with the ease 
of learning associated with the specificities of the technological knowledge, e. g. 
highly sophisticated and complex in contrast to easily recognisable knowledge. 
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Hence, while parameter b (extent parameter) captures the R&D made available 
in the industry, -yj (absorptive capacity paxameter) determines the fraction of it 
that the firm will effectively assimilate and use. For positive levels of spending in 
R&D, the firm will be able to absorb and exploit a portion -Yj of the spillover pool 
(bXi ), adding yibXi to its usable R&D. As implied by (3.8), the total amount 
of R&D a given firm i will have at a given moment of time will be the sum of 
its own R&D and the fraction of the rival's R&D that it can absorb from intra 
industry spillovers. 
The amount of usable R&D devoted to innovation increases the probability of 
success and hence the chances of improving its efficiency level, wi. The outcome 
of firm i's innovative activity, captured by the random variable vi, is given by: 
Vi 
1 with probabiRty p(vi) (3.10) 
0 with probabflity 1- p(vi) 
where 
ami 
P(vi) -+ ami 
thus, when the binaxy variable vi talms value 1, the firm is successful in in- 
novating. In equation (3.11), a indicates the productivity of usable knowledge 
in increasing the likelihood of developing an innovation. This is basically the 
technological opportunity in the industry, i. e., the difficulty of innovating in the 
industry, and it is related to the stage of development of scientific knowledge and 
other knowledge specific characteristics. 
The probability of an increase in the efficiency level of firm i can be expressed 
as: 
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1 (1 - L)ami a (xi + -yi(xi)bxj) Probability (wi = Wi + 1+ami +a (xi +, yi(xi)bxj) 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a paxameterized example of how the probability of in- 
novation changes with own and rival's R&D investment. The graphs show the 
probability of innovation associated with a combination (xi, Xj) of own R&D (in 
the x-axis) and rival's R&D (in the y-axis). For the purposes of this illustration, 
productivity paxameters a and -y are set to 0.5 and 1, respectively. Fig 3.1 a) 
depicts a situation of My appropriable R&D, which is the same as saying that b 
is set to zero, such that the only input to the innovative activity is the knowledge 
the firm develops by pursuing R&D spending. 
This figure makes clear the decreasing marginal returns of R&D to the prob- 
ability of innovation showing a monotonically increasing concave relationship be- 
tween R&D and the probability of innovation. Under full appropriability, rival's 
R&D is irrelevant for the probability of innovation, since it does not translate 
into external R&D. 
Fig 3.1b) and 3.1c), on the other hand, depict a situation where 20% of the 
R&D undertaken in the industry spills to the common pool of knowledge (b 
= 0.2). Figure 3.1b) captures the costless spillovers case, where firms can achieve 
succ ess in innovation even if they do not pursue positive amounts of R&D spend- 
ing because they allocate to the innovative activity the external R&D that they 
absorb. Figure 3-1c) illustrates the absorptive capacity case and shows how a 
firm can experience an increase in its probability of developing an innovation due 
to the increase in the amount of R&D undertaken by the rival firm. Under this 
scenaxio, and as can be seen in the figure, an increase in the public pool of knowl- 
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edge will only translate into higher probability of innovation if the firm conducts 
some R&D of its own. The higher the firm's own investment effort, the higher 
the impact of a unit of external R&D in its probability of innovation. There are 
also decreasing marginal returns to rivals R&D, as shown by the concavity of 
the probability of innovation with respect to the common pool of knowledge. In 
the case of absorptive capacity, the impact of a small increase in rival's R&D is 
large2, but smaller than the impact for the probability of success of an increase 
of the same magnitude in the expenditures in own R&D. 
3.2.4 Dynamic Equilibrium 
In each period of time, firms choose the level of R&D expenditures that maximize 
the expected present value of their future strewn of profits. This optimal ýhqice 
requires the perception of rivals' future states. Let s= [wi] be a vector which 
describes the market structure by listing the efficiency level of each firm at a given 
moment in time, and pr(wi', s' I x, wi, s) denote a firm's perceptions of the joint 
probability that its efficiency will evolve to wi in the next period, and that the 
market structure it faces will be s', conditional on the vector of R&D investment 
for the two firms, x, its current state and current market structure. Then the 
optimal investment choice is the one solving the following Bellman equation: 
Vi(wi, s) =maxj-7r(wj, s) - cxi + #EtVi(wi, s)} (3.12) xi! O 
where 8= 1/(l + r), with r standing for the interest rate, is the discount 
factor, common to all firnis, and c is the unit cost of R&D investment. Given 
2Except for the absorptive capacity case when the level of own R&D investment is zero, in 
which case the external pool of R&D cannot be used by the firm, and consequently leaves the 
probability of innovation at zero. 
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the optimal investment choice x,?, the firm receives the maximum value of the 
stun of current period profits minus its investment expenditures in R&D, plus the 
discounted value of the future payoffs conditional on future market structures. In 
order to solve for value maximization, firms sum over the values of all possible 
future states weighted by their probability of occurrence. Given the transition 
matrix of the probabilities that the maxket structure moves from its current state 
to all other possible states, we can write (3.12) as: 
Vi(w s) = max{7r(wi,. s) - cxi + ßVi(wi, s)pr(wi, s' 1 x, wi, s)} mi5; 0 
To understand the impact of the extent of spillovers, we need to understand 
the basic shape of the value function. Figure 3.5 shows the solution to the value 
function for firm 1 using the parameters listed in Table 3.1 in appendix with 
b=0. The x-axis represents firm 1's efficiency level, the y-axis is the rival firm's 
(firm 2) efficiency level, and the z-aNis is firm 1's value. Higher efficiency levels 
mean lower marginal costs. Thus, firm l's value increases in its own efficiency 
level due to higher current and expected profits, while its value decreases in its 
rival's efficiency level. Holding the rival firm's efficiency level fixed, the value 
function takes a distinctly convex shape at low levels of efficiency, and after 
some point it then becomes concave. At the extreme ends, the value function 
is relatively flat. In these regions, firms enter coasting states where they cease 
R&D as they hit the non-negativity constraint. Firms too small to compete cease 
R&D because the marginal gains are too small relative to the costs given that its 
rival has such a laxge advantage. However, as the gap in efficiency levels shrinks, 
the value increases at an increasing rate creating laxger maxginal increments in 
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value. Eventually, with higher relative efficiency levels, the firm enters the concave 
portion of the value: ftmction. This region represents a firm with most or all of the 
market that achieves little benefit from reducing costs because it captures little, 
if any, additional maxket shaxe from its rival and it faces diminishing returns in 
the product market. 
Let C, (w'i + 1, sý) denote the expected value of the firm conditional on success 
in innovating, and C2 Q the expect value in the case it fails to develop an 
innovation. Then one can rewrite (3.13) as: 
ir(wi, s) - cxi+ß [pr(wi, s' 1 X, Wi, S)CJ(di+ l's, Vi (wi, s) = max ýl-pr(w 
it S' 
1 Xi Wij S)] C2(Wýi SI)] 
1 
Furthermore, both the expected values of the firm conditional on success (Cl), 
and its expected value conditional on failure, (C2), can be expressed in ternis of 
the two possible outcomes for the rival firm (firm j): 
C, Mi + 1, S, M) = pr (Wi, S, I X, wj, S) Cii (wsý + 1, S, = (Wý + 1, wj' + 1)) ms (3.15) 
+ [1-Pr(Wj, S' I X, Wj, S)] C12(&i + li Slm = (&i + 
- and 
C2(Uýii81m) : --Pr(WjiS" 1 XiWjiS)C2l(Uý981m ---: 
(UýyWjp +1» 0 
+ [l -Pr (Wj t S" 
1 X, Wi, S)] C22 (Wi, Sim `-' (Wt ) Uýj» y 
where C1, is the fim's value conditional on both its own and its rival's success; 
C12 is the firm's value when it is successful and its rival fails to develop an 
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innovation; C21 is the firm's value conditional on its own failure and its rival's 
success in innovating; and finally, C22 is the firm's value associated with the failure 
of both itself and its rival. Hence, the value of the firm conditional on its success, 
(Cl), and its lack of success in innovating (C2) will be the weighted average of 
the two possible outcomes for the rival firm (success/failure), where the weight of 
each of these outcomes is given by the rival firm's probability of success/failure. 
Given that a firm's value is monotonically increasing in it's efficiency level, and 
decreasing in that of its rival, the following relationship holds: C12 > C11 and 
C22 > C21. A higher value is attached to an outcome involving the firm's success 
and the rival's failure, with the lowest value being associated with its failure and 
its rival's success. The profit function has those relations and the value function 
heavily reflects the profits, so the relationship between the values associated with 
different outcomes follow from that. 
The problem can therefore be written as: 
ir(wi, s) - cxj+ 
vi ws max '8 
a(xi+-fi(. i)bxj) a(zj+-yj(xj)bxi) Cii +1 C12 + 
I+a(xi+, yi(xi)bxj) 
I 
1+a(xj+-yj(xj)b-i) 1+a(-j+-yj(. Tj)F-7i 
bxi 
1 C21 + C22 
1+a(xi+-yi(xi)Fxj) x 1+a(xj4-yj(xj)bxi 1+a(xj+-fj(xj) 
Fx-i 
(3.17) 
The difference between this dynamic problem and the one which departs from 
the assumption of full appropriability resides on the fact that, due to the ex- 
ternalities of R&D investment, the outcome of the rival's R&D process is not 
independent of the firm's R&D investment. My rational firms take this strate- 
gic effect of their R&D spending into account when deciding the optimal level of 
their R&D investment. 
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Taking the derivative of (3.17) with respect to xi: 
avi -C a---L ami + axi (Cl - C2) ++ ami Cll+ (3.18) axi (1 + ami)2 (1 + amj )2 
1 aa'j 1 C21 ax. r ami C12+-f -+C22 
+ )2 aMi a' 
[Y + ami ami 1+ami 
I 
mi 
I 
where (Cl - C2) is simply the maxginal value gain from innovating. Let - 
(Cl* - C2*) be the differential value between the outcome in which the rival inno- 
vates, and that in which the rival experiences failure in innovation, Le.: 
C (W'i, S',,, ) 
ami Cii+ 
1 
C21 (3.19) 11m 
+ami 1+ ami 
ami I C2 
+ ami 
C12+ 
+ ami 
C22- (3.20) 
Then we can rewrite the first order condition in a simplified. form: 
avi -C aa axi 4 (3.21) (C* ý7x, + (1 + ami)2 
(Cl 
- C2) + 
(1 + amj )2 
il - CD 0 
The firm's value function is monotonically increasing in its own efficiency level, 
and monotonically decreasing in the efficiency level of the rival. Thus, the firm 
experiences a value increase when it sees its position relative to the rival improve, 
i. e., (Cl - C2) is positive, and t4e firm is better off if the rival fails to innovate then 
when it is successful, i. e., (Cl* - C2*) is negative. Again, these reflect the higher 
current and expected profits associated with successfull innovation outcomes for 
the firm and with rival's faillure, as both translate into an improvement in the 
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firm's relative state. 
While in the second chapter, it was not possible to ensure the existence of 
equilibrium in pure strategies due to entry and exit decisions, these problems do 
not arise here, as we abstract from entry and e--, dt3. Concerning potential multiple 
equilibrium, since entry and exit decision, which are discrete, are an important 
source of these multiple equilibrium, having a fixed number of firms reduces the 
likelihood that multiple equilibrium arise. Furthermore, this reduction is stronger 
in the context of an industry with a very small number of agents, which is a feature 
of the model presented here (duopoly). 
For each level of R&D spending, the probability of innovation when spillovers 
are costless differs from that of the absorptive capacity case, which entails different 
formulations for the Bellman equation. This justifies the separate treatment we 
assign to the dynamic equilibrium in each of these two scenarios. 
Costless R&D SpiHovers 
Myopic R. &D Choice In order to disentangle the economic forces at work in 
the model, as well as the sources of the impact of spillovers on the incentives to 
conduct R&D, we start by presenting the R&D choices which firms would pursue 
if they behaved myopically, i. e., if they did not internalize the strategic effect of 
their investment decisions on their rival's transition matrix. Myopic firms are 
assumed to ignore the (positive) impact that their decision of engaging in R&D 
has on promoting the rival's chances in being successful in innovation, which 
implies, given the structure of the model, a deterioration in the firm's profits 
and, consequently, its value. Analytically, this implies ignoring the third term in 
3More details on these issues can be found in the appendix to Chapter 2, where the Pakes 
et al. algorithm is briefly presented -and discussed. 
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the first order condition set out in equation (3.21): 
-C a ++ 
a(xi + bxj))2 
(cl 
- C2) (3.22) 
Solving the equation with respect to x*, we obtain the optimal choice of R&D 
investment when there axe costless R&D spUlovers and firms behave myopically: 
xe 
1 [ýl(Cl C2), ß 
l] bx'.. 1a1 
(3.23) 
Substituting the analytical formula for the, optimal choice for the rival's in- 
vestment, we obtain the best response function for investment by firm j: 
C2)ß C226 
+b-1 (3.24) - býI-C1 cc 
(, IC-l --C2 
- b%fCl§ 
--C2§) +b-1 (3.25) 
c1 
where C1 §- C2§ denotes the marginal value gain from innovating for the rival. 
The relationship between C1 - C2 and C11 - C2§ depends on the relative slope 
of the value function at the states where both the firm and its rival are. 
The solution in (3.23) is similar to the optimal R&D investment under full 
appropriability (the original Ericson-Pakes (1995) set up), the only difference 
residing on the last term (-bxj), which reduces the R&D choice. Since firms 
benefit from rivals' R&D, and provided xj > 0, they can lower their level of 
R&D expenditures without reducing the rate of innovation. This negative effect 
of spillovers in R&D investment has been widely discussed in the literature and 
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we refer to it as the substitution effect Holding the level of rival's R&D fixed, 
the larger the extent of spillovers, the higher the reduction in own R&D due to 
the substitution effect. However, xj is an endogenous variable, and the last term 
captures both the direct effect of spillovers, in decreasing a firm's own R&D, as 
well as the indirect effect through the impact of b on the rival's R&D, xj. The first 
term of the R&D choice in (3.23) might also differ from the full appropriability 
choice to the extent that the marginal value gain from innovation (CI - C2) is 
endogenous with respect to b. A change in the extent parameter may change the 
slope of the value function by means of the positive cost effect and its impact on 
the distribution of the incentives to invest, which in turn depend on the amount 
of R&D undertaken by the rival and the productivity of own R&D in decreasing 
marginal costs. 
If we substitute the expression for the optimal amount of own R&D spending 
into the expression for the optimal level of total usable R&D, we obtain: 
me = X? + aZ bxj (3.26) 
me =1 
[a(Cl - C2)ß] 
1/2 
-1 1aca 
The expression for the total level of usable R&D (m? ) by a myopic firm in S 
a setting with costless R&D spillovers is analogous to the one presented in FP 
(1995) for optimal R&D investment (xi*) in the case of fully appropriable R&D. 
Consequently, the expression for the optimal probability of innovation will also 
be analogous to that of the full apropriability case. The firm will be choosing 
the combinations of in-house and outside R&D to input into the knowledge pro- 
duction function (3.11) that allow incurring in the lowest possible investment 
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cost (cxj) while delivering the optimal amount of total usable R&D, W. In this 
R&D program, own and external R&D are substitute investments since increases 
in bxj*, ceteris pa-ribus, decrease xj* in order to maintain m* at its optimal level. 
Therefore, the shaxe of external R&D in rA* is bigger the more favourable the 
conditions for spillovers in R&D, and the higher the unit cost of own R&D. 
This does not imply, however, that m? in this specification is equal to the S 
optimal amount of own R&D investment in E-P (1995), since the presence of 
spillovers will have an impact on the incremental value from innovation (Cl - C2). 
Spillovers aff6ct the incremental value from innovation to the extent that they 
affect the slope of the value function, and consequently the incentives to invest. 
This impact is made both through the cost saving emerging from the existence of 
a pool of R&D, as well as through the changes in the transition matrix. We can 
not conclude about the dirpction of this effect, but the simulations we performed 
showed it to be small relative to the other effects'. Thus, we do not expect costless 
spillovers to significantly affict the rate of innovation when firnis axe myopic with 
respect to the strategic effect of their R&D investment choices. The relative 
efficiency levels, which are determined by the rates of innovation of the two firms 
in the industry, shape the market structure in this model. Consequently, the level 
of concentration should remain fairly unchanged with vaxiations in the degree of 
appropriability of R&D. 
The price paid by consumers reflects the marginal costs of production, which 
depend on firms' efficiency levels. What matters in terms of consumers' welfare 
is not the level of own R&D undertaken by the firm (xi), but rather the rate of 
innovation which depends on the total amount of R&D (mi) the firm is able to 
devote to the research process, independently of whether it's the firm's own R&D 
4These results are presented and discussed in section 3.3. 
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investment or the rival's R&D. Firms utilise outside knowledge as a substitute 
for their own efforts and reduce costs which leads to lower R&D expenditure, but 
the use of outside knowledge allows the rates of innovation to remain the same. 
Consequently, when firms are myopic, costless R&D spillovers axe not expected 
to have a significant impact on market structure and consumer welfare. 
Fully Strategic R&D Choice We now abandon the hypothesis of bounded 
rationality, and assume that firms Hly account, in their R&D decisions, for, the 
impact of their investment spending on the rival's chances of success. The first 
order condition for finding the optimal policy function for R&D investment can 
then be written as follows: 
-C a ab 0+ -% -%2 (C1 - C2) + -,,, 2 (Cl* - C2*), (3.27) (1 + a(xi + bxj)) (1 + a(xj + bxi)) 
which differs from the first order condition for the myopic case (eq (3.22)) in 
the last term, which captures the strategic effect of spillovers on a firm's R&D 
choice. All the parameters in this term axe positive, there is a non-negativity 
constraint on the levels of xi and xj, and (Cl* - C2*) < 0, henceforth the term 
is negative. Consequently, a lower level of R&D is required for optimality. This 
is so because a firm's efficiency level will be stochastically increasing in its own 
R&D investment as well as in the external R&D it absorbs, but its profitability, 
and hence its value, will be stochastically decreasing in the amount of R&D 
the rival inputs to its innovative activity, which is higher the larger the pool of 
external R&D made available. When choosing its R&D expenditure the firm will 
anticipate the positive impact on the rival's probability of success. The strategic 
effect driven by the imperfect appropriability of R&D investment generates a 
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free rider problem and decreases a firm's incentive to invest even further with 
respect to the myopic R&D choice. Note that in the myopic case of costless 
spillovers, despite the reduction in the level of own R&D expenditures due to 
the substitution effect, the total amount of R&D devoted to innovation remains 
fairly similar to the ftffl appropriability level. Consequently, we expect the level 
of R&D investment, and thus the rate of innovation in the industry, to be lower 
than in the myopic case. 
Solving implicitly for the optimal level of total usable R&D, we obtain: 
1 a(Cl - C2)p + ýbfl 
1+ ami 
2*- 1/2 
M! (Cl* - C2*) s-acc+ amj 
)a 
(3.28) 
This solution differs from the myopic case in the last term inside brackets, 
which is negative. Holding the marginal increment in value (Cl. - C2) constant, 
the total amount of usable R&D that fully rational firms devote to the process of 
developing new innovations is smaller in the presence of costless R&D spillovers 
than in the set up where firms are able to fidly appropriate their R&D investment. 
Since the total amount of R&D inputted to the innovative activity is expected to 
be smaller, the rate of innovation associated with an industry with fidly strategic 
(rather then myopic) firms will be smaller. With less frequent innovations, and a 
less favourable innovation path, the marginal costs in the industry will be higher 
than under full appropriability, and consequently, spillovers will lead to a decrease 
in consumer welfare. 
The first order condition in (3-27) has no analytical solution. The optimal 
amount of firms' R&D investment is determined numerically within the value 
function iteration algorithm. In section 3.3.2, we analyse the results of simu- 
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v 
lating this set up in order to evaluate whether the magnitude of the change in 
(Cl - C2) is how we expect and to conclude about how costless R&D spillovers af- 
fect the optimal probability of innovation, and thus maxket structure and welfare 
measures. 
The Case of Absorptive Capacity 
Myopic R&D Choices When the absorption and exploitation of spillovers 
requires the firm pursuing some positive level of R&D investment, the amount of 
usable R&D differs from the one in the costless spillovers case. The absorptive ca, 
pacity case introduces a new role to a firm's own R&D expenditures, the learning 
incentive of R&D investment. The free riding problem of knowledge externalities 
might eventually be compensated by the role of R&D in increasing the ability of 
the firm to assimilate and exploit the knowledge which is made available to it at 
the expense of rivals' costs. As before, we start by addressing the myopic case. 
The first order condition for the dynamic problem of a myopic firm, in the case 
of absorptive capacity, is as follows: 
a 
(1 + avi -C 
bxj) 
7=T+ 
C2) =0 (3.29) 
x1+ a(xi +b "'i xj) 
-2 
(cl 
1+-Yxi 
Solving implicitly for the optimal level of total usable R&D of myopic firms 
we obtain: 
1 [a(Cl - C2), B 'y bxj) 
] 
1/2 
-1 M* - 
(1 
++ 
_YX, ]2 
(3.30) 
ca 
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Holding the marginal value gain constant, this solution differs from the full 
appropriability case (and thus the costless myopic) in the second term inside 
the curly brackets, which is positive. This term captures the increase in the 
productivity of R&D in the absorptive capacity case. An extra unit of own R&D 
not only adds a further unit to total usable ]R&D through its lineax contribution 
to m*, it also increases the level of rival's R&D that the firm is able to add to 
its R&D stock. Thus, we expect to find that R&D spillovers in the absorptive 
capacity case increase the rate of innovation in the industry with respect to both 
the full appropriability and the costless spillovers cases. Myopic firms take the 
learning effect of R&D into account when making their decisions and increase 
their R&D spending as a response to the increased productivity associated with 
the absorptive capacity. 
Fully Strategic R, &D Choices Fully strategic firms in the absorptive capac- 
ity case will fully account for the impact of their R&D decisions on the chan: ces 
of the rival being successful in innovating. In the absorptive capacity case, we 
allow firms to take into account, in their choices of xi , the learning incentive of 
R&D investment, as well as the fact that they also contribute to the rivals' inno- 
vative activity by expanding the industry pool of R&D becoming available in the 
industry. The free riding problem of knowledge externalities might eventually be 
compensated by the role of R&D in increasing the ability of the firm to assimilate 
and exploit the knowledge which is made available to it at the expense of rivals' 
costs. The absorptive capacity requirement win change the impact of a firm's 
R&D choice on its rival's rate of innovation. 
The R&D prograin. of fiffly strategic firms in the absorptive capacity case will 
be the one solving the following first order condition: 
129 
a+ bxj 
k2 
(cl 
- C2) (3.31) 
18 + a(xi +b "" xj)) 1+-Yxi 
ami ab "I + 1-f-yxj -, 2 [Cll-cl2l 1+ ami (1 +a (xi +b "'I xi) 1+-fxj 
) 
ami ab ýý. L 1 F-Yxj 
,2 
[C21 
- C22] 
ami (1 +a (xi +b "" xi) 
2 
which yields the following implicit solution for total usable R&D: 
M! =1 
[a(Cl - C2), 8 (1 + -y bxj 
ac [1 
(3.32) 
41 yXj 
) 
(Cl +ab, 
6 1+ ami 
1/2 
c 
(1+amj 
1+ -yxj 
C2 
a 
(3.33) 
When comPared with the solution in (3.28) for the fiffly strategic costless 
case, this solution differs in the two terms associated with the absorptive capac- 
ity, -y(xi). The first term, as we already discussed in the myopic case, is related 
with the increase in the productivity of R&D. In the second, the expression 1+-yxj 
for the absorptive capacity of the rival (firm j), appears multiplicatively in the 
strategic effect. The requirement of building absorptive capacity to explore ex- 
ternal knowledge increases the productivity of own R&D, on the one hand, and 
restricts the portion of the firm's R&D that the rival is able to absorb, on the 
other. However, since the strategic term is negative, the expression in (3.32) al- 
lows concluding that, holding marginal value gains constant, the amount of R&D 
devoted to innovation in the absorptive capacity case is lower when firms behave 
130 
rationally than when they choose R, &D myopically. 
Since there is no explicit analytical solution for the optimal level of R&D 
investment in the fully strategic case of absorptive capacity, we analyse the effects 
of R&D spillovers in this case in section 3.3.3. 
3.3 Numerical Results 
3.3.1 Methodology 
In what follows we address the results concerning the impact of R&D spillovers on 
concentration and welfare by simulating the evolution of industry market struc- 
ture. We interpret the results obtained in order to conclude about the relative 
magnitude of the effects involved, given that the limitations of the analytical 
analysis only allowed us to infer about the expected direction of these effects. 
The numerical algorithm solves for the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium pol- 
icy functions for investment and values associated, providing the equilibrium 
strategies Jxj(wj, s), Vj(wj, s)j for all wi E W, and all sES. The simulation 
program then uses these equilibrium policies to stochastically generate the evo- 
lution of the market structure of the industry, which is an ergodic process. As 
noted in the appendix to Chapter 2, where a description of the core of the Pakes 
et al. algorithm is presented, multiple equilibrium cannot be ruled out in the 
original framework proposed by Ericson Pakes. However, multiple equilibria in 
the model are associated with entry and exit decisions which is not a feature of 
the model presented here. We simulate the costless and absorptive capacity cases 
of the model 100.000 times each for various values of parameter b, the extent of 
spillovers, to obtain the numerical results for the ergodic distributions of market 
structures and the expected discounted value of the welfare measures for different 
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levels of R&D appropriability. 
We allow for the extent of spillovers to go from fully appropriable R&D to 
complete spillovers, with jumps of 10% in the extent of knowledge becoming 
available in the industry. In a few cases, when the spillovers paxameter reached 
b=0.9 and 1.0, firms began exceeding the maximum efficiency level. Thus, we 
only present the results for the range between b=0 and a situation where 80% 
of the R&D firms undertaken leaks to the public stock of knowledge, as these axe 
enough to demonstrate the predictions of section 3.2. The paxameter values used 
for the simulation of the model are as in table 3.1 at the end of the chapter. 
3.3.2 Costless R&D Spillovers 
Optimal Polic- 
.ý 
Rmctions 
In order to evaluate the impact of imperfect appropriability of R&D on market 
structure, we analyse how the optimal policy functions for all possible market 
structures change when spiRovers increase. Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal policy 
surface for R&D investment for My rational firms at different levels of external- 
ities, namely full appropriability (b = 0), 20%, 50% and 80% of R&D spillovers. 
In the figures, each point in the grid formed by the x and the y =is- corresponds 
to one possible combination of firms' efficiency levels, i. e., one possible market 
structure. The vertical aids gives a firm's (say, firm 1) optimal level of investment 
as a function of its own efficiency level (wj) and its competitor's efficiency level 
(W2)- 
As depicted in figure 3.2, firm 1's investment initially increases with the 
firm's own level of efficiency, reaches a maximum at the inflection point (around 
w, = 5), and thereafter it decreases with wl. 
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These properties of the optimal policy function for investment derive from 
the fact that the value fimction as defined in E-P (1995) is bounded above and 
below, such that it is initially a convex and then a concave function of the firm's 
own efficiency level. Consequently, the incremental value from innovating when 
the firm has a high efficiency level is very small, and the firm has little incentive 
to invest in R&D. 
As costless spillovers increase, there is a noticeable slump in the amount of 
investment of firm 1 around the market structures where the rival has efficiency 
level 5. At these market structures, the competitor is investing heavily in R&D 
and the external pool of R&D potentially available to firm 1 is at its maximum. 
The higher b, when the rival is investing heavily, the higher the reduction in firm 
i's R&D. Therefore, as b increases, the firm will substitute external for own R&D. 
This substitution occurs more intensively when the rival is investing heavily in 
R&D, which happens when w2 =5 because of the convexity of the rival's value at 
that state. We refer to the top left panel of figure 3.2 (page 148), where it is seen 
that the maximum investment by the rival occurs around an average of about 5, 
i. e., in the middle of the range shown. Figure 3.2 shows how the composition of 
the R&D program is changing with the increase in the extent of spillovers, but 
in order to evaluate the impact on market structure it is necessary to analyse 
what happens to the value function and the probability of success when spillovers 
increase. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the change in the probability of success 
and firm's value when there axe externalities to R&D. The vertical axis in figure 
3.3 gives the probability of success when there axe spillovers to R&D minus the 
probability of success when R&D is fully appropriable for each market structure. 
According to Figure 3.3, for some market structures, changes in b lead to very 
small changes in the optimal probability of innovation. However, the optimal 
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probability of innovation for firm 1 experiences a significant increase for most 
market structures where the rival firm has an efficiency level, W2, around 5. From 
figure 3.2, it is made clear that at efficiency level 5 firms are strongly engaging 
in R&D investment. This increment in the probability of innovation of firm 1 is 
especially significant for market structures where firm 1 has a very high efficiency 
level, and those where it has a particularly low efficiency level. At those market 
structures, firm 1 has little incentive to perform R&D (as made clear in figure 
3.2), and so all the R&D it devotes to innovation is outside R&D steaming from 
the intense R&D activity of firm 2. Furthermore, the increases in the probability 
of innovation of firm 1 axe higher when it holds a dominant position in the market 
(to the left of the diagonal) than when the firm is the follower firm in the industry 
(market structures to the right of the diagonal). 'The fact that the probability of 
reducing marginal costs is higher when the firm has a strong lead suggests that 
costless R&D spiRovers increase the concentration level. In market structures 
where firm 1 has a high efficiency level and firm 2 has a very small efficiency 
level, the probability of innovation of firm 1 decreases as spillovers, increase. At 
these market structures, the incentives for firm 1 to invest are minimal because 
this firm is in the upper end of the value function, where further innovations 
will generate very small increments to the firm's value, and moreover the rival 
can increase its value significantly by enhancing the amount of R&D devoted to 
innovative activity and thus highly benefit from spillovers. Figure 3.4 depicts the 
change in value that emerges from an increase in the extent of costless spillovers. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates that for many of the market structures, spillovers lead 
to an increase in value mainly due to the fall in the costs of financing R&D that 
follows from the emergence of an alternative type of investment. This increase 
in value is particularly significant at market structures where the rival firm is 
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strongly engaging in R&D. However, the market structures for which figure 3.3 
show a higher increase in probability do not correspond to those where the value 
increase is higher. This apparent contradiction is related to the shape of the value 
function. Figure 3.5 depicts the value function, for b=0. At market structures for 
which firm 1 has a very high efficiency level, the incremental value for innovation 
is very small due to the concavity of the value function at those efficiency levels. 
The higher increases in value with the extent in spillovers shown in figure 3.4 
correspond, in turn, to market structures for which, in spite of having a smaller 
increase in the optimal probability of innovation, the marginal value gain from 
innovation is higher due to the convexity of the value function at those market' 
structures, as depicted in figure 3.5. However, figure 3.4 shows an exception to this 
situation at market structures where firm 1 has efficiency level of approximately 
5, and for which the slope of the value function is at its highest but there is no 
matching increase in value from spillovers. This slump in firm 1's value differential 
is due to the fact that at those efficiency levels, firm 1 is strongly engaging in 
R&D and firm 2 is free-riding on this R&D spending. This effect lessens the value 
gains from spillovers for firm 1 at those market structures. 
Simulation Results 
In our search for the impact of costless R&D spillovers on the evolution of market 
structure, we now turn to the probability of occurrence of each of the market struc- 
tures associated with the ergodic: distribution of market structures we obtained 
from simulating the model. We also register mean investment, mean value and 
ihean probability for each value of b, i. e., for each degree of R&D spillovers. VvUle 
previously we addressed the optimal policy functions for every possible market 
structure, in what follows we look at the results of simulating the evolution of 
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firms' states, and thus market structure, departing from an initial condition and 
given the optimal policy functions discussed above. Figure 3.6 depicts the er- 
godic distribution of the market structures obtained from the simulations, i. e., it 
informs about the frequency with which a certain maxket structure was visited 
out of the hundred thousand periods of industry dynamics. 
The grid represents all possible combinations of the efficiency levels of the two 
firms in the industry. The vertical aids registers the frequency of occurrence of 
each of these market structures. The market structures are represented as weakly 
descending tuples of the efficiency levels of the firms such that there are no events 
to the right of the diagonal of the grid because there cannot be a market structure 
where the leader has a lower efficiency level then the follower firm. As spillovers 
increase, the symmetric mode where both firms axe relatively efficient disappears. 
The mass of the distribution moves towards the asymmetric mode, at the same 
time as the likelihood of occurrence of higher efficiency levels decreases for both 
firms. Thus, as spillovers increase firms compete less fiercely but, on the other 
hand, the likelihood of more asymmetric market structures increases. The results 
for the myopic case axe not presented here, but it suffices to say that the market 
structure stays fairly unchanged as costless spillovers increase. This implies that 
the changes we described for the market structure of the fully strategic case ax6 
all attributable to the strategic effect. Figure 3.7 shows the percentage change in 
the concentration index C, when we allow for externalities in R&D with respect 
to the complete appropriability case. The solid line corresponds to the results 
of simulating the set up assuming rational firms and the dashed line illustrates 
the results of simulating the model departing from the assumption of myopic 
firms. We perform this exercise since it helps elucidating which impacts arise 
from the-strategic effect of spillovers. The levels of concentration do not seem 
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to change much with the increase in costless R&D spillovers. When firms are 
myopic, given that most variations in C, are below the tolerance level used for 
finding the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium of the model, it seems fair to say that 
the level of concentration in the industry stays fairly unchanged in the presence of 
spillovers. When firms behave fully rationally, the level of concentration initially 
decreases and then from b=0.5 onwards it increases with the extent of spillovers, 
although the variations are of small magnitude throughout. The difference in the 
impact of b on the concentration index is due to the strategic effect. For b bellow 
0.5, given that the follower will free ride on its R&D expenditure, the leader will 
experience a disincentive to invest. The leader's probability of innovation will 
decrease together with an increase in the follower's likelihood of success, causing 
a decrease in concentration. However, for high enough spillovers, the leader starts 
increasing its investment. In spite of the fact that the follower is free riding, the 
decrease in its R&D investment widens the gap between the follower and the 
leader, such that concentration starts rising. 
Figure 3.8 shows mean R&D investment, mean probability of innovation and 
mean firm's value obtained from the simulations for the different levels of the 
extent of spillovers. The graphs on the left, with the solid lines, correspond to 
the results for rational firms and the graphs on the right, with the dashed lines, 
illustrate the results of simulating the behaviour of myopic agents. Additionally, 
in all graphs, the lines with the triangular markers represent the leader (the firm 
with the highest efficiency level and thus with the highest market share) and the 
ones with no markers represent the follower. This correspondence will be used in 
all the graphs throughout this section. The figure shows the general tendency for 
a decrease in R&D investment as the extent of costless R&D spillovers increases, 
which takes place for both myopic and fully strategic firms. When firms ignore the 
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strategic effect of their R&D choice, according to the analytical results obtained 
in section 3.2.4, they choose their investment as to maintain their probability 
of innovation at the optimal level, which is not expected to differ substantially 
from the faU appropriability case. As a result, the graphs for the myopic case 
illustrate a set up where there is a fall in investment while the rate of innovation 
stays fairly stable. Nevertheless, there is an increase in firm's value reflecting 
the decrease in the investment cost involved in the MD activity. In fact, firm 
spend less than in the fully appropriable R&D set up by substituting own for 
external R&D (which comes at no cost), and achieve a similar level of probability 
of innovation. The difference between these results and those of the simulations 
for rational firm's lies in the strategic effect. FUy rational firms may reduce 
further their R&D investment, anticipating the impact of their R&D in their 
rival's odds of innovating. For lower values of b, the reduction in the leader's 
investment is stronger than that of the follower. Whence, the gap between the 
leader and the follower decreases leading to a decrease in the value of the leader 
and increase in the value of the follower. For high levels of spillovers, the rate 
of decay of the leader's investment get's smaller until investment actually starts 
to increase, while the follower continues reducing its R&D spending. This allows 
the leader to gain market share again. This gain in market share is not reflected 
in a value gain most probably because of the investment costs in which the firm 
is incurring. 
In order to analyse the effects of the costless R&D spillovers on social welfare, 
we compute the statistics for the present discounted value of consumer surplus and 
producer benefits obtained in the simulation of the ergodic equilibrium. We use 
firm's value, Vi (wi, s), as a pro: )d for producer benefits. We register the observed 
outcomes for both the welfare measures and weight them by their probability of 
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occurrence. Figure 3.9 depicts the percentage change of the expected discounted 
value of consumer surplus for the rational firms case (solid line) and the myopic 
case (dashed line). For myopic firms, the impact of the extent of spillovers, on 
consumer surplus is negligible. This is so because consumer surplus is fully de- 
termined by the rate of innovation, which stays fairly unchanged in the costless 
myopic case as depicted in figure 3.8. However, if firms behave rationally, an 
increase in costless R&D spillovers leads to a decrease in consumer surplus. The 
direct comparison of these two cases allows us to identify the strategic effect as 
the source of the decrease in consumer welfare. The incorporation of the strategic 
effects in firms' decisions adds a further disincentive to invest in R&D which will 
translate into lower rates of innovation and consequently higher prices and lower 
consumer welfare. 
In what concerns the impact of costless spillovers in the EDV of Producer 
benefits for rational (solid lines) and myopic firms (dashed lines), illustrated in 
figure 3.10, the results are quite surprising. The direct compaxison of these two 
figures suggests that, in general, in the presence of costless R&D spillovers, firms 
would be better off interacti: Rg in a myopic manner than if they behave fully 
rationally. If firms ignore the strategic effect, there are welfare gains to both 
firms due to the extra source of R&D, which is free. However, as previously 
shown in figure 3.9, these gains are not passed onto the consumers. If firms behave 
rationally, while the follower continues to benefit due to cost minimization from 
free riding in the leader's R&D, the leader registers a value loss as a result of the 
decrease in its own investment for strategic reasons. Consequently, its losses in 
terms of the probability of innovation more than compensate for the gains in cost 
saving from costless R&D spillovers. 
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3.3.3 Absorptive Capacity 
Optinial Policy Functions 
In what follows we argue that spillovers do not necessaxily deliver maxket struc- 
tures which axe detrimental for consumers. We present the results obtained for 
the optimal policy functions and the simulation of the model under the assump- 
tion that the absorption of R&D spillovers requires absorptive capacity. Figure 
3.11 illustrates the evolution of R&D investment with the increase in the extent 
of spillovers. 
As b increases, firm 1's R&D investment decreases for market structures where 
the competitor has a high investment level (around w2 = 5). In these market 
structures, the effectiveness of own R&D increases by allowing the firm to absorb a 
substantial amount of external R&D. Therefore, when there is an external pool of 
R&D and the firm has some positive level of absorptive capacity, R&D investment 
decreases because firms can now ad: Lieve the same probability of innovation with 
lower levels of R&D spending. 
In their static, deterministic model with symmetric firms, Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) find that externalities in R&D might increase the amount of R&D invest- 
ment undertaken in an industry. The predictions implied by the model presented 
here suggest their results cannot be extended to a dynamic, stochastic framework 
with firm heterogeneity. However, the fall in R&D investment does not imply 
that the efficiency level of firms will decrease. 
In fact, the analysis of figure 3.12 suggests that the probability of success of 
the follower increases, in spite of the decrease in R&D investment. In turn, the 
leader's rate of innovation will decrease for market structures in which it has very 
high efficiency levels and its rival has a very low efficiency level. At these market 
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structures the follower benefits much more from each unit of R&D investment. 
Figure 3.13 illustrates how the changes in the rate of spillovers affect the value 
of the firm. Spillovers have a positive impact on firm 1's value in most market 
structures. This increase is higher when the rival firm is investing more heavily 
in R&D (w2 = 5). Given the convexity of the value function for lower levels of 
efficiency, the increment in value is higher when firm 1's efficiency level is lower, 
and decreases with wi. The only market structures where firm 1 experiences a 
value decline due to the increase in spillovers axe those in which the rival has a 
small efficiency level, especially if, concomitantly, firm 1 has an efficiency level 
around its maximum for investment (w, = 5). This is so because the rival is 
engaging in few R&D, while the firm's own R&D investment is large. In these 
market structures, the leader firm has virtually nothing to gain from spillovers 
and the rival is free riding (as it emerges from figure 3.12 as well). 
Simulation Results 
In order to analyse how the externalities actually affect the evolution of the maxket 
structure in the industry, we now turn to the analysis of the results obtained when 
simulating the model assuming firms are required to have absorptive capacity to 
benefit from external R&D. Figure 3.14 is analogous to figure 3.6. 
As the extent of spillovers increase there is a cleax shift in the likelihood 
of occurrence from highly concentrated maxket structures to more competitive 
ones. The peak on the lower left hand corner of the graphs captures the high 
probability of occurrence of maxket structures where the firm with the highest 
efficiency level has a very strong lead over the follower. As b increases, this peak 
becomes smaller, and the likelihood of maxket structures closer to the diagonal, 
the ones where the gap between the efficiency levels of the leader and the follower 
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is at its minimum, rises. The decrease in the mean level of concentration in the 
industry, as measured by the concentration index C1, with the increase in the 
extent of spillovers is confirmed by figure 3.15. 
The fall in concentration is even higher when firms behave strategically than 
when they are myopic. The difference between the two lines is attributable to the 
strategic effect and hence, the disincentive to invest in R&D. Since this effect is 
particularly strong for the leader, the gap between the two firms decreases further 
than in the myopic case. 
Figure 3.16 shows the change in mean R&D investment, mean probability of 
success and mean value when b increases. Analogously to figure 3.8, the graphs 
on the left illustrate the results for rational firms, and the ones on the right show 
the results for myopic firms. 
For both rational and myopic firms, an increase in spillovers decreases the 
amount of R&D undertaken in the industry, and this reduction is larger for the 
leader firm in the industry. The firm with the highest efficiency level will be 
engaging in the amount of R&D that will deliver fairly the same probability 
of innovation as in the full appropriability case, as made clear by the stability 
of the leader's probability of innovation. The follower, however, experiences an 
increase in the likelihood of enhancing its efficiency level. Whence, the follower 
will experience an increase in value, while the impact of spillovers on the leader's 
value is much less significant, and slightly non-monotonic. The amount of R&D 
investment and the probability of success of the follower firm actually overcome 
those of the leader at intermediate values of b. 
The comparison of the graphs for rational and myopic firms suggests that, 
when the absorption of R&D spillovers requires absorptive capacity, the strategic 
effect of R&D speeds up the reduction in the gap between the leader and the 
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follower. In fact, the disincentive to invest is higher for the leader. Although the 
level of R&D of the follower also decreases with spillovers, the rate of decay is 
smaller than that of the leader, such that for high enough levels of spillovers the 
follower's level of R&D actually overcomes that of the leader. 
The welfare implications of R&D spillovers for consumers in the case of ab- 
sorptive capacity are illustrated in figure 3.17. 
As opposed to the results obtained for costless R&D spillovers, there is a clear 
positive impact on consumer welfare in the case of absorptive capacity. This result 
follows from the rise in the follower's likelihood of developing a new innovation 
and consequently experiencing an increase in its efficiency level. This benefit 
will translate into lower marginal costs of production and hence be passed on to 
consumers through a decline in prices. 
The evolution of producer benefits is illustrated in figure 3.18. The changes 
in producer surplus reflect two types of effects, namely the cost saving in R&D 
spending steaming from the efficient choice of in-house and external R&D, and 
the effects of R&D spillovers on the relative position of the two firms in the 
industry. A firm experiences a value increase, ceteris paribus, if its probability 
of success increases more than that of its rival. Figure 3.18 shows a sharp rise in 
the follower's value, which is higher when firms interact strategically. In turn, the 
leader's value remains fairly constant when there is no strategic effect of R&D 
spillovers, but it experiences a clear-cut value decrease if firms take into account, 
in their investment decisions, the effect of their R&D in the rival's position. The 
disincentives to invest arising from the strategic effect axe higher for the leader, 
leading to a sharper decrease in its level of R&D investment. Consequently, the 
follower will see its relative position improve. Even if the probability of innovation 
of the leader stays fairly stable, as made clear in figure 3.16, its value decreases 
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since the losses from the increase in the followers probability of innovation preside 
over the gains from R, &D cost saving. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Apart from the oligopolistic interactions in investment decision-making embed- 
ded in the Ericson-Pakes (1995) framework, the model presented here allows for 
knowledge to spill inside the industry. Therefore, when a firm invests in R&D, 
it enhances its probability of developing a new idea, increasing the competitive, 
pressure on the rival firm, but through knowledge externalities it will also improve 
the likelihood of the rival being successful in its innovative process. 
Our simulations show that the degree of appropriability plays a fundamental 
role in determining the degree of asymmetry between firms. However, the impact 
of spillovers on the incentives to conduct R&D depends on the process through 
which firms acquire external knowledge. If external knowledge is a pure public 
good, i. e., if there are no knowledge requirements to learn from outside R&D, the 
strategic effect lowers the levels of R&D bellow those which would guaxantee a 
stock of usable R&D that would deliver the rates of innovation obtained under 
full appropriability. Firm's R&D choices translate into a lower rate of innovation 
in the industry, implying higher marginal costs and higher prices for consumers. 
If firms would ignore the positive feedback of their R&D on the rival's rate of 
innovation, then they would engage in the amount of R&D that together with 
the external R&D available to them, delivers an optimal probability of success 
which is fairly similar to that of full appropriability. If this would be the case, then 
the market structure would remain unchanged and consumers would experience 
no gains or losses of welfare. Firms, on the other hand, would gain from the 
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emergence of a alternative, free source of R&D. 
When the absorption of external R&D requires absorptive capacity, an in- 
crease in spillovers delivers more competitive market structures. There are welfare 
gains for consumers due to the increase in the amount of innovations developed 
in the industry. There are also welfare gains from externalities for the follower in 
the industry, because this firm able to improve its position relative by investing 
more heavily than the leader along with the R&D cost saving it is able to incur. 
The main substantive finding relates to the way in which market structure 
changes as spillovers of a pure public good kind increase. It might seem intuitively 
that such spillovers would deter R&D and so lower the fixed costs incurred by 
the incumbent and thereby lower equilibrium concentration. What we show, 
however, is that the strategic interaction in our present model is as to lead a rise 
in concentration (paragraph 3, page 136). 
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Figure 3.1: The Impact of Spillovers on the Probability of Innovation Under the 
Different Appropriability Scenarios 
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values 
Linear Demand Intercept A 8 
Linear Demand Slope B 1 
Discount Rate facing firms 1/(1 + r) 1/1.08 
Rate of increase of the factor price index j 0. 
Productivity of R&D investment for innovation a 3 
Productivity R&D investment for absorption ly 3 
Unit cost of R&D Spending C 2 
Fixed Costs f 0.1 
Rate of Decrease in Marginal Costs 27 0.3 
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Figure 3.2: The Impact of Costless Spillovers, on the Optimal Investment Policy 
Function 
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Figure 3.3: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on the Optimal Probability of 
Innovation 
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Figure 3.4: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on the Optimal Firm's Value 
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Figure 3.5: The Value Function for b=0.0 
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Figure 3.6: The Impact of Costless Spillovers; on the Ergodic Distribution of 0 
Market Structures 
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Figure 3.7: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on the Concentration Index Cl 
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Figure 3.8: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on Investment, Probability of Suc- 
cess and Firm's Value 
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Figure 3.9: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on Consumers' Surplus 
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Figure 3.10: The Impact of Costless Spillovers on Producer Benefits 
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Figure 3.11: The Impact of Spillovers on the Optimal Investment Policy Function 
in the Case of Absorptive Capacity 
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Figure 3.12: The Impact of Spillovers on the Optimal Investment Probability of 
Success in the Case of Absorptive Capacity 
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Figure 3.13: The Impact of Spillovers on Firm's Value in the Case of Absorptive 
Capacity 
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Figure 3.14: The Impact of Spillovers on the Ergodic Distribution of Market 
Structures in the Case of Absorptive Capacity 
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Figure 3.16: The Impact of Spillovers on Investment, Probability of Success and 
Firm's Value in the Case of Absorptive Capacity 
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Figure 3.17: The Impact of Spillovers on Consumers' Surplus in the Case of 
Absorptive Capacity 
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Figure 3.18: The Impact of Spillovers on Producer Benefits in the Case of Ab- 
sorptive Capacity 
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Chapter 4 
Monopolistic Competition and 
Dynamic R&D 
4.1 Aims and Motivation 
We propose an imperfect competition model a la Dixit and Stiglitz, with many 
firms, instead of the oligopolistic framework proposed'in E-P. In fact, there axe 
very few examples of rational expectations, multi-agent, stochastic models, and 
most methods for computing stationary equilibrium in these models have been 
doomed at facing dimensionality problems, both in terms of memory and time 
requirements, that restrict their applicability. In particular, the computation of 
equilibrium in discrete-time stochastic games, such as that proposed by Ericson- 
Pakes, can be -solved only for an industry with a few firms, since increasing the 
number of players would increase exponentially the possibilities for the future 
states of the game, such that computing the expectations over future outcomes 
becomes infeasible. 
Many attempts where made to overcome this limitation, such as Dorazelski 
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and Judd (2003) continuous-time stochastic version of their dynamic game and 
Pakes and MacGuire (2001) method of calculating the expectations over the states 
on the ergodic path only, ignoring the rest of the off path possible market struc- 
tures. As Ericson and Pakes (1995) highlight, there is a descriptive and policy 
need for dynamic models accounting for heterogeneity both in firms as well as 
in their response, and we believe that the computational burden associated with 
this dynamic problem needs to be overcome such that we can model variability 
of firms' fates for an industry with a large number of firms simultaneously active. 
Consequently, we propose a dynamic model analogous to that of Ericson and 
Pakes (1995) (E-P from henceforth) with a few important differences. 
Firms are characterized by the state variable which is their efficiency level or 
"index of success". The degree of market competition a firm faces is determined 
by the mkt structure, and it is entirely captured on what we define as the 
oven-di effidency index in the industry. The profitability of each firm depends 
on the ratio of the firm's own efficiency level to the overall efficiency level in the 
industry. We assume that firms cannot access (or rationally don't make use of) 
all relevant information to form expectations concerning the evolution of their ri- 
vals' efficiencies. However, they are able to form ratio*nal expectations concerning 
the long run efficiency index in the industry, which is enough to determine their 
profitability in the stationary equilibrium. This is a convenient assumption that 
we believe to represent an improvement in terms of the realism in the represen- 
tation of actual industries. Furthermore, it allows to solve the model for a large 
number of agents and overcome the "curse of dimensionality" highlighted by Ben- 
man in 1961, when referring to the computational problem of the excess burden 
IWe don't specify the rationality in choosing not to use the information concerning the 
evolution of the relative position of each of the competitors, but it's easy to imagine situations 
where accessing this information might come at a cost. 
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associated with dynamic stochastic problems with a large number of states. By 
having agents taking decisions based on their rational expectations concerning 
the expected long run level of competition, as given by the efficiency index in 
the industry, we transform a multidimensional problem into a one dimension one. 
We propose an algorithm to find the optimal policy function for R&D investment 
under these assumptions. Upon simulating the model, we show that it delivers 
a market structure, in equilibrium, which accounts for a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity. 
4.2 Background 
Theories of endogenous growth explain economic growth through the accumula, 
tion of knowledge that derives from the R&D decisions made by profit maximis- 
ing innovating firms. Yet, this decision process is operated, within these models, 
in an extremely stylized environment that has embodied little of the theoreti- 
cal and empirical unfoldings of the Industrial Organization (1.0. ) literature. In 
the quality ladder models of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), incumbent firms do not perform R&D 
and each innovation is introduced by a new "courageous" entrepreneur. Growth 
arises as a consequence of investment incentives that generate the dynamics of 
"creative-destruction" due to the "winner takes it all" assumption. As a result, 
these models deliver market structures, in equilibrium, which are implausible. 
For tractability reasons, symmetry is also a common assumption in endogenous 
growth models (Romer (1986)) that widens the gap between their micro-structure 
and that of the 1.0. models. Modelling growth through decisions at the corporate 
level departing from strong assumptions on the market structure is questionable, 
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especially given the widely accepted strong relevance of market structure to firms' 
decisions. As Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) highlight, the importance of this issue 
is clear cut "because a recognition of the importance of technical progress mises 
serious doubts about the adequacy with which traditional micro-economic models 
allow one to understand the functioning of modern market economies, and develop 
policy presc7iptions ý. 
Empirical work on firm level data has uncovered the high degree of firm het-' 
erogeneity within industries as well as variability in similar firms' fates over time. 
This heterogeneity manifests itself in firms' market shaxes, their investment strate- 
gies and therefore, in the evolution of a firm's position relative to its rivals. The 
stylized facts of the 1.0. literature concerning maxket structure are now well 
established in economic theory. One of the oldest and probabiy most studied 
empirical regularity in the 1.0. literature is the fact that most industries depict a 
highly skewed asymmetric distribution of firm sizes, and that the Gibrat's Law, 
according to which a firm's growth rate is independent of its size, is a good, al- 
though imperfect approximation to firm growth (Mansfield (1962), Hall (1987) 
and Evans (1987)). However, smaller firms appear to experience more volatile 
growth rates than large firms (Dinne and Hughes (1994) and Hart and Oulton 
(1996)). These were the regularities uncovered by a large'stream of empirical 
literature concerning the scaling relationship, among which we highlight only a 
few. 
Up to the moment, there are only a handful of frameworks that explain growth 
through the modelling of more complete micro-maxket structures. Thompson 
(2001) proposes a R&D based growth model with product differentiation and 
stochastic quality growth as a way to explore the micro-structure of endogenous 
growth models. In his model, however, each new innovation makes the previ- 
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ous one obsolete just as in the creative-destruction models. Klette and Griliches 
(2000) propose a theoretical model that accounts for firm heterogeneity and where 
the evolution of the mkt structure and growth is driven by quality improve- 
ments that result from the stochastic outcome of the R&D activity. This model 
takes inspiration on the patent race literature and the firms' main competitive fo- 
cus is to prevent the entry of any other firm in their product line. In the model by 
Klete and Kortum (2002), each firm produces a certain number of differentiated 
products and can experience size growth by engaging in R&D and adding further 
new products to its portfolio. Aghion et al (2001) analyse the effect of product 
market competition on growth in the context of a duopoly model where firms 
invest in R&D to improve the attractiveness of their product. Finally, Laincz 
(2005) proposes an endogenous growth model with a dynamic market structure 
and entry and exit analogous to that of FP (1995) and this model is shown to 
deliver results which are consistent with the results of the empirical 1.0. literature 
(see Laincz and Rodrigues (2006)). However, this model shares with the Eric, 
son and Pakes methodology the drawback of dynamic, discrete stochastic games, 
the problem of the "curse of dimensionality", that arises from the fact that the 
burden of computing players expectations over all possible future states increases 
exponentially in the number of state variables. 
Ile model we propose here is a dynamic industry model with many, hetero- 
geneous agents with idiosyncratic uncertainty. Firms allocate resources to R&D 
aiming at developing new, improved production processes and reducing their max- 
ginal cost of production. This assumption is in line with the increased attention 
devoted to corporate R&D as a source of growth in the past decades, as invention 
and innovation by manufacturing firms has arisen as the main source of R&D 
in the economy. A firm's returns to R&D are determined not only by the firm's 
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performance but also by the outcome of the research effort of its rivals. Growth 
is driven by a spillover effect of the innovations developed by the firms in the 
industry. When firms are successful in developing a technical improvement, it 
is assumed that given the limitations of intellectual property rights protection 
and secrecy, this innovation will contribute to the increase of the public stock of 
knowledge and consequently improve the marginal cost conditions for all firms in 
the industry. The evolution of the size of each firm is determined endogenously 
according to the stochastic outcome of the R&D process and an exogenous sto- 
chastic process of depreciation. We aim at obtaining a stationary equilibrium, 
where growth is driven by a process of knowledge difFusion, and which delivers a 
firm size distribution with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. This distribution 
of firm sizes or rn ket structure is the endogenous outcome of an R&D invest- 
ment process in which firms engage in an attempt to enhance their likelihood of 
developing innovations. Firms' decisions are driven by the ambition of moving 
forward in terms of their state variable in order to ultimately exploit profitable 
opportunities. 
Therefore, we represent* growth, at the hidustry level, through a rich repre- 
sentation of the microfoundations of firms' decisions, inspired in the set up of 
Ericson and Pakes (1995), biA allowing for heterogeneity among a large number 
of firms operating in the same industry. However, in order to better to appro3d- 
mate better the statistical properties of the real firm size distribution the degree 
of heteregeneity should be more skewed. Therefore, avenue for future work would 
be to introduce entry and e--, dt of firms in the model. In fact, turbulence in the 
market as given by entry and e--dt would increase the mass of small firms. At 
each period of time, there would be a number of firms that recently entered the 
industry which would still be struggling to gain market share, and firms which 
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would be getting small and closer to their eidt threshold value. Also, increas- 
ing the variability in firm's fates in the model would improve the match of the 
distribution of firm sizes. We believe that introducing a further element of het- 
erogeneity in the model would allow approximating better the higher moments of 
the actual firm size distribution found for real data. An example of such elements 
are randomly drawn set up costs and scrap values, that would vaxy the exit and 
entry threshold among firms, and assuming that the degree of risk aversion varies 
across agents and that the private discount factors are randomly drawn from a 
common distribution. The latter would vary firm's decisions reflecting different 
degrees of "impatience". These two assumptions would increase the variability in 
firm's outcomes and consequently the skewness of the firm size distribution for 
our simulated data. 
4.3 The Model 
In this section we propose an endogenous growth model with a dynamic market 
structure. We model an industry with many firms, each producing a slightly 
differentiated product. Consumers have CES preferences over a set of monopo- 
listic commodities. We allow firms to differ in their technologies of production, 
such that marginal costs are asymmetric amongst firms. Ceteris paribus, each 
firm's profits are increasing in the price of rival commodities and decreasing in the 
price of the good produced by the firm. In an attempt to increase their market 
share, firms invest in cost-reducing R&D to improve the likelihood of experienc- 
ing a marginal cost reduction that will allow them to decrease the price of their 
good relative to the price of the other goods in the industry. Investment deci- 
sions are intertemporal, and the firm will choose the level of R&D expenditure 
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that maximi es its expected future stream of profits. As opposed to the origi- 
nal dynamic industry framework proposed by E-P, we assume that rather than 
assigning probability weights to all possible future market structures, firms form 
rational expectations on the long-run overall efficiency index in the industry, and 
will compute their expected future stream of profits assuming that this long-run 
level of efficiency index in the industry is constant. This allows us to decrease 
tremendously the computational burden of this dynamic game and, consequently, 
solving the model for environments where a large number bf firms are operating 
simultaneously in the industry. 
Growth, in this model, arises from the increases on the public stock of knowl- 
edge which are a stochastic consequence of firms' innovative activity, as in Laincz 
(2004). Increases in the public stock of knowledge represent positive aggregate 
productivity shocks in the marginal costs of all firms in the industry. Given the 
specification of the model presented here, a proportionate improvement in the 
marginal cost conditions of all firms in the industry will not alter the profitability 
of firms as every firm's ratio of price index to own'price will remain unchanged, 
and therefore so v6iU the R&D program. Only changes in firms' efficiency levels 
which cause non-proportionate changes in the vector of marginal costs of the ac- 
tive firms in the industry will alter firms' profitability. However, as a result of 
the aggregate productivity shocks, the total output produced within the industry 
will increase giving rise to continuous industry growth. 
4.3.1 The Spot Market 
We model a monopolistically competitive industry composed by n firms producing 
a set of commodities 1,2,3... n. We abstract from entry and selection process in 
this model, so the number of firms, and therefore the number of commodities 
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produced in the industry, is fixed. We assume consumers have Cobb Douglas 
preferences over the output of the monopolistically competitive sector, denoted 
by y; and a good zero which represents the numeraire and aggregates the rest of 
the economy. 
uu (xo, y) = X0 
Each of the monopolistic goods is an imperfect substitute of the other n-I 
differentiated goods produced in the industry, such that consumer preferences 
over these goods can be represented by a CES sub-utility function. 
16 (Xo, nc i+c) 
U=U Exi (4.2) 
i 
U is an homogeneous, concave function, increasing in the consumption x of good 
i and e< -1 is a parameter representing the price elasticity of demand for good 
i. We can write down the budget constraint of the consumer as: 
n 
X0 + Exipi (4.3) i 
where pi is the price paid and xi is the quantity consumed of good i, re- 
spectively, and I is the income of the consumer in terms of the numeraire. We 
denote the amount of income or total expenditure devoted to the n monopolistic 
commodities by Y: 
n 
Exipi 
i 
(4.4) 
The overall price index and the quantity index in the industry axe q and y, 
respectively: 
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n+ 
Epil (4-5) 
i 
Exi (4.6) Y= 
I 'i 
The Cobb Douglas specification for preferences over y and the rest of the 
economy ensures a constant budget share allocated to the monopolistically com- 
petitive sector 2, such that: 
Y aI 
Y=-=- 
qq 
I We further define the overall marginal cost index in the industry, which we 
denote by m. Letting mci stand for the marginal cost of production of firm i: 
1+e I: MC3 (4.7) 
The optimal level of consumption for good i is given by: 
Xi 
y (1) (4.8) 
q pi 
The number of firms operating in the industry is assumed large enough to con- 
sider the effects of a firm's price choice, pi, on the overall price index, q, as negligi- 
ble and consequently, we have aggregate price taldng behaviour. The spot market 
condition for profit maximisation is given by the marginal revenue--marginal cost 
equation and the price charged by firm i will be a constant maxkup a over its 
marginal cost, mq : 
'This assumption of a constant budget share is crucial for the solution methodology as we 
discuss later on in the paper. 
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A= amci = i+ CmIci 
(4.9) 
At the aggregate level, this implies that the price index can be expressed as a 
function of the marginal cost index: q= am. 
If fixed costs of production are set to zero, then optimal profits can be written 
as: 
7ri (pi - mcj)Xi (4.10) 
A 
m 
mci] 
A firm's profits are increasing in the expenditure devoted to the monopolis- 
tically competitive industry and the marginal cost index in the industry, and 
decreasing in the firm's own marginal cost. This expression for profits is homo- 
geneous of degree zero in the vector of marginal costs. This property, which is 
also present in Laincz (2005 a) and b)) endogenous growth model, implies that 
proportionate changes in the vector of marginal costs leave profits unaffected. 
What is relevant for a firm's profitability is not the absolute value of its marginal 
cost, but rather its relative value with respect to the marginal cost index in the 
industry. Hence, the lower the ratio of own marginal cost to marginal cost index, 
the higher the profits of the firm. 
It is important to note that although profits are homogeneous of degree zero 
in the vector of marginal costs, the choice of quantity to produce is not: 
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xi 
Y (i) "=Y 7n-c-1 
q pi a mcj-' 
The quantity produced by firm i is increasing in the overall marginal cost 
index, m, and decreasing in its own marginal cost. An improvement on the 
marginal cost conditions in the industry causing a proportionate decrease in the 
vector of m ginal costs will increase xi, the quantity produced, although profits 
remain unchanged. 
4.3.2 The dynarnic envirorument 
The previous subsection showed how firms' profits are determined by their mar- 
ginal cost of production relative to those of the rivals. In the framework presented 
here, marginal costs are a negative function of the state variable, which is the 
firm's efficiency level. The efficiency level of a firm is basically its index of suc- 
cess, and high efficiency levels imply -the firm is in a favourable position relative 
to its rivals and thus able to obtain higher payoffs. In this model, we assume 
that efficiency levels affect payoffs by reducing the marginal cost of production. 
Firms differ in terms of their efficiency levels and therefore, they incur in differ- 
ent levels of marginal cost of production. Let Wj, t E Z+ stand for the efficiency 
level of firm i at time t. The efficiency levels are bounded from above, such that 
Wj, t E j1,2,... w}. Dropping time subscripts for simplicity, we further define 
the overall efficiency index in the industry at each moment in time as w: 
I 
n 
W= 
Ewjll+c) (4.12) 
The mapping between the efficiency levels and marginal costs is given by: 
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-A MCi, t = 7nCID, tWi, t (4.13) 
where p is the rate of cost reduction and mco, t is a scalar on marginal costs. 
The more efficient a firm is relative to its rivals, the lower the firm's marginal cost 
relative to the marginal cost index in the industry which implies a higher ratio 
of the overall price index in the industry relative to the price of the commodity 
produced by the firm and thus, a higher market share for that firm. This functional 
form for marginal costs complieswith two important conditions to hold for the 
marginal costs, namely that there is a smooth relationship between efficiency 
levels and marginal costs (see figure 4.1 at the end of the chapter), and that 
profitg are bounded from below and above. Given the setup used here, if the 
functional form for the mapping between the efficiency levels and the marginal 
costs was the one used in Pakes and McGuire (1995), i. e. mci, t = mco, te-Juwi, t, 
profits would increase exponentially in the efficiency level. The upper boundary 
condition on profits would not be satisfied and firms would invest more the higher 
their efficiency level implying that the state space for each firm would not be finite 
and the problem would have no solution. 
The marginal cost index can be written as a function of firms' efficiency levels: 
7n 
= mco = mrof (wt) with f'(wt) < 0. (4.14) 
Equation (4.13) implies that the marginal cost index in the industry decreases 
with the overall efficiency index. We hirther assume that mco decreases exponen- 
tially with the total nurnber of innovations developed in the industry: 
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--y-pst mco, t =e (4.15) 
PSt is the total stock of innovations developed in the industry until time t, 
and -y captures the cost reducing impact of the public knowledge in the industry. 
Increases in PS scale down the marginal cost curve for all firms in the industry. 
Figure 4.1 below depicts the marginal cost curve as a f1mction of the efficiency 
level associated with two different public stocks of knowledge, namely when there 
were 100 past successful innovations in the industry, and when the public stock 
is composed by 300 innovations. In calibrating the marginal cost curves depicted 
in the figure we use the same parameters that we later use for the simulations, 
i. e., we set y=0.002 and p=0.3. 
The market structure of the industry, at a given moment in time, is given 
by a vector indicating the efficiency levels of the finns in the industry. These 
efficiency levels evolve, over time, as a result of the stochastic outcomes of two 
processes: the investment process undertaken by firms and the outcome of the 
idiosyncratic shocks that deteriorate the firm's state. Given the efficiency level 
of firm i at time t, the realizations of the two stochastic outcomes will determine 
efficiency levels at time t+1. Letting primes refer to the values of the variables 
next period, then: 
W: i = wi + vi -& for i=1,2. (4.16) 
The random variable & captures the outcome of the'depreciation process that 
affects negatively a firm's efficiency level, leading to loss of competitiveness for the 
I 
firm and hence a deterioration of profits. The realizations of this random variable 
are independent across firms such that for each firm i there is a positive probability 
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S that & takes value 1, and a probability 1-8 that & is zero3. Positive realizations 
of & increase the marginal cost of the firm by exactly the same amount of the 
decrease in marginal costs driven by a successful innovation. The second process is 
the firms' innovative activity, whose outcome is captured by the random variable 
vi, which is also firm specific. Firms invest in R&D in an attempt to enhance 
the likelihood of being successful in innovating and consequently decreasing their 
marginal costs of production. 
The outcome of firm i's innovative activity, captured by the random variable 
vi, is given by: 
=1 with probability p(vi) 
Vvi 
I=0 
with probability 1- p(vi) 
where 
P(vi) 
ai (4.17) 
1 +azi* 
In the above set of equations, zi stands for the level of investment undertaken 
by firm i and a is a parameter denoting the productivity of R&D investment 
in increasing the likelihood of developing an innovation. This is basically the 
technological opportunity in the industry, i. e., the difficulty of innovating in the 
industry, and it is related to the stage of development of scientific knowledge and 
other knowledge specific characteristics. 
'In &P the negative shocks to firms' efficiency levels are industry wide. Here, in order to 
allow for more variability in firm sizes, and also because we find it more adequate in terms 
of realism, we model these shocks as idiosyncratic. Furthermore, an aggregate shock to the 
efficiency levels would be incompatible with a constant long run market structure. 
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4.3.3 The R&D Choice 
In each period of time, firms choose the level of R&D expenditures that max- 
imises the expected present discounted value of their future stream of profits. In 
the FP formulation, this optimal choice requires the perception of rivals' future 
states. They propose a numerical algorithm, for which a code is made available, 
which solves this dynamic problem. The simulation of the market structure, given 
the optimal policy functions, delivers an ergodic distribution of firms' states. In 
the model presented here, we assume that in maldng their intertemporal choices 
concerning R&D investment, firms do not assess the probability of all possible 
future market structures, they rather form an expectation on the long-run ef- 
ficiency index in the industry, and optimise accordingly. When a large enough 
number of firms are present in the industry, then the industry's efficiency index 
will converge to a constant value, fv: 
Let T>0.3 no, s. t. n> no : lim (wt - ED) < -r t 4,00 
Firms have rational expectations concerning this long-run value of the effi- 
ciency index in the industry, and their profitability will be fully determined by 
the evolution of their own efficiency level and the expected value for the long-run 
industry state, which they treat as constant. 
The firm's intertemporal problem will then be written as a function of this 
expected value: 
Vi(wi, w, U)) =maxf7r(wi, wt) - czi + #EtVi(Wi, ib)}, (4.18) zC; 0 
where 6 is the dLscount factor, common to all firms and c is the unit cost of 
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R&D investment. The Bellman equation above simply states that a firm's value 
at each moment in time is given by its current profits minus its expenditures in 
R&D investment plus the discounted expected value next period. If we denote 
by pr (wi' I zi, wi) the probability that firm i faces of moving from efficiency level 
wi to wi, conditional on firm i's level of investment, zi, we can write (4.18) as: 
Vi (wi, w, fv) = max{7r(wi, wt) - czi +, 6Vi (Wi, iD-)pr(Wi I zi, wi) (4.19) zi3; 0 
Since firms take the long-run efficiency level as constant, and form rational 
expectations on this value, the likelihood that the firm's present discounted value 
next period is V(wi, fv) depends only on the evolution of its own efficiency level. 
In the original Markov-Perfect Dynamic Industry model proposed by E-P, the 
firm would also have to work out the probability of facing each possible market 
structure. Having firms' decision process taking into account only the long-run 
industry's efficiency index as proposed here greatly simplifies the method for 
finding the optimal policy functions as there is only one dimension to this problem, 
which is simply the evolution of the state variable of the optimising firm. 
Let C, = Vi (&j + 1, fv) denote the expected value of the firm conditional on 
success in innovating, and C2 = Vi (&j, iv-) the expected value in the case it fails 
to develop an inno-. -ation. Then one can rewrite the equation above as: 
Vi (wi, w, max 
7r(wi, wt) - czi+ 
(4.20) 
jO 
[ 
-+'Ii Vi i+1, fv) + TlL. Vi (&i, fv- I+azj 1+azi 
The first order condition for this dynamic BeRman equation is given by: 
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av 
-c+p 
a (Cl - C2) 5ý -",: 
[(i 
+ azi)2 
which yields the following optimal policy function for R&D investment: 
zi* = max 
0, 
(4.21) 
g2l 1 
c 
Zi 
aca 
The expression above shows that a firm's optimal choice of R&D investment 
is decreasing in the unit cost of investment (Ozi*/i9c < 0) and increasing in the 
discounted value gain from innovating (azi-la (c, - co > 0). 
An increase in 
the discount factor, 8 increases the level of investment because the firm attaches 
higher weights to future payoffs (azvo >0). The effbct of an increase in the 
productivity of investment, a, in the optimal level of investment is ambiguous 
because higher values of a imply more R&D ascribed to the innovative activity, 
but the higher a the more quiddy decreasing returns settle down. 
In order for the upper limit on the efficiency levels not to drive the results from 
the optimization process,, %m ensure that a firm at the highest efficiency level does 
not have an incentive to invest and therefore x? (w = wm") = 0. Furthermore, it 
is shown in the appendix to this chapter that the convexity of the profit function 
in (4.10) holds if -p(l + c) < 1. 
We constructed an algorithm to solve for the equilibrium policy functions and 
a code for simulating the model. The algorithm is described in section 4.3 ahead. 
4.3.4 Endogenous Growth 
As in the New Growth theory models, the source of growth in this model are the 
externalities that arise from the innovative activity in which firms engage. In this 
I 
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framevmrk, each new innovation developed enhances the knowledge base of the 
industry. The public stock of knowledge at a given moment in time will then be 
given by the sum of all the innovations generated until then by the set of firms 
in the industry. Equation (4.22) below describes the change in the public stock 
of knowledge from one period to the next: 
n 
Pst+l = Pst + 
Evi't) (4.22) 
i=l 
n 
where Fv4 is the surn of all Positive realizations of the firm specific random 
variables capturing the outcome of the investment process. It is this process of 
knowledge spillovers that will allow for marginal'costs to continuously decrease 
in the industry. The motion of the public stock of knowledge given by equa, 
tion (4.22) will generate a continuous improvement through time of the marginal 
cost conditions in the industry as mq) decreases with the cumulative effect of 
innovations. However, changes in mco imply proportionate changes in the vector 
of marginal costs in the industry and, as in implied by equation (4.10) above, 
proportionate changes in the vector of marginal costs do not affect firms' prof- 
itability: 
7ri y[ 
E mci 
1 
Y[ 
E Wi 
Ile set of equations above implies that profits remain unchanged by the 
increasing motion of the public stock of knowledge, and consequently so win 
the optimal R&D program. If there are no changes in the optimal investment 
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decisions, the evolution of the market structure will not be affected and the long- 
run efficiency index in the industry will be constant in spite of the continuous 
amelioration of the marginal cost conditions. This property of the homogeneity 
of degree zero of profits in the vector of marginal costs is crucial for solving for 
the R&D program under the assumption that firms form rational expectations 
on the long-run index in the industry and treat it as constant. If this was not the 
case, then the long-run efficiency index in the industry would not be constant. 
Rational firm behaviour implies that firms would take into account the impact of 
the motion of the public knowledge base in their R&D investment decisions. 
When finding the equilibrium policy functions for this problem, we can simply 
ignore the motion of PS. However, quantity choices at each period of time will 
be affected by the aggregate productivity motion since the homogeneity of degree 
zero does not hold for quantities: 
xi 
Y 7n-t-1 (4.23) 
a mcj-' 
y 
[MC; 
D 
n 
W, 
1+6 
a WTI 
Yf M-6-1 
a 7nrowieA 
It is straightforward from the equation above that the quantity produced 
by each firm will increase as mro decreases with the increasing motion of the 
public stock of knowledge. The negative idiosyncratic shocks to the efficiency 
level of firms will. maintain the competitive pressure on them to pursue R&D 
investment, and thus the number of innovations developed in the industry will be 
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ever increasing. As a result, the overall quantity produced in the industry will 
continuously increase as the vector of marginal costs decreases through time. This 
process will generate continuous growth in the total quantity produced within the 
industry. 
The assumptions of no substitution between the monopolistic goods and the 
rest of the economy, together with the property of homogeneity of degree zero of 
the profit function with respect to the vector of marginal costs in the industry axe 
essential for the validity of the methodology used to solve this dynamic, stochastic 
problem. Ile endogenous growth process in the industry leads to ever decreasing 
marginal costs in the industry. If profits were sensitive to proportionate changes 
in the vector of marginal costs, the optimal R&D investment policy would be 
changing over time. Furthermore, as marginal costs decrease, so Will the overall 
price index in the economy, q. If we were to allow for the substitution between 
the monopolistic commodities and the rest of the economy, the budget share 
allocated to the former would increase. Allowing for Y to be negatively related to 
q would imply a continuous increase in the budget share allocated to monopolistic 
competitive sector, due to the decrease in the price index for the sector relative 
to the rest of the economy. A quick look at the expression for profits (equation 
4.10) shows that the budget allocated to the monopolistically competitive sector 
affects firms' profits positively. Thus, the level of profits for a given efficiency level 
would be increasing over time. Dropping either of these assumptions would imply 
that profitswould change as a consequence of the continuous improvement in the 
marginal cost conditions, and hence so would the optimal investment strategies, 
preventing us from being able to find an optimal solution for the problem at 
question. 
In the framework presented here there is no mechanism that can generate 
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the empirically observed correlation in firm's fates. Having the budget share 
allocated to the monopolistically competitive sector increasing as the marginal 
cost index in the industry decreases over time, as described above, would generate 
an elegant source of correlation in firms' profits, but this assumption would render 
the solution methodology inapplicable. Still, there is some degree of correlation 
in the quantities produced which increase as a result of the advances in the public 
stock of knowledge. 
4.4 Solution Methodology 
In order to find the Markov equilibrium of the model previously described, we 
design an algorithm to find the optimal R&D investment choices and correspon- 
dent firm value for every state in which a firm can be. This is possible because 
there are a finite number of these states as there is an (endogenous) bound on 
the maximum efficiency level a firm can achieve in the industry. The algorithm is 
composed of two main loops: a major loop on the expected value for the overall 
efficiency level in the industry-, and a smaller loop, inside the major one, iterat- 
ing on the value function to determine the optimal policy function for a given 
expected long-run efficiency index in the industry. 
Once the primitives of the model were inserted into the algorithm, namely the 
fixed number of firms, the maximum efficiency level and the parameter choices, 
the algorithm starts with an arbitrary guess for the long-run overall efficiency 
index in the industry, say wA. Then, the vector for the profits 7r(wi, w9l) a-, %- 
sociated with each efficiency level Wi E 11,2,... wm"}, is calculated . Given the 
profit vector and the parameters choices, the algorithm finds the optimal level of 
R&D investment for each efficiency level in which a firm can find itself, i. e., the 
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vector of optimal investments that solves the bellman equation in (4.18), given 
the expected long run efficiency index fv. 
The algorithm then involves the simulation of the maxket structure for the 
number of periods of time chosen, using the optimal policy function that emerged 
from the value function iteration. The market structure at the last period of time 
is registered and the overall efficiency level associated with this distribution of 
efficiency levels or market structure is computed. So as to impose rational expec- 
tations equilibrium, i. e., that equilibrium is reached when the outcome of firms' 
strategies is precisely equal to the expected outcome used to compute these opti- 
mal strategies, we compare the overall efficiency level generated from the market 
structure simulation and the expected value of the overall efficiency level used 
in the last iteration to compute the optimal R&D investment choices. If the 
difference between the two is lower than some tolerance level chosen by the re- 
searcher, then we found the optimal policy function for a given parameterisation. 
Otherwise, a new guess for the long-run efficiency index is calculated according 
to a smoothing function and the algorithm repeats-the previous steps. In what 
follows, we present the structure of the algorithm in a more schematic way. 
Start with an arbitrary choice for ED, say w9 = w9l. 
Step 1: Computes 7r(wi, w9) for all i= {1,2,... Wmax}. 
Step 2: Set j=0 
2.1: Value Function iteration; iteration= j 
2.2 : Starts with an arbitrary guess for the 1"' iteration V(wj, w99j=0 
zj(wj, w9) and 
pr(w, +II zi, wi)j. 0 (eg, set them all to zero), 
2.3 : Performs one iteration for the Bellman equation in (4.18) for all 
i 
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2.4: If V(wi, w% - V(wi, w-9)j-l <tolerance level, go to step 3; 
Otherwise j=j+1 and step 2.2 is repeated. 
Step 3: Starts with an initial guess for the market structure, and uses ! he 
optimal zi (wi, w-9) computed according to equation (4.2 1) to simýlate the market 
structure until the maximum number of periods of time chosen by the researcher 
is reached. 
Step 4: w is computed according to equation (4.12). 
If w- w-9 <tolerance level, stop; 
Otherwise, w9 = . 1w + A--' w9 and the procedure is repeated starting A 
again in step 1. 
4.5 Firm Size Distribution 
In this section, we analyse the characteristics of the firm size distribution that 
is generated by the dynamic, stochastic model proposed in section 4.2. We also 
analyse the equilibrium investment strategies for the parameterisation chosen. 
We solve for the equilibrium policy functions, which involves the simulation 
of the model as described in the methodology section. In order to ensure the 
convergence of the overall efficiency index and have a rich distribution of finn 
sizes, vm simulate an industry with two hundred firms simultaneously active. 
Our choice of parameters is specified in table 4.1 We choose the budget share 
of the monopolistically competitiie sector large enough to ensure that given the 
demand and cost conditions in the industry, all firms will be making positive 
profits. The discount rate is set at 0.925 as in Pakes and McGuire (1995). The 
depreciation rate is 0.7 such that innovations become obsolete after approximately 
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1.5 years after they were developed. After this time, the innovation will still have 
an effect on the firm's marginal costs through its contribution to the public stock 
of knowledge. Hov6 ever, this knowledge is common to all firms in the industry and 
it does not affect their relative positions and hence their profits. While mco leaves 
profits unaffected, the quantity choice decreases with the scalar on maxginal costs. 
Thus, the rate of growth of total output produced in the industry is determined 
by the rate of decay of marginal costs, which stems from the improvements in the 
public stock of knowledge. 
Firms' profitability depends only on their efficiency level and the overall effi- 
ciency index, which they take as given due to the assumption of aggregate price 
taldng behaviour. The impact of each further innovation in decreasing a firm's 
marginal costs is determined by y, which is set to 0.3. The elasticity of substi- 
tution is set to -2.0 such that the condition for the existence of a steady state 
solution to the R&D program., as stated in proposition 1, is satisfied. The unit 
cost of R&D investment is set to one and a half units of the numeraire. 
The solution methodology involves the simulation of the evolution of the mar- 
ket structure for 100,000 periods, given the initial condition or initial market 
structure, the optimal policy functions previously computed by the numerical al- 
gorithm and a random number generator. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the profits 
and firm! s value associated with each efficiency level given the long-run efficiency 
index. Figure 4.2 shows how profits evolve in a concave manner with the effi- 
ciency level, such that the incentives to improve the index of success decrease as 
the firm becomes more efficient. Figure 4.3 illustrates how firm value changes 
with the efficiency level. The concavity of the value function implies that firms 
at lower levels of efficiency will invest in R&D more heavily because their incre- 
mental value from developing an innovation is higher. Firms at the maximum 
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efficiency level will not be engaging in any R&D investment. It is precisely this 
concavity of the N-alue function that ensures the existence of a solution to the 
dynamic problem. If this condition fails to hold, which happens when the con- 
dition in proposition 1 is not met, the state of the industry explodes. Given the 
probability 3a firm faces of experiencing a depreciation in its efficiency level, and 
the small amount of R&D pursued at very high efficiency levels, there's a small 
probability that these firms will increase their index of success. 
The optimal solution for R&D investment, depicted in figure 4.4, reflects the 
firms' incentives emerging from the relationship between both profits and value 
and the efficiency level. Ile highest level of investment is undertaken by the 
smaller firms, who have more to gain from developing innovations, than larger 
firms. Firms at very high efficiency levels do not invest because they have little 
to gain from inno-oation. These results show that the endogenous solution for 
R&D investment ensures that the bound on the maximum efficiency level is not 
exceeded. 
The stochastic outcome associated with the R&D decision and the exogenous; 
shocks to the efficiency levels govem the evolution of the market 'structure in 
the industry. By simulating the model presented here, we generate a firm size 
distribution with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. We compare the results 
we obtain with the properties of real firm size distributions. Figure 4.5 shows the 
size distribution for British firms in terms of their capitalization, illustrating the 
conventional, empirically documented properties of firm size distribution, found 
for the majority of industries. The distribution of firm sizes is highly skewed, 
with most of the firms being very small, and only a few firms ever achieving very 
large sizes. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 that follow illustrate the firm size distribution in 
levels and in logs, respectively, generated by the model. 
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The model generates a firm size distribution with some degree of heterogene- 
ity, although the degree of heterogeneity and skewness amongst firms is far less 
than the one registered for actual firm size distributions. Similar results were 
found by Krusell and Smith (1998) for the distribution of income and wealth. 
They propose an extended version of the stochastic growth model with uncer- 
tain aggregate productivity shocks and idiosyncratic income shocks to include 
substantial heterogeneity in income and wealth and found it "to display far less 
cross-sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than the U. S. data. When 
the representative agent model is altered only by adding idiosyncratic, uninsur- 
able risk, the resulting stationary wealth distribution is quite unrealistic: there 
axe too few very poor agents and much too little concentration of wealth among 
the very richest". Our model also generates too few small firms compared with 
the size distributions found in most industries, and a smaller degree of asymmetry 
than expected. 
Nevertheless, we are able to generate a population of heterogeneous agents in 
the context of this micro-based model of firm choices. Reproducing precisely the 
moments of the firm size distribution is definitely a way to progress in this line 
of research. We believe that introducing further elements of heterogeneity, such 
as heterogeneity in firms' discount factors, would allow to better approximating 
actual firm size distributions. Introducing turbulence into the model by adding 
entry and exit, and having randomly drawn sunk costs and scrap values, might 
be another way of bringing this model closer to reality. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
There are very few macroeconomic models at present which include a rich rep- 
resentation of the micro structure. However, these issues axe of fundamental 
importance given the need to develop policy prescriptions that do not rely so 
heavily on representative agent abstraction. As Ericson and Pakes (1995) state, 
"there is a policy and descriptive need for such models", given the importance 
of heterogeneity in firms' responses to assess the implications of the aggregate 
market response to a given policy. 
The model presented here is a model of endogenous industry growth, which 
arises from a process of knowledge diffusion that takes place automatically every 
time a firm succeeds in developing a new innovation. The micro setup of this 
model is a rich one, where firms invest in R&D in order to improve their relative 
position in the market structure and the dynamics axe driven by the stochastic 
outcomes of firms' innovative activity. 
Purthermore, we propose a method of firm decision making where firms form 
rational expectations concerning the overall long run average state of the indus- 
try rather than weighting the probability of the industry being in all possible 
future market structures. Growth arises from aggregate productivity shocks on 
the maxginal costs conditions in the industry but, by leaving firm's profitability 
unchanged, these improvements have no effect on the optimal investment policy. 
Thus, we can treat the long run state index of the industry as constant even if the 
output produced in the industry is increasing over time. If the aggregate produc- 
tivity shock would affect the firms' profitability, and consequently firms' optimal 
R&D program, we would not be able to solve for the equilibrium policy function 
for this model. This framework, contrary to most of the methodology proposed 
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for solving dynamic models with multi-agent heterogeneity, does not Buffer from 
the curse of dimensionality and can be solved for very high efficiency levels and 
for a large number of firms. Having price taldng firms form expectations on the 
long run average industry state is an elegant and simplifying manner to overcome 
dimensionality problems, and the model allows for that while still being compat- 
ible with a growth process arising from changes in the aggregate conditions in 
the industry. After simulating the model for an industry with a large number 
of firms, we show that we axe able to generate a firm size distribution with a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity. 
9 %3j 
Table 4.1: Parameter Values 
Productivity of R&D Investment a 1.5 
Discount Factor 
ja 
0.925 
Probability of Exogenous Depreciation 0.7 
Unit Cost of R&D Investment c 1.5 
Rate of Marginal Cost Reduction from efficiency level y 0.3 
Rate of Marginal Cost Reduction from Public Knowledge 'Y 5.10-6 
Fixed Costs of Production fc 3 
Budget Share for Monopolistically Competitive Sector 2000 
Elasticity of Demand 6 -2.0 
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Figure 4.1: The Change in the Marginal Cost Curve with PS 
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Figure 4.2: Firm's Value as a function of the Efficiency Level 
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Figure 4.3: Investment as a function of the Efficiency Level 
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Figure 4.4: The Distribution of Firm Sizes for a Sample of British Firms 
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Figure 4.5: The Distribution of Employment 
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Figure 4.6: The Distribution of Ln Employment 
Firm Size Distribution (Logs) 
45 
40 
35 
>, '-M Q 2 -- 25 0 Z 
cr :0 0 
tz -. 5 
,. 0 
Ln Employment 
201 
4 14i (6 K :6 4s ý6, 
NNNN, N -5 0) -), (-ý vi '. 5 t. ) 
4.7 Appendix 
(Proff of proposition 1) 
7ri 
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The fist order conditon is positive: 
It -6-1)-l alrilaw = 11114(-C - 1)Wi t 't 
The second order condition: 
Wi 
The condition to ensure the concativity of the profit function: 
p(-e-1)-1 <0 
-11(c + 1) 
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Chapter 5 
Final Remarks 
Throughout this thesis, we built on the Maxkov Perfect Dynamic Industry frame- 
work proposed by Ericson and Pakes (1995) to explore various dimensions of the 
dynamic strategic interaction between the active firms in an industry. We model 
an industry where firms differ in their efficiency level, which reflects the cumu- 
lative outcome of their innovation path, and determines their marginal costs of 
production. Firms invest in R&D in order to enhance the likelihood of devel- 
oping a cost reducing innovation, and lowering their unit costs of production. 
The m ginal cost each firm faces conditions its competitiveness in the product 
maxket, where firms engage in repeated competition. Profits axe maximised in 
each period of time conditional on the firm's current maxginal cost relative to 
that of its rivals. It's the relative positions in the industry that determine the 
spot Mt profits, not the absolute level of marginal costs. Firms axe hetero- 
geneous with respect to their efficiency levels, and thus are subject to different 
incentives to engage in R&D, which will generate heterogeneity in R&D efforts 
across firms. Within this framework, we studied how industry characteristics axe 
correlated with the higher moments of the firm size distribution. These issues 
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are manifestly important given the empirical evidence revealing cross industry 
differences in the statistical properties of the firm size distribution. It is our 
belief that the investigation carried out in this thesis represents a contribution 
to the understanding of the relationship between several industry characteristics 
(such as fixed costs, sunk costs of entry, the rate of technological progress, the 
productivity of R&D and the rate of technological spillovers) and the degree of 
concentration in the industry. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to pro- 
pose a theoretical model able to explain the disparity on firm asymmetry across 
industries. Ebrthermore, the framework proposed is micro based, i. e., it explains 
cross industry differences in the firm size distribution based on the outcome of 
rational firms' optimizing behaviour with respect to R&D investment, in an envi- 
ronment that is a good approximation for the market turbulence in which firms 
carry out their activity. We found that the model reasonably matches the real 
industry databoth in terms of the statistical properties of the firm size distri- 
bution and in terms of cross sectional empirics. After validating the model for 
the task at hand, we analysed how the moments of firm size distribution change 
with industry characteristics identified as relevant in the literature. Our model 
predicts that industries with high fixed costs and higher technological growth are 
likely to have a higher mean size of firms, because they reduce the mass of small 
firms in the industry. By increasing the mass of medium sized firms and reducing 
the frequency of smaller firms, fixed costs flatten and lengthen the tail on the left 
side, reducing the skewness. With respect to the degree of technological progress 
in the industry we found that the higher the cost reduction in the industry the 
higher the incentives to invest in order to enhance the efficiency in the product 
market relative to the other players as well as defending their existing positions. 
Thus, rapid growth should lead to a high variance and a flatter distribution. 
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Analogously to fixed costs, sunk costs also reduce the mass of small firms, but 
their impact is rather at the level of potential entry, due to its discouraging effect 
of reducing the expected discounted value of entry. Industries with higher sunk 
costs will exhibit greater average firm size, higher variance in size but a flatter 
distribution with multiple modes. Similarly to the empirical results of Audrestch 
et. al. (2004), we also found that industries where entry is less costly will more 
nearly match the log normal distribution and the strong form of Gibrat's Law, 
and this is particularly true in industries less capital intensive and where scale 
economies play less of a role. Increases in the productivity of R&D increase the 
mass of firms to the right of the peak of the distribution, therefore increasing 
the mean size of firms, but, similarly to the effects of technological progress, we 
should not expect the productivity of R. &D to have clear monotonic effects on the 
higher moments of the firm size. distribution. Concerning the rate of spillovers, 
we found tat industries where incumbents can protect their advantages through 
secrecy, patent protection and/or lead time will have a higher mean and vaxiance 
in the size of firms, because the higher the appropriability of an innovation, the 
higher its value to the firm and the higher the incentives to invest. The impact of 
the rate of spillovers on the skewness and kurtosis axe highly non-monotonic and 
depict no discernible pattern, which prevents us from drawing any conclusions 
regarding the effects of this structural parameter on the higher moments of the 
firm size distribution. 
Avenue for future work would be to examine empirically the hypotheses gener- 
ated by the theoretical model. This exercise would most certainly deliver orienta, 
tion for further refinements to the model. Applications of the model to particular 
industries by calibration of the parameter set would provide an excellent frame- 
work for analysing the effects of policies, such as R&D subsidization or changes 
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in entry regulation, on the firm size distribution. 
This thesis also investigated the impact of knowledge externalities on firms' 
incentives to perform R&D. We extended the E-P (1995) dynamic industry frame- 
work to allow for the fact that the R&D investment each firm pursues adds into a 
public stock of knowledge that improves the knowledge conditions in the industry. 
We showed that the lack of appropriability has an unambiguous negative effect 
on the amount of R&D undertaken in the industry. That does not imply, how- 
ever, that the rate of innovation in the industry falls given that, with knowledge 
spillovers, the same level of R&D spending delivers a higher innovation rate than 
under full. appropriability since firms also benefit from the external pool of R&D. 
Upon simulating the model, we found that when R&D spillovers axe costlessly 
absorbed, the rate of innovation actually decreases with respect to the case of full 
appropriability due to the strategic effect of R&D spillovers. Firms combine own 
R&D investment and the external knowledge available in the industry in order 
to achieve the optimal rate of innovation, and take advantage of the scope for 
cost saving in R&D spending that follows from R&D spillovers. The fact that 
each firm anticipates that the rival will free ride on its own investment leads to a 
further decrease in the level of its R&D expenditure. Due to this strategic effect, 
the rate of innovation in the industry will decay, and this will translate into lower 
consumer welfare. The level of concentration in the industry initially decreases 
as the gap between the leader and the follower falls but for higher degrees of 
spillovers this gap starts widening up and concentration starts increasing. Over- 
all, we found the effect of costless spillovers on concentration to be non-monotonic 
and not very strong, even if there is a clear change in the ergodic distribution of 
market structures. 
By comparing these results, obtained under the assumption of public knowl- 
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edge being a pure public good, with those obtained under the assumption that 
firms that have their own R&D are better at making use of outside knowledge, we 
find that the Schumpeterian relationship between appropriability and innovation 
does not hold in the context of this stochastic dynamic industry environment. 
These results are in line with those obtained by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) in 
the context of a static model, and which they support in another paper with 
a review of the empirical evidence, Cohen and Levinthal (1990). In fact, when 
imposing the requirement of research effort for assimilating external R&D, the 
productivity of R&D increases because besides increasing the rate of innovation 
by adding a further unit to the level of own R&D, it also improves the amount 
of external R&D devoted to innovation. As a result, the increased incentive for 
R&D investment that follows from the increase in the productivity of R&D com- 
pensates for the disincentive to invest that arises from the free riding effect. We 
also found, in our duopoly model, that the follower firm experiences an improve- 
ment in its position relative to the leader, which implies that its value increases 
and that the level of concentration in the industry decreases. 
This framework can be brought closer to reality by introducing entry and e--dt 
in the model and by expanding the number of firms interacting in the industry. 
Allowing for the R&D externalities to affect the entry decision of potential com- 
petitors reinforces the strategic effect of R&D spillovers and may offset the welfare 
gains that arise in the absorptive capacity case. Another way of pursuing further 
this line of researchwould be to analyse the robustness of the results to different 
assumptions concerning the creation of absorptive -capacity. An example would 
be to analyse the impact of R&D sPillovers when the firm's absorptive capacity 
is path dependent, e. g. a fimction of R&D stock rathei than R&D flow, or as 
a function of the firm's past successes, i. e., the firm's Stock of innovations. The 
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contestability of the leader's position in this scenario would be lower, and the 
incentives to invest by the follower firm would decrease. 
In chapter 4, we propose a framework to approximate an industry with several 
firms. We move away from the oligopolistic setting by assuming that there axe 
many heterogeneous firms, each firm being too small to have a strategic effect 
on its rivals' choices. In the original EP framework, the oligopolistic maxket 
structure follows an ergodic stochastic process and settles down into some re- 
current pattern, but with a limited number of firms. At each moment in time, 
decisions concerning R&D investment are made taking into account the firm's 
perceptions concerning the probability associated with each rival's outcome. In 
the model proposed here, by having many firms simultaneously active where each 
firm is too small to have a strategic effect on its competitors' decision, firms do 
not form perceptions concerning the probability outcomes for each of its rivals, 
they rather only care about the long run average industry state. We are therefore 
able to overcome the "curse of dimensionality", and solve the stochastic dynamic 
industry game with many heterogeneous agents. We developed an algorithm and 
code to find the optimal policy functions for the model presented, and simulated 
the mt structure for a given set of parameters for 100.000 periods of time. 
We plotted the simulated data in size bins and showed that the model is able to 
deliver a firm size distribution with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. This 
inodel also accounts for productivity growth, maintaining the tractability of the 
solution methodology. We concluded, however, that in order to approximate the 
firm size distribution to that obtained with real industry data, there should be 
1nore heterogeneity across firms. 
This framework is a first step and can be improved in many ways. Intro- 
ducing selection would enrich the model, and bring it closer to reality by adding 
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turbulence to the environment. Furthermore, entry and exit win most likely in- 
crease the mass of smaU firms in the industry, thus increasing the skewness of the 
distribution. Further improvements would involve introducing more elements of 
heterogeneity amongst firms, such as firm specific randomly drawn scrap values 
and/or time discount factors. 
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